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1.1.1 Cryptography with Mutually Distrusting Parties
Cryptology began as the art of designing and breaking ciphers that allow
two parties to communicate in such a way that an outsider who observes the
messages does not learn the actual content. During the second half of the 20th
century, cryptology has changed significantly: it became more rigorous and
scientific, and also expanded its scope.
Replacing mechanical with digital ciphers made it possible to create much
stronger encryption schemes. Also, entirely new concepts of encryption were
introduced: While previous encryption schemes all required both parties to
have the same secret key, public-key cryptography makes it possible to generate
a key pair consisting of a public key and a private key so that messages can be
encrypted using the public key but decrypted only with the private key. Thus,
the receiver can safely publish the public key and receive encrypted messages
from anyone.
In traditional cryptographic applications, we want to protect two commu-
nicating parties from outside attackers. However, modern cryptography also
considers situations where mutually distrusting parties want to cooperate in
a secure way, meaning that no party needs to disclose more information than
strictly necessary and that each party is protected if the other one turns out
to be dishonest. A classic example is the Millionaires’ Problem where two
millionaires want to know who is richer, without disclosing any additional
information about their wealth to the other one. Situations like this are con-
sidered in multi-party computation where n players each hold one input xi to a
function f and want to compute f(x1, . . . , xn) so that the other parties do not
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Another example of such a situation is a so-called coin-flipping protocol,
i.e., a protocol between two parties, called Alice and Bob, that generates a
uniformly random bit b which is output to both of them. A coin-flipping
protocol needs to ensure that neither party can bias the “coin”: if one party
is dishonest and deviates from the protocol, the output distribution for the
honest party must still be a uniformly random bit.
If we can ensure that both parties send their messages simultaneously,
this problem is easy to solve: each of them sends a uniformly random bit to
the other and then outputs the XOR of the bit they sent and the one they
received. The output will then be a uniformly random bit, as long as at
least one party is honest. However, if we cannot ensure that the messages are
sent simultaneously, this protocol is not secure. Suppose that Bob receives
Alice’s message before sending his own. If he is dishonest, he can then choose
his bit depending on the one he received from Alice and enforce any output
distribution he likes for the protocol.
In both of the applications that we discussed so far, all participants have
the same security concerns. However, there are also applications where that
is not the case, such as zero-knowledge proofs: Suppose that one party (called
the prover) knows a satisfying assignment for a Boolean formula. In a zero-
knowledge proof system for the satisfiability problem, the prover wants to con-
vince another party (the verifier) that a formula is satisfiable, but he does not
want to reveal any further information (such as the satisfying assignment). The
verifier on the other hand wants to be certain that a dishonest prover cannot
deceive him about the satisfiability of the formula, but is not concerned with
the secrecy of the satisfying assignment.
Traditional cryptographic primitives, like encryption or message authenti-
cation, can still be useful in the context of mutually distrusting parties – for
example, multi-party computation protocols generally require that each par-
ticipant has a confidential and authenticated channel to each other participant.
However, on their own, these tools are not sufficient for building protocols for
coin-flipping, multi-party computation, or zero-knowledge proofs. New crypto-
graphic primitives were required to solve these problems. In the next section,
we introduce such a cryptographic primitive.
1.1.2 Commitment Schemes
A commitment scheme is a cryptographic primitive which was first formally
defined in 1988 by Gilles Brassard, David Chaum and Claude Crépeau in
order to build a zero-knowledge protocol for proving that a Boolean formula
has a satisfying assignment [BCC88]. Since determining the decidability of a
Boolean formula is an NP-complete problem, this also shows that there are
zero-knowledge protocols for all problems in the complexity class NP. However,
the general idea of bit commitments has already been used in the early 80s
in work on coin-flipping protocols and similar applications [SRA81, Blu82,
529291-L-bw-Fillinger
Processed on: 27-2-2019 PDF page: 7
1.1. BACKGROUND 3
EGL83].
A commitment scheme allows a prover to select an element s of a publicly
known set D so that he can later reveal it to another party, called the verifier,
in such a way that the verifier can be certain that the revealed value is the
same as the originally selected one. If D is the set {0, 1} we speak of a bit-
commitment scheme. If we want to emphasize that a commitment scheme
has a larger domain, we call it a string-commitment scheme (even when the
elements of D are not actually strings). If the domain has size (at least) 2n,
we call the commitment scheme an n-bit string commitment scheme.
More formally, a commitment scheme consists of two interactive protocols
between the prover and the verifier, called the commit phase and opening
phase. The commit phase takes as input an element s ∈ D from the prover
and no input from the verifier. It outputs some state information to the two
parties. The verifier’s state is commonly called the commitment to s. The
opening phase takes the state information of the prover and verifier as input,
and outputs an element s′ ∈ D or the failure symbol ⊥ to the verifier; we say
that the prover opened the commitment to s′, or if the output is ⊥, that he
failed to open the commitment. The opening phase is often non-interactive in
the sense that the prover sends some opening information to the verifier who
then determines the output by local computation.
A basic requirement of a commitment scheme is that if both parties follow
the protocols, the input s to the commit phase and the output s′ of the opening
phase are identical. This property is called completeness. Informally, the
security requirements for a commitment scheme are as follows:
• The hiding property: by the execution of the commit phase, the verifier
does not learn the prover’s input s. In particular, this holds even if the
verifier is dishonest and deviates from the commit protocol in arbitrary
ways.
• The binding property: after the commit phase has been executed, there
is at most one element s′ ∈ D that the prover can open to in the opening
phase. This holds even if the prover is dishonest and deviates from the
protocols in arbitrary ways.
To see how bit-commitment schemes can be used for coin-flipping, consider
the following protocol, which does not require that the parties send their mes-
sages simultaneously: First, Alice samples a random bit and commits to it.
Then, Bob samples a random bit and sends it to Alice. Finally, Alice opens
the commitment and both parties output the XOR of the two random bits. In
this protocol, the hiding property of the commitment scheme ensures that Bob
does not know Alice’s bit before sending his bit. The binding property ensures
that Alice can not choose her bit after learning Bob’s: after the commit phase,
there is at most one value she can open to.
There remains one subtle issue: how should the case where Alice fails to
open the commitment be handled? After Alice receives the bit from Bob, she
529291-L-bw-Fillinger
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knows what the outcome of the coin flipping protocol will be, but Bob does not.
A dishonest Alice could thus decide whether or not to open the commitment
depending on the outcome. If one outcome of the coin-flipping protocol is
considered favorable for Alice, and the other unfavorable, it makes sense to
stipulate that the protocol outputs the unfavorable outcome in that case. But
then, the protocol only implements weak coin-flipping, meaning that dishonest
parties can bias the output distribution, but only towards the outcome that is
unfavorable for them.
1.1.3 Capabilities of Adversaries
Rigorous security claims of cryptographic schemes always require some model
that specifies the capabilities and limitations of the honest parties and of the
adversaries. Most commonly, the honest parties and adversaries are modeled
as Turing machines that are limited to efficient computations. Efficiency here
is understood asymptotically: algorithms and protocols are parametrized by
a security parameter n, and the running time for the honest parties must be
polynomial in n, while the adversaries must not be able to break the scheme in
time polynomial in n. Security proofs in this model typically use computational
hardness assumptions, i.e., assumptions that certain computational problems,
such as factoring large integers, can not be solved efficiently. We then speak
of computational security. No such assumptions have been proven.
The security of cryptographic primitives that are relied on in practice is
typically based on problems that have been studied for a long time, without
an efficient solution being discovered. This is considered empirical evidence
that the problem in fact does not have an efficient solution.
The security of many popular cryptosystems (e.g., RSA and the Diffie-
Hellman Key Exchange) is based on problems that are believed to have no
efficient solution in the Turning machine model, but do have an efficient so-
lution on a quantum computer [Sho97]. Since quantum computers might be-
come practical in the near future, there is a lot of interest in quantum-safe
(also called post-quantum) cryptosystems which are hard to break even with a
quantum computer, but can be executed on classical computers. Formally, one
would then model the honest parties as Turing machines and the adversary as
a family of quantum circuits with a polynomial number of gates.
In the information-theoretic model, we remove the efficiency requirement
from the adversary – we say that the adversary is computationally unbounded.
For example, an encryption scheme would only be considered secure in the
information-theoretic model if the adversary cannot recover any amount of
information about the message, even given unlimited time.1 In other words,
the plaintext is (almost) statistically independent of the information that the
adversary has. If a scheme is proven to be secure in the information-theoretic
1One can also relax this requirement and allow the adversary to obtain a very small
amount of information.
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model, it is secure against adversaries with unlimited computing power. We
also call such schemes unconditionally secure.
Most schemes that are used in practice are not unconditionally secure. For
example, if we consider a symmetric cipher with an n-bit key, a computa-
tionally unbounded adversary could decrypt a given ciphertext under every
possible key. He then knows that one of the 2n outputs must be the original
plaintext. If the size of the plaintext space is greater than 2n, this gives the
adversary a significant amount of information. Furthermore, if the plaintext is
known to be, e.g., English text, the adversary is likely able to rule out all but
one of the candidate keys. Unconditionally secure encryption is only possible
if the key has at least as much entropy as the message, as Claude Shannon
proved in 1949 [Sha49].
Note that up to now, we discussed the standard model where the partici-
pants in the scheme or protocol can only communicate classical information
via a completely unsecured channel. More results can be achieved if the hon-
est parties have access to additional resources. An example is Quantum Key
Distribution (QKD), introduced by Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard in
1984 [BB84]. It allows two parties to securely establish a shared random key
using an authenticated classical channel and a completely insecure channel
for quantum information. The generated key can then be used for a classi-
cal information-theoretically secure encryption scheme like the One-time Pad.
QKD offers information-theoretic security beyond the Shannon bound, but it
requires that the honest parties are able to produce, transmit, and measure
quantum states, e.g., in the form of polarized photons.2
As another example, if two parties can communicate via a noisy channel,
they can also transmit messages securely, as Aaron Wyner proved in [Wyn75].
The noisy channel here is modeled as a channel that flips every bit that is sent
with a known probability ε and leaves it unchanged otherwise. In particular,
if an adversary taps the channel, the bits he receives are flipped with the same
probability, but independently of the bits received by the intended recipient.
Cryptographic primitives that are useful for cryptography with mutually dis-
trusting parties, like oblivious transfer, can be implemented as well using a
noisy channel [CK88].
One can also impose non-computational restrictions on the adversary, such
as limited classical memory [CM97, CCM98], or limited or noisy quantum
memory [DFSS05, WCSL10]. Storing quantum information is a difficult prob-
lem, and thus schemes where an adversary needs to store large amounts of
quantum information while the honest parties can measure the quantum states
as they arrive are of interest. A different kind of restriction is to split the prover
into two separate parties and restrict the communication between them. We
discuss this in more detail in Section 1.2.2.
2Note that QKD does not require the honest parties to have a quantum computer or
quantum memory. A channel for transmitting quantum information suffices.
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1.2 Two-Prover Commitment Schemes
1.2.1 (In)security of Commitment Schemes
The existence of commitment schemes in the computational model follows
from very week assumptions: if a pseudo-random generator3 exists, then there
exists a commitment scheme that is both hiding and binding [Nao91]. The
existence of pseudo-random generators has not been proven, although there
are many candidates in both theory and practice. But if they do not exist,
then there are no secure cryptographic schemes in the computational model
[IL89].4 Or conversely, if computational cryptography is at all possible, then
commitment schemes exist.
Let us now consider commitment schemes in the information-theoretic
model, typically referred to as unconditionally secure commitment schemes.
It is well known that in the standard communication model, bit-commitment
schemes can not be both unconditionally hiding and unconditionally bind-
ing. Consider a bit-commitment scheme that is unconditionally binding. It is
easy to see that a computationally unbounded dishonest verifier can break the
hiding property as follows.
First, both parties execute the commit phase, which outputs state informa-
tion stateP and stateV to the prover and verifier, respectively. If the opening
phase is executed with inputs stateP and stateV , the output is the bit b that
the prover committed to. The binding property requires that the prover can
open to at most one bit, so if stateP is replaced with a different input, the
output will be either ⊥ or b (except possibly with some small probability).
A computationally unbounded verifier can simulate the opening phase for ev-
ery possible value of stateP , and thus determine the bit b that the prover
committed to.
Since unconditionally secure bit-commitment is impossible in the standard
communication model, we have to move to a different one. There was some
hope that unconditionally secure bit-commitment schemes could be achieved
using quantum communication, but eventually, an impossibility result was
proved also in that setting [May97, LC97]. If the dishonest players have
bounded memory [CCM98], then unconditionally secure bit-commitment is
possible.5 The same holds in the bounded quantum storage model where adver-
saries have unlimited classical memory, but only a limited amount of quantum
memory [DFSS05].
3A function that maps a short string of random bits to a longer string so that the longer
string cannot be distinguished from a truly random string in polynomial time.
4The cited paper argues that computational cryptography cannot exist if there are no
one-way functions; it is possible to implement a pseudo-random generator with one-way
functions.
5The topic of the cited paper is not bit-commitment, but a different cryptographic prim-
itive called oblivious transfer. However, bit-commitment schemes can be implemented using
oblivious transfer.
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1.2.2 Adding a Second Prover
Another way to circumvent the impossibility result is to split up the prover
into two entities that are assumed to be unable to communicate with each
other. This so-called two-prover setting was introduced by Michael Ben-Or,
Shafrira Goldwasser, Joe Kilian and Avi Wigderson [BGKW88]. The provers
can communicate before the start of the commit phase to generate shared
randomness, and, if they are dishonest, agree on a cheating strategy, but from
the start of the commit phase until the end of the opening phase, they cannot
communicate.
As an example for a scheme in this model, we consider a scheme that
was introduced by Jean-Raymond Simard in [Sim07] and further explored by
Claude Crépeau, Louis Salvail, Simard and Alain Tapp in [CSST11]. This
scheme will also play an important role in the remainder of this thesis. We
call this scheme CHSHq where q is a prime power. It works as follows: Let
b be the bit that the provers want to commit to and r a uniformly random
element of the finite field Fq that the provers agree on as shared randomness
before the execution of the commit phase. In the commit phase, the verifier
V sends a uniformly random element a of the finite field Fq to the first prover
P , who sends back x = a · b + r. In the opening phase, the second prover Q
sends the bit b and y = r to V . Then, V outputs b if x − y = a · b, and the
failure symbol ⊥ otherwise.6
Let us verify that this scheme satisfies the properties that we want a com-
mitment scheme to have. The hiding property requires that a (possibly dis-
honest) verifier can learn nothing about the committed bit before the opening
phase. The scheme is perfectly hiding because P ’s message x is always a uni-
formly random field element, independent of the value of b.
Completeness requires that if all parties are honest, the verifier opens to
the bit that the provers committed to. It is easy to see that this requirement
is satisfied.
The binding property requires that even dishonest provers can open to at
most one value. Let a and x be the messages exchanged between V and P in
the commit phase. Since we consider dishonest provers, x does not have to
be computed as specified in the protocol – in fact, the dishonest provers do
not need to have any specific bit b in mind while executing the commit phase.
The following argument works for any value of x and makes no assumptions on
how it is computed. If Q wants to open to b = 0, he needs to send b = 0 and
y = x to V ; if he wants to open to b = 1, he needs to send b = 1 and y = x−a.
Thus, if Q can open to both bits, it follows that he knows a. But a was sent
only to P , and by assumption, P and Q cannot communicate. Therefore, Q
can only open to both bits if he correctly guesses a. This happens only with
6This version of CHSHq differs slightly from the version we use later on, where Q does
not send the bit b. In that case, V has to check whether the equation x− y = a · b holds for
b = 0 or b = 1.
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8 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
probability q−1.
We emphasize that CHSHq as described above and as analyzed in previous
work is a bit-commitment scheme, but it can be naturally extended to a string-
commitment scheme by letting b be an arbitrary element of Fq. This extension
has been used as part of a larger protocol in [LKB+15], but prior to our work in
[FF16], it has not been analyzed as a stand-alone string-commitment scheme.
Analyzing it as a string commitment scheme turns out to be somewhat
subtle: for instance, it is not clear a priori what the right formal definition
of the binding property is for a string-commitment scheme in the two-prover
setting. This thesis will answer those kinds of questions.
1.2.3 Capabilities of the Provers
As discussed above, the security of CHSHq relies on the assumption that
the provers cannot communicate. However, it turns out that what this pre-
cisely means is more subtle than the previous section makes it appear. As in
[BGKW88], we implicitly assumed in the argument above that the only type
of information that the provers can share before the commit phase is classical
information. However, as pointed out in [Sim07, CSST11], the argument falls
apart when we consider provers that share an entangled quantum state. The
reason for that is non-locality, one of the counterintuitive properties of quan-
tum mechanics, which is studied by means of Bell inequalities and non-local
games [EPR35, Bel64, CHSH69].
Formally, the point where the argument from the previous section fails
in the quantum case is the part where we conclude that a prover who can
choose to output either x or x − a must also know a. This does not follow
in the quantum case. It is generally not possible to measure (i.e., extract
information from) a quantum state without irreversibly changing the state. If
Q could produce y = x using one measurement and y = x − a using another
measurement, then he could open to any bit he likes, but it does not follow
that he could produce both x and x− a at the same time. Hence, it does not
follow that he knows a.
[CSST11] shows that CHSH2
n
is secure in the quantum case. On the
other hand, the same paper also shows that a slight variation of this scheme
is secure only against classical adversaries: an error-tolerant version where
V only checks that 85% of the bits in x and y or x and y + a are equal is
secure against classical adversaries, but completely insecure against quantum
adversaries. This is a consequence of the fact that players with an entangled
quantum state can win the non-local game known as the CHSH game with
probability ≈ 0.85 (see Section 5.2.4). This connection with the CHSH game
is the reason why we refer to the commitment scheme as CHSHq.
Thus, the seemingly sole assumption that the provers cannot communi-
cate during the execution of the protocol is actually underspecified. To truly
base security only on the no-communication assumption, one needs to consider
529291-L-bw-Fillinger
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general non-signaling adversaries, i.e., adversaries that are equipped with a hy-
pothetical resource that allows them to correlate their behavior in arbitrary
ways as long as no communication is implied. Such hypothetical resources are
known as non-local boxes.
1.3 Relativistic Cryptography
1.3.1 Enforcing the No-Communication Assumption
There are two-prover commitment schemes that are secure if the two provers
cannot communicate and can correlate their behavior only through shared
randomness or entangled quantum states. This leaves open the question of how
one might actually prevent the provers from communicating. In relativistic
commitment schemes, we exploit the fact that information does not travel
faster than light, and thus, messages from one prover to the other arrive only
with some delay.
In [BC96], Gilles Brassard and Claude Crépeau briefly discuss the idea,
communicated by Louis Salvail, of applying special relativity to two-prover
bit-commitment schemes that rely on the no-communication assumption, as
described in Section 1.2.2. If the provers are n light-seconds apart, the laws
of physics ensure that the commitment is binding, but only for a limited time:
The commitment will “live” for n seconds, starting when the first message
from the verifier arrives at a prover. If the provers open within this time-
span, the verifier can be assured that the provers can open to at most one
value, since the no-communication assumption is guaranteed by the fact that
information can not be transmitted faster than the speed of light. If the
commitment is not opened within this time-span, it is possible that the provers
have communicated with each other. Thus, they might be able to open to
multiple values.
Adrian Kent introduced the concept of relativistic commitment schemes
that can remain binding indefinitely as long as the provers can only commu-
nicate with some delay [Ken99, Ken05]. This is achieved by introducing an
additional sustain phase between the commit and opening phase. During this
phase, additional communication between the verifier and the provers takes
place that is meant to ensure that the commitment remains binding. The
hiding property should still apply during this phase.
1.3.2 Previous and Related Work
The first relativistic commitment scheme was introduced by Kent in [Ken99].
He argues that the scheme is secure against classical adversaries, and he reasons
that dishonest provers with quantum capabilities can not break the commit-
ment scheme on its own, but might gain an advantage if it is part of a larger
protocol.
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A major issue with Kent’s original scheme is that the length of the mes-
sages that need to be communicated in each round of the sustain phase grows
exponentially in the number of rounds. Furthermore, the security arguments
are rather informal and not in terms of rigorous definitions. As such, it cannot
be considered a mathematical security proof. However, his work demonstrated
that it is possible, or at least plausible, to base the security of a commitment
scheme on the fact that information does not travel faster than light and thus
laid the foundation for subsequent work in this area.
In [Ken05], he introduced an improved scheme where the same number of
bits is communicated in every round. Additionally, the security proofs are more
formal, using the sum-binding definition (see Definition 2.14). However, the
results are mostly of an asymptotic nature and clearly not practical, although
some concrete parameter choices are also discussed.
Kent also considered commitment schemes that involve quantum communi-
cation. Concretely, he presented a scheme where the players transmit quantum
states instead of classical bits [Ken11], and a scheme where the verifier sends
a quantum state to the provers, and the provers return classical bits [Ken12].
These schemes do not require a sustain phase. Furthermore, the former one
requires only one prover and one verifier. The latter requires a prover that is
split into three agents.
A security proof for the latter scheme was later published in a joint work
of Sarah Croke and Kent [CK12]. See [KTHW13] for an alternative proof.
This scheme was implemented in 2013 by Tomaso Lunghi, Jędrzej Kaniewski,
Felix Bussières, Raphael Houlmann, Marco Tomamichel, Adrian Kent, Nicolas
Gisin, Stephanie Wehner and Hugo Zbinden [LKB+13, Kan15].
In later work [Ken13], Kent isolated the “game” whose hardness underlies
the security of the quantum bit-commitment schemes. In the summoning
problem, Alice gives a quantum state to Bob. The description of the state
is known to her, but not to Bob. She will later ask Bob to “summon” it to
some point. For simplicity, one may assume that she fixes two points P0 and
P1 that are known to Bob, and selects one of them uniformly at random.
After receiving Alice’s summoning request, Bob has a short amount of time to
produce a quantum state at this point that Alice can not distinguish from her
original state.
Kent shows that this task is (in general) impossible by combining the no-
cloning theorem [Par70, WZ82], which states that it is in general not possible
to create a perfect copy of quantum states, with special relativity: Bob cannot
send copies of the state to both locations due to the no-cloning theorem. But
if the two points are far enough apart, he cannot position the state in such
a way that he can always “summon” it to the point Alice chooses within the
time constraint. Further work on the summoning problem can be found in
[AK16, Ken18].
Deterministic quantum bit commitment schemes that do not rely on secret
randomness have been proposed by Emily Adlam and Kent [AK15a]. The se-
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curity proofs are based on relativity and monogamy of entanglement [CKW00].
For many quantum-cryptographic tasks, such as Quantum Key Distribu-
tion, device-independent protocols have been discovered [MY98]. In such pro-
tocols, the participants do not even need to trust the devices that carry out the
preparation and measurement of quantum states. Quantum bit-commitment
schemes with this property have been discovered as well [AK15b].
But there also has been progress for classical schemes: Lunghi, Kaniewski,
Bussières, Houlman, Tomamichel, Wehner and Zbinden proposed a new multi-
round commitment scheme where the honest parties communicate classically
[LKB+15]. They provided a rigorous, non-asymptotic, security analysis with
respect to the sum-binding definition. However, their analysis only guarantees
an error term that worsens double-exponentially in the number of rounds of
communication. Furthermore, their security proof only applies to classical
provers, i.e., provers with no quantum capabilities.
The fact that information does not travel faster than light has also been
applied in related areas of cryptography: Roger Colbeck and Adrian Kent in-
troduced variable-bias coin-tossing schemes, where the probability distribution
of the outcome is secretly determined by one of the parties [CK06, Col06]. On
the other hand, Colbeck showed that unconditionally secure two-party com-
putation is not possible (for most functions) even with the combined power of
quantum information and relativity [Col06, Col07].
A relativistic quantum key distribution scheme has also been proposed
[RKKM14]. While QKD schemes like the one introduced by Charles Bennet
and Gilles Brassard [BB84] can be proven secure only on the basis of quantum
mechanics, implementations can often be broken due to imperfections in the
physical apparatus (see e.g. [LWW+10]). While not being device-independent,
the relativistic scheme has a higher tolerance for the type of imperfections that
occur in practice, and is more efficient than device-independent protocols.
A different conjectured application of relativity is position-based quantum
cryptography, also known as quantum tagging. Here, a prover wants to demon-
strate that he is at a specific location. This claim is checked by a set of verifiers
which are positioned at different points in space. The verifiers use the response
time of the prover to determine his position. However, just sending a nonce to
the prover and requiring him to send it back is insufficient: a group of adver-
saries could pretend to be a single prover at the correct position, even though
none of them are actually there. Therefore, techniques to prevent this attack
using quantum information have been studied.
The first position-based cryptography scheme, patented in 2006 [KMSB06],
was invented by Kent, William Munro, Timothy Spiller, and Raymond Beau-
soleil. Robert Malaney was the first to publish such a scheme in the scientific
literature in 2010 [Mal10a, Mal10b]. None of these schemes were proven se-
cure, and, in fact, were later broken: in 2011, Kent, Munro and Spiller pub-
lished a proof that all schemes proposed so far were insecure if the dishonest
provers have shared entanglement [KMS11]. Harry Buhrman, Nishanth Chan-
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dran, Serge Fehr, Ran Gelles, Vipul Goyal, Rafail Ostrovsky and Christian
Schaffner proved a general impossibility result: position-based cryptography
schemes cannot be secure if dishonest provers can have an unlimited amount of
pre-shared entanglement [BCF+11]. Further research in the field of position-
based cryptography aimed at finding a scheme where dishonest provers need
large amounts of pre-shared entanglement compared to the number of qubits
that the honest parties need to exchange.
1.4 Contributions of this Thesis
This thesis is based on the following publications and follow-up work:
• Serge Fehr and Max Fillinger. Multi-Prover Commitments Against Non-
Signaling Attacks. In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2015, part II,
pages 403-421.
Also presented at QCRYPT 2015 .
• Serge Fehr and Max Fillinger. On the Composition of Two-Prover Com-
mitments, and Applications to Multi-round Relativistic Commitments.
In Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2016, part II, pages 477-496.
An earlier version was presented at QCRYPT 2015. An extended version
is available at
https://arxiv.org/abs/1507.00240.
The author published two other papers during his PhD studies. These are
not featured in this thesis because they are about very different subjects and
would not allow for a coherent presentation. A full list of publications can be
found on page 109.
1.4.1 New Definitions for the Binding Property
Finding good security definitions is a crucial part of cryptography. A good
definition has to capture the intuitive notion of the desired security property
in a precise mathematical way. It should be as strong as possible, but it also
should be possible to prove that this definition can be met, or to reduce it to
standard hardness assumptions in the case of computational security.
In the case of two-prover commitment schemes, the main topic of this thesis,
the information-theoretic hiding property is straightforward to define: the
commitment that the verifier receives should be distributed independently of
the bit or string that the provers commit to. One can also relax this definition
somewhat by allowing the distributions to have some small statistical distance.
However, defining the information-theoretic binding property turns out
to be tricky: a somewhat accepted definition is the sum-binding property
(see Definition 2.14). This definition requires that, for any strategy that the
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dishonest provers may use, it holds that p0 + p1 ≤ 1 + 2ε, where pb is the
probability that the provers successfully open to b. However, this definition
suffers from several limitations. An immediately obvious limitation is that
this definition only applies to bit-commitment schemes, and there is some
ambiguity in how to extend it to string-commitment schemes. It also does not
fully capture the intuitive requirement of the binding property: Suppose that
a scheme rejects all opening attempts of dishonest provers with probability
1/2 and allows dishonest provers to open to an arbitrary bit with probability
1/2. This scheme then has a “perfect” parameter of ε = 0 (see Remark 3.13),
but the intuitive requirement that the provers should only be able to open a
commitment to at most one value is violated with probability 1/2. Finally, it
turns out that the sum-binding definition is inconvenient to work with, e.g., it
does not seem to compose well.
Contribution 1.1. We propose several new definitions for the binding prop-
erty of bit and string commitment schemes and analyze their relations with
each other and with the sum-binding definition.
These definitions overcome many of the shortcomings of the sum-binding
definition. They are applicable to bit and string commitment schemes, they
are closer to the intuitive definition that a commitment has only one bit or
string “inside” and they are more convenient to work with. Indeed, one of the
main results of this thesis crucially relies on the use of these new definitions.
Depending on the version of our definition, we end up with weaker or
stronger notions of the binding property. When we restrict the domain to one
bit, the weaker definition is equivalent to the sum-binding definition, while the
stronger definition is strictly stronger.
Our definitions also include relaxed versions, called fairly-binding, which
allow dishonest provers to open to a value other than the one they committed
to, but if they do, the resulting string will be random and out of their control.
This relaxation will play an important role later on.
Naturally, a new definition is only useful if there are schemes that actually
satisfy it:
Contribution 1.2. We show that for every binding property that we define,
there exists a variant of CHSHq that satisfies it. In particular, this is the
first time that the security of this scheme is analyzed as a string-commitment
scheme.
Recall that CHSHq is easily understood as a string-commitment scheme
when the bit b is replaced with an arbitrary field element. We show in Sec-
tion 3.2.6 that this scheme satisfies the fairly-binding property. This in turn
allows us to analyze the scheme from [LKB+15] using our composition the-
orem (see Section 1.4.2 and Chapter 4). Furthermore, if we change CHSHq
so that the second prover sends the string s that he wants to open to along
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with the opening information, it satisfies our stronger definition of the binding
property.
1.4.2 Composition Theorem for Multi-Round Schemes
Contribution 1.3. We prove a composition theorem for two-prover commit-
ment schemes: if a pair of two-prover commitment schemes S and S ′ satisfies
some mild requirements, they can be composed into a new secure commitment
scheme with delayed opening.
The composition works as follows: In the first round, the first prover com-
mits to some string s using S. In the second round, instead of sending the
opening information, the second prover commits to the opening information
using S ′. Then, the opening phase of S ′ is executed, the verifier learns the
opening information and uses it to open the commitment produced by S. Note
that the opening phase in S ′ can itself be multi-round, so this composition op-
eration can be applied iteratively.
Intuitively, one would expect such a composition to work. Committing
to the opening information before revealing it should not affect the security
of the commitment, as long as S ′ is secure. However, proving that this is
indeed the case turns out to be nontrivial. In particular, there seems to be no
straightforward way to prove this result using the sum-binding definition.
As we mentioned in Section 1.3.1, a two-prover commitment scheme that
is binding for non-communicating provers is binding for a limited time in the
relativistic setting, i.e., when the provers can only communicate with some
delay. By means of the above composition, it is possible to delay the opening
of the original commitment. Thus, the multi-round schemes that are generated
by the composition operation are binding in the relativistic setting, if the
rounds are timed correctly.
Using our new definitions of the binding property, we formally prove this
composition theorem. The failure probabilities of the component schemes add
up. That is, if the binding property in S fails with probability at most ε and
in S ′ with probability at most ε′, the composed scheme fails with probability
at most ε+ ε′.
Given that, the bit-commitment scheme presented in [LKB+15] can be
viewed as a composition of multiple instances of CHSHq. Contribution 1.3
gives us a means to analyze that scheme. Thus, we obtain the following result:
Contribution 1.4. The binding error of the Lunghiet al. relativistic com-
mitment scheme grows linearly in the number of rounds, instead of double-
exponentially, as previously proven in [LKB+15]. Furthermore, security holds
with respect to a stronger definition of the binding property instead of the
commonly-used sum-binding definition.
To put this difference in real-world terms: The authors of [LKB+15] im-
plemented their scheme with provers in Bern and Geneva (distance: 129.2
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km). Based on their analysis, they concluded that this commitment would
stay binding for at least 2 ms. Based on our analysis, this time can be scaled
up to 1056 years, or, speaking more practically, until the devices run out of
memory. Alternatively, one can also decrease the distance: Verbanis et al. ex-
ecuted the Lunghi et al. scheme for 24 hours across a distance of 7 km, based
on our security analysis [VMH+16].
Finally, we also show that our analysis of the scheme is essentially tight,
i.e., the binding error probability can not be better than linear in m.
1.4.3 Partial Progress towards Quantum Safety
So far, no multi-round relativistic commitment scheme has been proven to be
“post-quantum” or quantum-safe in the sense that honest parties are protected
against adversaries with quantum capabilities, while not having such capabil-
ities themselves. Our notion of quantum-safety is different from the one used
in computational cryptography: In the computational setting, quantum-safe
cryptography is concerned with adversaries that use a quantum computer. In
the information-theoretic setting, quantum computers are irrelevant because
the set of computable functions is the same for classical and quantum com-
puters. Quantum computers are believed to provide speedups for computing
some functions, e.g., factoring integers, but this makes no difference when we
consider computationally unbounded adversaries. However, when we impose
restrictions on the communication between adversaries, a different aspect of
quantum information becomes relevant: using quantum entanglement, the ad-
versaries can correlate their behavior in ways that are not possible with shared
randomness only.
The basic intuition of the composition theorem still applies. If we have two
commitment schemes that are binding for provers with shared entanglement,
then the composed scheme should be binding as well: the provers commit to
the opening information of the first scheme, so they can delay revealing it
without being able to change it. In Chapter 5, we show some partial progress
towards proving that the Lunghi et al. scheme is quantum safe.
The first hurdle for proving quantum-safety is that some of our new defini-
tions do not make sense for entangled adversaries, since they assume that the
provers can only use shared randomness.
Contribution 1.5. We provide quantum analogues for our new definitions
of the binding property and prove a composition theorem for these definitions
with respect to adversaries that have a shared entangled quantum state.
We define a quantum analogue for our stronger binding property and show
a composition theorem based on this definition. We also show that CHSHq
satisfies the weaker definition of the binding property against provers with
quantum capabilities.
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The proof of the composition theorem for the quantum case follows an ap-
proach that is slightly different from the composition theorem for the classical
case: In the classical case, we extend a multi-round scheme by prefixing it
with a one-round scheme. Both schemes are assumed to be binding according
to the same definition, and the composed scheme is binding according to that
definition as well.
In the quantum case, we start with a multi-round scheme that is bind-
ing according to the weaker definition and a one-round scheme that is bind-
ing according to the stronger one. The one-round scheme is appended to the
multi-round scheme. The composed scheme is binding according to the weaker
definition.
There remains one missing piece for actually proving that there is a multi-
round scheme which is binding in the quantum setting: we do not know if
CHSHq (or any other one-round scheme) also satisfies the stronger binding
property and thus, the question whether the composed scheme is binding for
provers with quantum capabilities is left open.
1.4.4 Impossibility of Two-Prover Commitments with Se-
curity against Non-Signaling Attacks
In Chapter 6, we leave the topic of relativistic commitment schemes and discuss
whether there are two-prover commitment schemes whose security depends
only on the assumption that the provers can not communicate. In the classical
and quantum case, we make assumptions about the physical laws that the
provers can use to correlate their behavior. To remove these assumptions,
we need to consider non-signaling provers. That is, we allow any input-output
behavior of the provers as long as it does not imply transmission of information.
An example of a non-signaling system is the NL-box (non-local box), also
known as the PR-box which was introduced by Sandu Popescu and Daniel
Rohrlich in [PR94]. Let p(x, y|a, b) be a conditional distribution where x, y,
a and b are bits. Suppose that the marginals p(x|a, b) and p(y|a, b) are both
uniformly random, but for any values of a and b, p(x ⊕ y = a · b|a, b) = 1.
Now consider two provers with joint access to a “black box” that samples this
distribution. The first prover supplies the input a and receives the output x.
The second prover supplies b and receives the output y. We assume that the
box immediately returns the output once the input is entered. It is impossible
for them to use this box to communicate with each other, since each prover
only sees a uniformly random bit, no matter what input the other prover has
entered. However, both provers know that the outputs they receive are always
correlated so that x⊕ y = a · b.
Implementing such a box appears to be physically impossible without the
two “halves” of it exchanging information. Using classical shared randomness,
such a box could at most achieve p(x ⊕ y = a · b|a, b) = 0.75. Quantum
entanglement increases this probability to ≈ 0.85 (see Section 5.2.4). But if
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we are not willing to make any assumptions about the laws of physics that
constrain them, we need to assume that the provers could use such a box.
Note that this box renders the CHSHq scheme non-binding: If the verifier’s
first message is a = a1 . . . an, the first prover puts each bit in an independent
copy of the box and receives x = x1 . . . xn as output. The second prover then
can open to b ∈ {0, 1} by inputting b to every copy. The output y = y1 . . . yn
then satisfies xi ⊕ yi = ai · b, so the provers can open to any bit they want.
This shows that CHSHq is insecure against general non-signaling provers.
This is related to the fact that the CHSH game, like all XOR games7, has non-
signaling value of 1, meaning that there is a non-signaling strategy for this
game that always wins. However, there exist two-player non-local games that
have a non-signaling value strictly lower than 1. For example, the Fortnow-
Feige-Lovász game [For98, FL92] has a non-signaling, quantum and classical
value of 2/3 (see Appendix A in [Hol09] for a proof). Thus, one might hope
that there is a commitment scheme that is secure against general non-signaling
provers. However, we show that this is not the case.
Contribution 1.6. We show that a two-prover commitment scheme that is
hiding can not be binding for general non-signaling provers.
If the scheme is perfectly hiding, then non-signaling dishonest provers can
perfectly emulate the behavior of honest provers. As an example, consider a
simple bit-commitment scheme where, in the commit phase, the verifier sends
a message a to the first prover who replies with a message x, and in the opening
phase, the second prover sends some opening information y to the verifier. The
verifier then computes his output as a function of a, x and y.
Let pb(x, y|a) be the distribution that describes the input-output behavior
of the honest provers when committing and opening to b ∈ {0, 1}. Then, if
the scheme is perfectly hiding, p(x, y|a, b) := pb(x, y|a) is a bi-partite non-
signaling distribution, where a is the input for P and b the input for Q. Thus,
it is possible for non-signalling provers to sample this distribution and exactly
replicate the input-output behavior of the honest provers. But unlike the
honest provers, they can choose the bit that they want to open to after the
commit phase, since b is an input for the second prover who is inactive in the
commit phase.
Furthermore, we show that if the scheme is close to perfectly hiding, there
is a bi-partite non-signaling distribution that is statistically close to the input-
output behavior of the honest provers. Thus, the dishonest provers can emulate
the honest provers almost perfectly in that case.
We prove similar results for more general schemes where both provers are
active in the commit and opening phase. Here, the proof is somewhat more
involved, because when we adapt the approach used in simple schemes to this
problem, the outcome is not a non-signaling distribution. We also investigate
7A XOR game is a two-player non-local game where the players output bits and the
outcome only depends on the exclusive-or of the players’ outputs.
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the case where the commit phase can consist of multiple rounds of commu-
nication. Here, we again show an impossibility result, but only for perfectly
hiding schemes.
We also present a positive result:
Contribution 1.7. We show the existence of a three-prover commitment
scheme that is perfectly hiding and at the same time binding for non-signalling
provers.
A scheme that achieves this property works as follows: Take the CHSHq
bit-commitment scheme and add a third prover that mimics the behavior of
the second prover in the opening phase. In the opening phase, the verifier
computes the output as usual from the messages of the first two provers, and
also checks if the second and third prover sent the same message. If that is
not the case, he outputs ⊥.
This construction is reminiscent of a result by Masanes, Acin and Gisin
[MAG06] which implies that for every two-player game G where the second
player has two possible inputs, there is a three-player game G′ whose non-
signaling value is the same as the classical value of G. That is, non-signaling
provers have the same chance of winning G′ as classical provers have of winning
G. The scheme G′ is constructed by having the first two players play G and
requiring that the third player produces the same output as the second player.
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A (finite) probability distribution is a function p : X → [0, 1], x 7→ p(x),
where X is a finite non-empty set such that
∑
x∈X p(x) = 1. For x◦ ∈ X , we
write p(x=x◦) instead of p(x◦). For any subset Λ ⊂ X , called an event, the




p(Λ) + p(Γ) = p(Λ ∪ Γ) + p(Λ ∩ Γ) ≤ 1 + p(Λ ∩ Γ) (2.1)
for all Λ,Γ ⊂ X , and, more generally, that
k∑
i=1
p(Λi) ≤ p(Λ1 ∪ . . . ∪ Λk) +
∑
i<j
p(Λi ∩ Λj) ≤ 1 +
∑
i<j
p(Λi ∩ Λj) (2.2)
for all Λ1, . . . ,Λk ⊂ X . For a distribution p : X ×Y → R on two variables and
a relation R on X × Y (e.g., x=y, x=f(y), x 6=y) the probability p(R(x, y))
is defined by
p(R(x, y)) = p
(







The marginals p(x) and p(y) are given by p(x) =
∑
y p(x, y) and p(y) =∑
x p(x, y), respectively. Vice versa, given two distributions p(x) and p(y), we
say that a distribution p(x, y) on two variables is a consistent joint distribution
if the two marginals of p(x, y) coincide with p(x) and p(y), respectively.
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Definition 2.1. Let p(x) and p(y) be two distributions over a common set X .






|p(x = x◦)− p(y = x◦)|
2.1.2 Some Basic Technical Results
We will make use of the following lemma regarding the existence of a consistent
joint distribution that maximizes the probability that x = y.
Lemma 2.2. Let p(x) and p(y) be two distributions on a common set X .
Then there exists a consistent joint distribution p(x, y) such that p(x = y =
x◦) = min{p(x=x◦), p(y=x◦)} for all choices of x◦ ∈ X . Additionally, p(x, y)
satisfies p(x, y|x 6= y) = p(x|x 6= y) · p(y|x 6= y).
Proof. We first extend the respective probability spaces given by the distribu-
tions p(x) and p(y) by introducing an event ∆ and declaring that
p(x=x◦ ∧∆) = min{p(x = x◦), p(y = x◦)} = p(y=x◦ ∧∆)
for every x◦ ∈ X . Note that p(∆) is well defined (by summing over all x◦). As
we will see below, ∆ will become the event x = y. In order to find a consis-
tent joint distribution p(x, y), it suffices to find a consistent joint distribution
p(x, y|∆) for p(x|∆) and p(y|∆), and a consistent joint distribution p(x, y|¬∆)
for p(x|¬∆) and p(y|¬∆). The former, we choose as
p(x = x◦ ∧ y = x◦|∆) := min{p(x = x◦), p(y = x◦)}/p(∆)
for all x◦ ∈ X , and p(x = x◦ ∧ y = y◦|∆) := 0 for all x◦ 6= y◦ ∈ X , and the
latter we choose as
p(x = x◦ ∧ y = y◦|¬∆) := p(x = x◦|¬∆) · p(y = y◦|¬∆)
for all x◦, y◦ ∈ X . It is straightforward to verify that these are indeed con-
sistent joint distributions, as required, so that p(x, y) = p(x, y|∆) · p(∆) +
p(x, y|¬∆) · p(¬∆) is also consistent. Furthermore, note that p(x= y|∆) = 1
and p(x=y|¬∆) = 0; the latter holds because we have p(x=x◦ ∧∆) = p(x =
x◦) or p(y=x◦∧∆) = p(y = x◦) for each x◦ ∈ X , and thus p(x=x◦∧¬∆) = 0
or p(y = x◦ ∧ ¬∆) = 0. As such, ∆ is the event x = y, and therefore
p(x = y = x◦) = p(x = x◦ ∧ ∆) = min{p(x = x◦), p(y = x◦)} for every
x◦ ∈ X as required. Finally, the claim regarding p(x, y|x 6= y) holds by con-
struction.
The following property of the statistical distance is well known (see e.g.
[RK05]) and can easily be proved using Lemma 2.2.
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Corollary 2.3. Let p(x) and p(y) be two distributions over the same set X




= ε. Then, there exists a consistent joint
distribution p(x, y) over X × X such that p(x 6=y) = ε.
Proof. We apply Lemma 2.2 to obtain a consistent joint distribution p(x, y)
such that for all x◦ ∈ X , p(x = y = x◦) = min{p(x=x◦), p(y=x◦)}. We then
have
p(x 6=y) = 1−
∑
x◦∈X

























The following is an immediate consequence.





ε. Then, there exists a consistent joint distribution p(x0, x1, y0, y1) such that
p′(x0 6=x1) = ε and, as a consequence, d
(
p(x0, y1), p(x1, y1)
)
≤ ε.
Proof. We first apply Corollary 2.3 to p(x0) and p(x1) to obtain a consistent
joint distribution p(x0, x1), and then we set
p(x0, x1, y0, y1) = p(x0, x1) · p(y0|x0) · p(y1|x1) .
It is easy to see that this distribution is consistent with p(x0, y0) and p(x1, y1).
For the last claim, we note that
p(x0, y1) = p(x0 =x1) · p(x0, y1|x0 =x1) + p(x0 6=x1) · p(x0, y1|x0 6=x1)
= p(x0 =x1) · p(x1, y1|x0 =x1) + p(x0 6=x1) · p(x0, y1|x0 6=x1)
and
p(x1, y1) = p(x0 =x1) · p(x1, y1|x0 =x1) + p(x0 6=x1) · p′(x1, y1|x0 6=x1)
and the claim follows because p(x0 6=x1) = ε.
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When applying the above lemma, we say that we “glue together” the dis-
tributions p(x0, y0) and p(x1, y1) along x0 and x1.
Remark 2.5. In the special case where p(x0) and p(x1) are distributed iden-
tically, we obviously have p(x0, y1) = p(x1, y1).
Remark 2.6. It is easy to see from the proof of Lemma 2.4 that the fol-
lowing natural property holds. If p(x0, x1, y0, y1, y′0, y′1) is obtained by glu-
ing together p(x0, y0, y′0) and p(x1, y1, y′1) along x0 and x1, then the marginal
p(x0, x1, y0, y1) coincides with the distribution obtained by gluing together the
marginals p(x0, y0) and p(x1, y1) along x0 and x1.
Let p(x, y, z) be a distribution over X × Y × Z and let Λ ⊆ X × Y × Z.
We then write x→ y → z to express that p(x) and p(z) are independent when
conditioned on y, i.e., p(x, z|y) = p(x|y)p(z|y). Similarly, we write x→ Λ→ y
to express that p(x, y|Λ) = p(x|Λ)p(y|Λ), etc. We show the following property
for conditionally independent variables.
Lemma 2.7. If x→ y → z and x→ x 6= y → y, then x→ x 6= y → z.
Proof. We assume that x→ y → z and x→ x 6= y → y. We first observe that
p(x, x 6= y, z|y) = p(x, x 6= y|y) p(z|x, y, x 6= y)
= p(x, x 6= y|y) p(z|x, y)
= p(x, x 6= y|y) p(z|y) ,
which means that (x, x 6= y) → y → z, and, by summing over x, implies
x 6= y → y → z. It follows that
p(z|x, y, x 6= y) = p(z|y) = p(z|y, x 6= y) ,
which actually means that x→ (y, x 6= y)→ z. Therefore,
p(x, z|x 6= y) =
∑
y
p(x, y, z|x 6= y) =
∑
y
p(x, y|x 6= y) p(z|x, y, x 6= y)
= p(x|x 6= y)
∑
y
p(y|x 6= y) p(z|y, x 6= y)
= p(x|x 6= y)
∑
y
p(y, z|x 6= y)
= p(x|x 6= y) p(z|x 6= y) ,
which was to be proven.
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2.2 Two-Prover Commitment Schemes
2.2.1 Protocols
In this work, we will consider 3-party interactive protocols, where the par-
ties are named P , Q and V (the two “provers” and the “verifier”). Such a
protocol protPQV consists of a triple (protP , protQ, protV ) of L-round interac-
tive algorithms for some L ∈ N. Each interactive algorithm takes an input,
and for every round ` ≤ L computes the messages to be sent to the other
algorithms/parties in that round as deterministic functions of its input, the
messages received in the previous rounds, and the local randomness. In the




protP (inP )‖protQ(inQ)‖protV (inV )
)
to denote the execution of the protocol protPQV on the respective inputs
inP , inQ and inV , and that the respective outputs outP , outQ and outV are
produced. Clearly, for any protocol protPQV and any input inP , inQ, inV ,
the probability distribution p(outP , outQ, outV ) of the output is naturally well
defined.
If we want to make the local randomness explicit, we write protP [ξP ](inP )
etc., and understand that ξP is correctly sampled. Furthermore, we write
protP [ξPQ](inP ) and protQ[ξPQ](inQ) to express that protP and protQ use the
same randomness, in which case we speak of joint randomness.
We can compose two interactive algorithms protP and prot′P in the ob-
vious way, by applying prot′P to the output of protP . The resulting inter-
active algorithm is denoted as prot′P ◦ protP . Composing the respective al-





V ) results in the composed protocol prot
′
PQV ◦ protPQV . If
protP is a non-interactive algorithm, then prot′PQV ◦ protP is naturally un-
derstood as the protocol prot′PQV ◦ protP = (prot′P ◦ protP , prot′Q, prot′V ), and
similarly prot′PQV ◦ protQV in case protQV is a protocol among Q and V only.
2.2.2 Defining Commitment Schemes
We model a two-prover commitment scheme as two protocols, one for the
commit phase, one for the opening phase. In the commit phase, the input
for the provers is an element s of the scheme’s domain D which is the value
they want to commit to. The verifier has no input. All three participants
may output some state information. The protocol for the opening phase then
takes this state information as input, and the verifier outputs an element of
D ∪ {⊥}. An output of s ∈ D indicates that the provers successfully opened
their commitment to s while an output of ⊥ indicates that they failed to open
their commitment.
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Dishonest parties may execute arbitrary protocols. Dishonest provers do
not have an input in the commit phase: intuitively speaking, they do not know
which value they eventually want to open to at this time.
Definition 2.8. A 2-prover (string) commitment scheme S with domain D
consists of a pair of interactive protocols comPQV = (comP , comQ, comV ) and
openPQV = (openP , openQ, openV ) between the provers P and Q and the veri-
fier V , with the following syntactics. The commit protocol comPQV uses joint
randomness ξPQ for P and Q and takes an element s ∈ D as input for P
and Q (and independent randomness and no input for V ), and it outputs a






The opening protocol openPQV uses joint randomness ηPQ and outputs a
string or a rejection symbol to V , and nothing to P and Q:
(∅‖∅‖s)←
(
openP [ηPQ](stateP )‖openQ[ηPQ](stateQ)‖openV (c)
)
with s ∈ {0, 1}n ∪ {⊥}. If D = {0, 1}, we refer to S as a bit-commitment
scheme instead, and we tend to use b rather than s to denote the committed
bit.
Remark 2.9. Note that we still speak of string-commitment schemes even if
the domain D does not consist of bit-strings.
Remark 2.10. By convention, we assume throughout the paper that the com-
mitment c output by V equals the communication that takes place between V
and the provers during the commit phase. This is without loss of generality
since, in general, c is computed as a (possibly randomized) function of the
communication, which V just as well can apply in the opening phase.
Remark 2.11. Note that we specify that P and Q use fresh joint randomness
ηPQ in the opening phase, and, if necessary, the randomness ξPQ from the
commit phase can be “handed over” to the opening phase via stateP and stateQ;
this will be convenient later on.
Whenever we refer to such a 2-prover commitment scheme, we take it as
understood that the scheme is complete and hiding, as defined below, for
“small” values of γ and δ. Since our focus will be on the binding property, we
typically do not make the parameters γ and δ explicit.
Definition 2.12. A 2-prover commitment scheme is γ-complete if in an hon-
est execution V ’s output s of openPQV equals P and Q’s input s to comPQV
except with probability η, for any choice of P and Q’s input s ∈ D.
The standard definition for the hiding property is as follows:
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Definition 2.13. A 2-prover commitment scheme is δ-hiding if for any com-
mit strategy comV and any two strings s0 and s1, the distribution of the com-
mitments c0, c1, produced as
(stateP ‖stateQ‖cb)← (comP [ξPQ](sb)‖comQ[ξPQ](sb)‖comV (∅)),b = 0, 1
have statistical distance at most δ. A 0-hiding scheme is also called perfectly
hiding.
Defining the binding property is more subtle. First, note that an attack
against the binding property consists of a possible commit strategy comPQ =
(comP , comQ) and a possible opening strategy openPQ = (openP , openQ) for
P and Q. Any such attack fixes p(s), the distribution of s ∈ {0, 1}n ∪ {⊥}
that is output by V after the opening phase, in the obvious way.
A somewhat accepted definition for the binding property of a 2-prover bit
commitment scheme, as it is for instance used in [CSST11, LKB+15, FF15]
(up to the factor 2 in the error parameter), is the probability sum-binding
property defined below. Here, we assume it has been specified which attacks
are possible, e.g., those where P and Q do not communicate during the course
of the scheme.
Definition 2.14. A 2-prover bit-commitment scheme is ε-sum-binding if for
every possible commit strategy comPQ, and for every pair of possible opening
strategies open0PQ and open
1
PQ, which fix distributions p(b0) and p(b1) for V ’s
respective outputs, it holds that
p(b0 =0) + p(b1 =1) ≤ 1 + 2ε .
In the literature (see e.g. [CSST11] or [LKB+15]), the two probabilities
p(b0 =0) and p(b1 =1) above are usually referred to as p0 and p1, respectively.
In the information theoretic setting, a commitment scheme can not be both
hiding and binding with good (i.e., low) parameters. Thus, we have to assume
some restriction on the provers, e.g., that they are unable to communicate
during the execution of the scheme. However, we might also be more liberal
and allow some limited communication during the protocol, as in the Lunghi
et al. multi-round scheme.
If we rely on relativity to enforce the communication restrictions, we need
to make sure that the provers are at the appropriate distance from each other.
We do not address this problem in this thesis and assume that the provers are
at fixed known positions. However, depending on the commitment scheme,
it can be possible to also split the verifier into two separate agents that each
only need to communicate with one prover. These are then placed next to
the provers they communicate with, and brought together at the end of the
opening phase to compute the result. For the Lunghi et al. scheme, this is
possible – in fact, it is how the scheme is presented in [LKB+15]. For simplicity,
we describe protocols with only one verifier.
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Our proof of the commitment scheme relies on different, but stronger or
equivalent, notions of a binding commitment. We explain these, and the rela-
tions among them in Chapter 3.
2.2.3 The CHSHq Scheme
Our main example is a generalization of the bit-commitment scheme by Cré-
peau et al. [CSST11]. Let q be a prime power and let Fq be the finite field
with q elements. The bit-commitment scheme CHSHq works as follows: The
commit phase comPQV instructs V to sample and send to P a uniformly ran-
dom a ∈ Fq, and it instructs P to return x := r + a · b to V , where r ∈ Fq
is the provers’ joint randomness and b is the bit to commit to. The opening
phase openPQV instructs Q to send y := −r to V , and V outputs the (smaller)
bit b that satisfies x + y = a · b, and b := ⊥ in case no such bit exists. Note
that the provers in this scheme use the same randomness in the commit and
opening phase; thus, formally, Q needs to output the shared randomness as
stateQ. The opening phase uses no fresh randomness.
It is easy to see that this scheme is q−1-complete and perfectly hiding (com-
pleteness fails in case a = 0). For classical provers that do not communicate




-sum-binding. As for quantum provers, Crépeau
et al. showed that the scheme CHSH2
n
is 2−n/2-binding; this was recently
minorly improved to 2−(n+1)/2 by Sikora, Chailloux and Kerenidis [SCK14].
We also want to consider an extended version of the scheme where, instead
of a bit, the provers commit to an arbitrary field element s ∈ Fq, thus making
Fq the domain of the scheme. In the opening phase, the verifier’s output is
picked as above, except that it is selected from the set Fq instead of {0, 1}. If
a 6= 0, the output is s = a−1(x + y). In general, we will thus view CHSHq
as a string-commitment scheme, and explicitly mention when we restrict its
domain to {0, 1}.
However, it is a priori not clear what a suitable definition for the binding
property is, especially because for this particular scheme, the dishonest provers
can always honestly commit to a string s, and can then decide to correctly open
the commitment to s by announcing y := r, or open to a random string by
announcing a randomly chosen y—any y satisfies x + y = a · s for some s
(unless a = 0, which almost never happens).1
Due to its close relation to the CHSH game [CHSH69], in particular to the
arbitrary-finite-field version considered in [BS15], we will refer to this string
commitment scheme as CHSHq.
1This could easily be prevented by requiring Q to announce s (rather than letting V
compute it), but we want the information announced during the opening phase to fit into
the domain of the commitment scheme.
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Chapter 3
The Hiding and Binding
Properties
3.1 Introduction
Formal security definitions form a crucial part of modern cryptography, where
the aim is to mathematically prove the security of cryptographic schemes.
Such definitions should capture and refine the informal intuition about the
desired security requirements. For example, the informal goal of an encryption
scheme is to keep a message secret from an adversary that does not know the
appropriate key. The informal requirement guides the development of precise
definitions (such as the modern game-based ones), but in formalizing it, one
needs to also fill in many details that are left vague in the informal intuition.
Typically, we want security definitions to be as strong as possible while
still being satisfiable, in order to offer security guarantees that are as strong as
possible. Ideally, they should also be easy to work with. It is also desirable for
them to be composable: Informally, this means that the stand-alone security
of a scheme implies that security is still satisfied when the scheme is used as a
building block in a larger system, and the security of the scheme propagates as
expected to the larger system. The security proof for the larger system would
not need to concern itself with the internal details of the components if the
components satisfy composable security definitions.
In Chapter 1, we have discussed the informal security properties that a
bit-commitment scheme should have. They should be hiding, meaning that a
dishonest verifier cannot learn the committed value before the opening phase,
and binding, meaning that after the commit phase, there is at most one value
that can be revealed.
The (information-theoretic) hiding property is straightforward to define
formally: even if the verifier is dishonest and arbitrarily deviates from the pro-
27
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tocol, we require that the messages that he sees in the commit phase are sta-
tistically independent of the committed value. This definition can be relaxed
to allow a limited amount of information by requiring the distributions to have
small statistical distance from each other. Defining the information-theoretic
binding property for two-prover schemes is more involved. The naive approach
of requiring that the value to which the commitment can be opened should be
uniquely determined by the verifier’s view after the commit phase obviously
leads to a contradiction with the information-theoretic binding property (see
Section 1.2.1). Thus special care is necessary here.
In this chapter, we study several different and new definitions of the bind-
ing property which vary in certain technical aspects, and we analyze how they
relate to each other. Our definitions vary in how we formalize the bit or string
that the provers supposedly are committed to. One of our definitions, when
restricted to bits, turns out to be equivalent to the sum-binding definition,
while another one is strictly stronger. Our definitions also vary in how strict
we are in not allowing the adversary to open to anything else than the com-
mitted value. Schemes that satisfy the less strict definition can quite easily
be transformed into schemes that satisfy the stricter one by simply restricting
their domain.
Naively, one might think that it suffices to consider the strongest achievable
notion. However, some of our weaker definitions play a crucial role in our
analysis of multi-round schemes (see Chapter 4).
We also prove that all of the definitions are satisfied by variants of the
CHSH commitment scheme. This in particular is the first time the CHSH
commitment scheme is proven secure as a string commitment scheme.
3.2 Defining The Binding Property
3.2.1 Possible Strategies
Like the sum-binding property, the binding properties we discuss in this chap-
ter can only hold with respect to some restricted class of strategies. We call
these strategies the possible strategies. In this chapter, we assume that all
possible strategies (comPQ, openPQ) are classical interactive algorithms with
access to joint randomness. We consider strategies that use quantum entan-
glement in Chapter 5. Our main result holds only in the classical case.
We assume that the set of possible strategies is the convex hull of a set
of deterministic strategies. That is, if (comPQ, openPQ) is a possible random-
ized strategy, then the deterministic strategies that result from replacing the
randomness with fixed values are possible as well. Conversely, if a strategy
(comPQ, openPQ) instructs the provers to execute a possible strategy selected
according to some probability distribution, then (comPQ, openPQ) is itself a
possible strategy.
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We make this assumption because we think of the set of possible strategies
not as some arbitrary set, but as the strategies that are permitted by some
constraints on the communication between the provers. If a set of strategies
is permitted by those constraints, then executing a random strategy from
this set should be possible as well. If a randomized strategy is permitted by
those constraints, then deterministic strategies that result from replacing the
randomness with fixed values should not violate the constraints either.
In the remainder of this chapter, we usually leave the set of possible strate-
gies implicit and take it as understood that when we quantify over strategies,
we refer only to possible strategies.
3.2.2 The (Strong) Binding Property
Intuitively, we say that a scheme is binding if after the commit phase there
exists a string ŝ so that no matter what the provers do in the opening phase, the
verifier will output either s = ŝ or s = ⊥ (except with small probability). We
consider two definitions of the binding property which interpret this intuitive
requirement in two different ways. In the first definition, which we introduce
in this section, ŝ is a function of the provers’ combined view immediately after
the commit phase. In the second one, which we introduce in Section 3.2.3, ŝ is
specified by its distribution only. Both of these definitions admit a composition
theorem.
Definition 3.1 (Binding property). A 2-prover commitment scheme S is
ε-binding if for every commit strategy comPQ[ξ̄PQ] there exists a function
ŝ(ξ̄PQ, c) of the joint randomness ξ̄PQ and the commitment1 c such that for
every opening strategy openPQ it holds that p(s 6= ŝ(ξ̄PQ, c) ∧ s 6= ⊥) ≤ ε. In
short:
∀ comPQ ∃ ŝ(ξ̄PQ, c) ∀ openPQ : p(s 6= ŝ ∧ s 6= ⊥) ≤ ε . (3.1)
The string-commitment scheme CHSHq does not satisfy this definition
(the bit-commitment version does, as we will show): after the commit phase,
the provers can still decide to open the commitment to a fixed string, chosen
before the commit phase, or to a random string that is out of their control.
We capture this property of CHSHq by the following relaxed version of the
binding property: we allow V ’s output s to be different from ŝ and ⊥, but in
this case the provers should have little control over s; for any fixed target string
s◦, it should be unlikely that s = s◦. Formally, this is captured as follows; we
will show in Section 3.2.6 that CHSHq is fairly-binding in this sense.
Definition 3.2 (Fairly binding property). A 2-prover commitment scheme
S is ε-fairly-binding if for every commit strategy comPQ[ξ̄PQ] there exists a
1Recall that by convention (Remark 2.10), c equals the communication between V and
the provers during the commit phase.
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function ŝ(ξ̄PQ, c) such that for every opening strategy openPQ[η̄PQ] and all
s◦ ∈ D it holds that p(s 6= ŝ(ξ̄PQ, c) ∧ s = s◦) ≤ ε. In short:
∀ comPQ ∃ ŝ(ξ̄PQ, c) ∀ openPQ ∀ s◦(ξ̄PQ, η̄PQ) : p(s 6= ŝ ∧ s = s◦) ≤ ε . (3.2)
If we want to show that a scheme is ε-(fairly-)binding (with respect to all
possible strategies), it suffices to show that it is binding with respect to all
possible deterministic strategies, as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 3.3. Let S be a commitment scheme that is ε-(fairly-)binding with
respect to all possible deterministic strategies. Then it also is ε-(fairly-)binding
with respect to all possible strategies.
Proof. We prove the lemma for ε-binding schemes. It is easy to see how the
proof can be adapted for fairly-binding schemes. Let comPQ[ξ̄PQ] be a possible
commit strategy. By our assumptions from Section 3.2.1, it follows that the
strategy comrcPQ where we set the joint randomness ξ̄PQ to the value rc is
also possible for every rc. By the assumed binding property, for every rc,
there exists a function ŝrc such that for every deterministic opening strategy
openPQ, we have p(s 6= ŝrc ∧ s 6= ⊥) ≤ ε.
We define ŝ(ξ̄PQ, c) = ŝξ̄PQ(c). If the provers use comPQ[ξ̄] and any possible
deterministic opening strategy, we have
p(s 6= ŝ ∧ s 6= ⊥) =
∑
rc
p(ξ̄PQ = rc)p(s 6= ŝrc(c) ∧ s 6= ⊥|ξ̄PQ = rc) ≤ ε .
It is straightforward to extend the above inequality to randomized opening
strategies: the above inequality holds when we set the randomness to any
particular value, and thus it also holds for the randomized strategy.
The next lemma shows that in Definition 3.2, instead of quantifying over
strings s◦, we may also quantify over functions of the provers’ randomness.
Lemma 3.4. Let S be an ε-fairly-binding scheme and comPQ[ξ̄PQ] a commit
strategy. There is a function ŝ(ξ̄PQ, c) such that for every opening strategy
openPQ[η̄PQ] and every function s◦(ξ̄PQ, η̄PQ) with values in D, it holds that
p(s 6= ŝ(ξ̄PQ, c) ∧ s = s◦(ξ̄PQ, η̄PQ)) ≤ ε.
Proof. Let comrcPQ and open
ro
PQ be the deterministic strategies that results from
fixing the randomness in comPQ[ξ̄PQ] to rc and the randomness in openPQ[η̄PQ]
to ro. Fix an arbitrary function s◦(ξ̄PQ, η̄PQ). By the binding property, for
every r, there is a function ŝrc(c) such that p(s 6= ŝr(c) ∧ s = s◦(rc, ro)|ξ̄PQ =
rc, η̄PQ = ro) ≤ ε. Setting ŝ(ξ̄PQ, c) = ŝξ̄PQ(c), we have




p(ξ̄PQ=rc)p(η̄PQ=ro)p(s 6= ŝ(rc, c) ∧ s=s◦(rc, ro)|ξ̄PQ=rc, η̄PQ=ro)
≤ε
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which proves our claim.
Remark 3.5. Clearly, the binding property implies the fairly binding property.
Furthermore, in the case of bit commitment schemes it obviously holds that
p(b 6= b̂ ∧ b 6= ⊥) = p(b 6= b̂ ∧ b = 0) + p(b 6= b̂ ∧ b = 1), and thus the
fairly-binding property implies the binding property with a factor-2 loss in the
parameter. Furthermore, every fairly-binding string commitment scheme gives
rise to a binding bit-commitment scheme in a natural way, as shown by the
following proposition.
Proposition 3.6. Let S be an ε-fairly-binding string-commitment scheme with
domain D. Fix any two distinct strings s0, s1 ∈ D and consider the bit-
commitment scheme S ′ defined as follows. To commit to b ∈ {0, 1}, the provers
commit to sb using S, and in the opening phase V checks if s = sb for some
bit b ∈ {0, 1} and outputs this bit if it exists and else outputs b = ⊥. Then, S ′
is a 2ε-binding bit-commitment scheme.
Proof. Fix some commit strategy comPQ for S ′ and note that it can also be




0 if ŝ(ξ̄PQ, c) = s0
1 otherwise
Now fix an opening strategy openPQ for S ′, which again is also a strategy
against S. Thus, we have p(ŝ 6= s = s◦) ≤ ε for any s◦ (and in particular
s◦ = s0 or s1). This gives us
p(b̂ 6= b 6= ⊥) = p(b̂ = 1 ∧ b = 0) + p(b̂ = 0 ∧ b = 1)
= p(ŝ 6= s0 ∧ s = s0) + p(ŝ = s0 ∧ s = s1)
≤ p(ŝ 6= s0 ∧ s = s0) + p(ŝ 6= s1 ∧ s = s1) ,
≤ 2ε
and thus S ′ is a 2ε-binding bit-commitment scheme.
Remark 3.7. The proof of Proposition 3.6 generalizes in a straightforward
way: given an ε-fairly-binding commitment scheme S with domain D, and
a subset D′ ⊆ D, we define a commitment scheme SD′ with domain D′ as
follows: In the commit phase, the players use S to produce a commitment
to s ∈ D′. In the opening phase, the players run the opening phase of S.
If the result is in D′, V outputs it, and otherwise outputs ⊥. Then, SD′ is
|D′|ε-binding.
When D′ 6⊆ D, but |D′| < |D|, we can define a similar scheme by fixing
an injection from D′ to D. In particular, any ε-fairly-binding n-bit string-
commitment scheme can be turned into a 2kε-binding k-bit string-commitment
scheme for any k < n.
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3.2.3 The Weak Binding Property
Here, we introduce yet another definition for the binding property. It is similar
in spirit to Definition 3.1, but weaker. One advantage of this weaker notion
is that it is also meaningful when considering quantum attacks, whereas Def-
inition 3.1 is not. Note, however, that in the quantum setting, it does not
suffice to only consider deterministic attacks. Therefore, results that depend
on this property do not automatically carry over to the quantum setting. That
includes Theorem 4.13, the composition theorem. In Section 3.2.4, we will see
that for bit-commitment schemes, this weaker notion of the binding property
is equivalent to the sum-binding definition, i.e., Definition 2.14.
Definition 3.8 (Weak binding property). A 2-prover commitment scheme S
is ε-weak-binding if for all commit strategies comPQ there exists a distribution
p(ŝ) such that for every opening strategy openPQ (which then fixes the distri-
bution p(s) of V ’s output s) there is a consistent joint distribution p(ŝ, s) such
that p(s 6= ŝ ∧ s 6= ⊥) ≤ ε. In short:
∀ comPQ ∃ p(ŝ) ∀ openPQ ∃ p(ŝ, s) : p(s 6= ŝ ∧ s 6= ⊥) ≤ ε . (3.3)
We also consider a related, i.e., “fairly”, version of this binding property,
similar to Definition 3.2.
Definition 3.9 (Fairly weak binding property). We say that a 2-prover com-
mitment scheme S is ε-fairly-weak-binding if for all commit strategies comPQ
there exists a distribution p(ŝ) such that for every opening strategy openPQ
(which then fixes the distribution p(s) of V ’s output s) there is a consistent
joint distribution p(ŝ, s) so that for all s◦ ∈ {0, 1}n, p(s 6= ŝ ∧ s = s◦) ≤ ε. In
short:
∀ comPQ ∃ p(ŝ) ∀ openPQ ∃ p(ŝ, s) ∀ s◦ : p(s 6= ŝ ∧ s = s◦) ≤ ε . (3.4)
Remark 3.10. Lemma 3.3 and Remark 3.5 also hold for the weak binding
properties. Furthermore, it is easy to see that the binding and fairly-binding
properties imply their weak counterparts.
Proposition 3.11. Let S be a string-commitment scheme and define S ′ as
in Proposition 3.6. If S is ε-fairly-weak-binding, then S ′ is a 2ε-weak-binding
bit-commitment scheme.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 3.6 can be easily adapted: Let p(ŝ) be as
required by Definition 3.9. We define p(b̂) by taking the marginal of p(ŝ, b̂)
where b̂ = 0 if ŝ = s0, and b̂ = 1 otherwise. An opening strategy openPQ for
S ′ can also be viewed as a strategy for S. As such, there is a joint distribution
p(ŝ, s) as required by Definition 3.8 which we can extend to p(ŝ, s, b) by setting
b = 0 if s = s0, b = 1 if s = s1 and b = ⊥ otherwise. We define p(b̂, b) :=∑
ŝ,s p(ŝ, b̂) · p(s, b|ŝ). As in the proof of Proposition 3.6, one can easily check
that p(b̂ 6= b 6= ⊥) ≤ 2ε holds.
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3.2.4 Relations Between The Definitions
Here, we show that in case of bit-commitment schemes, the weak binding
property as introduced in Definition 3.8 above is actually equivalent to the
sum-binding-definition. Even though our focus in this chapter is on classical
attacks, the proof immediately carries over to quantum attacks as well.
Theorem 3.12. A 2-prover bit-commitment scheme is ε-sum-binding if and
only if it is ε-weak-binding.
Proof. First, consider a scheme that is ε-binding according to Definition 2.14.
Fix an arbitrary commit strategy comPQ. Let open0PQ and open
1
PQ be open-
ing strategies so that p0 = p(b0 = 0) and p1 = p(b1 = 1) are both maxi-
mized, where bi ∈ {0, 1,⊥} is V ’s output when the dishonest provers use the
commit strategy comPQ and opening strategy openiPQ. Let ε′ be such that
p0 + p1 = 1 + 2ε
′. Since the scheme is ε-binding, we have ε′ ≤ ε. We define
the distribution p(b̂) as p(b̂ = 0) := p0− ε′ and p(b̂ = 1) := p1− ε′. To see that
this is indeed a probability distribution, note that p0, p1 ≥ 2ε′ (otherwise, we
would have p0 > 1 or p1 > 1) and that p(b̂ = 0) + p(b̂ = 1) = p0 + p1− 2ε′ = 1.
Now we consider an arbitrary opening strategy openPQ which fixes a distri-
bution p(b). By definition of p0 and p1, we have p(b = i) ≤ pi and thus
p(b = i) ≤ p(b̂ = i) + ε′ ≤ p(b̂ = i) + ε. By Lemma 2.2, there exists a consis-
tent joint distribution p(b̂, b) such that p(b̂= b= i) = min{p(b= i), p(b̂= i)}.
We wish to bound p(b̂ 6= b ∧ b 6= ⊥) = p(b̂ = 0 ∧ b = 1) + p(b̂ = 1 ∧ b = 0). For
i ∈ {0, 1}, it holds that
p(b̂ = 1− i ∧ b = i) = p(b = i)− p(b̂ = b = i)
= p(b = i)−min{p(b̂ = i), p(b = i)}
= max{0, p(b = i)− p(b̂ = i)}
≤ ε
and furthermore, there is at most one i ∈ {0, 1} such that p(b = i) > p(b̂ = i),
for if p(b = i) > p(b̂ = i) for both i = 0 and i = 1, then p(b = 0) + p(b =
1) > p(b̂ = 0) + p(b̂ = 1) = 1 which is a contradiction. Thus, we have
p(b̂ 6= b ∧ b 6= ⊥) ≤ ε. This proves one direction of our claim.
For the other direction, consider a scheme that is ε-weak-binding. Fix
comPQ and let p(b̂) be a distribution such that for every opening strategy
openPQ, there is a joint distribution p(b̂, b) with p(b̂ 6= b 6= ⊥) ≤ ε. Now
consider two opening strategies open0PQ and open
1
PQ which give distributions
p(b0) and p(b1). We need to bound p(b0 = 0) + p(b1 = 1). There is a joint
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distribution p(b̂, b0) such that p(b̂ 6= b0 6= ⊥) ≤ ε and likewise for b1. Thus,
p(b0 = 0) + p(b1 = 1)
= p(b̂ = 0, b0 = 0) + p(b̂ = 1, b0 = 0) + p(b̂ = 0, b1 = 1) + p(b̂ = 1, b1 = 1)
≤ p(b̂ = 0) + p(b̂ = 1) + p(b̂ 6= b0 6= ⊥) + p(b̂ 6= b1 6= ⊥)
≤ 1 + 2ε
which proves the other direction.
Remark 3.13. By Remark 3.10, it follows that Definition 3.1 also implies the
sum-binding-definition. In fact, Definition 3.1 is strictly stronger (and hence,
also strictly stronger than the weak-binding definition). Consider the following
(artificial and very non-complete) scheme: In the commit phase, V chooses a
uniformly random bit and sends it to the provers, and then accepts anything
or rejects anything during the opening phase, depending on that bit. Then,
p0 + p1 = 1, yet a commitment can be opened to 1 − b̂ (no matter how b̂ is
defined) with probability 12 .
Since a non-complete separation example may not be fully satisfying, we
note that it can be converted into a complete (but even more artificial) scheme.
Fix a “good” (i.e., complete, hiding and binding with low parameters) scheme
and call our example scheme above the “bad” scheme. We define a combined
scheme as follows: At the start, the first prover can request either the “good”
or “bad” scheme to be used. The honest prover is instructed to choose the for-
mer, guaranteeing completeness. The dishonest prover may choose the latter,
so the combined scheme inherits the binding properties of the “bad” scheme: it
is binding according to the sum-binding-definition, but not according to Defi-
nition 3.1.
3.2.5 Simultaneous Opening
The binding definitions from the previous sections are useful for proving our
composition theorem, but it is not clear how to prove in a straightforward way
that a commitment scheme satisfies those definitions. In this section, we pro-
pose another definition which is easier to check and which implies the binding
properties from the previous sections (with some loss in the parameter). We
then use this result in Section 3.2.6 to prove that CHSHq is fairly-binding.
This binding property is based on the intuition that it should not be pos-
sible to open a commitment to two different values simultaneously (except
with small probability). For this, we observe that when considering a commit
strategy comPQ, as well as two opening strategies openPQ and open
′
PQ, we
can run both opening strategies simultaneously on the produced commitment
with two independent copies of openV , by applying openPQ and open
′
PQ to
two copies of the respective internal states of P and Q). This gives rise to a
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joint distribution p(s, s′) of the respective outputs s and s′ of the two copies
of openV .
Definition 3.14 and Theorem 3.18 were first considered in [Sca16].
Definition 3.14. A 2-prover commitment scheme S is ε-binding in the sense
of simultaneous opening if for all comPQ and all pairs of opening strategies
openPQ and open
′
PQ, it holds that p(s 6= s′ ∧ s 6= ⊥ ∧ s′ 6= ⊥) ≤ ε.
Definition 3.15. A 2-prover commitment scheme S is ε-fairly-binding in the
sense of simultaneous opening if for all comPQ, all pairs of opening strategies
openPQ and open
′
PQ, and all pairs s◦, s′◦ of distinct strings, it holds that p(s =
s◦ ∧ s′ = s′◦) ≤ ε.
Remark 3.16. Also for this notion of binding, it is sufficient to consider
deterministic strategies, as can easily be seen.
Remark 3.17. It follows directly from Eq. (2.1) that every bit-commitment
scheme that is ε-fairly-binding in the sense of simultaneous opening (against
classical attacks) is ε/2-sum-binding (and thus also according to Definition 3.8).
The converse is not true though: the schemes from Remark 3.13 again serve
as counterexamples.
Theorem 3.18. Let S = (comPQV , openPQV ) be a 2-prover commitment
scheme. If it is ε-binding in the sense of simultaneous opening, and openV
is deterministic, then S is 2
√
ε-binding.
Proof. By Lemma 3.3, it suffices to consider deterministic strategies for the
provers. We fix some deterministic commit strategy comPQ and an enumer-
ation {openiPQ}Ni=1 of all deterministic opening strategies. Since we assume
that openV is deterministic, for any fixed deterministic opening strategy for
the provers, the verifier’s output s is a function of the commitment c. Thus,
for each opening strategy openiPQ there is a function fi such that the verifier’s
output is s = fi(c). We will now define the function ŝ(c) that satisfies the
properties required by Definition 3.1. We will now define the function ŝ(c)
that satisfies the properties required by Definition 3.1. Our definition depends
on a parameter α > 0 which we fix later. To define ŝ, we partition the set C
of all possible commitments into disjoint sets C = R ∪
⋃
i Ci that satisfy the
following three properties for every i:
• fi(c) 6= ⊥ for all c ∈ Ci,
• p(c ∈ Ci) ≥ α or Ci = ∅,
• and p(c ∈ R ∧ fi(c) 6= ⊥) < α
The second property implies that there are at most α−1 non-empty sets Ci.
It is easy to see that such a partitioning exists: Start with R = C and while
there exists some i with p(c ∈ R∧fi(c) 6= ⊥) ≥ α, let Ci = {c ∈ R | fi(c) 6= ⊥}
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and remove the elements of Ci from R. For any c ∈ C, we now define ŝ(c) as
follows. We set ŝ(c) = fi(c) if c ∈ Ci and ŝ(c) = 0 for c ∈ R.
Now fix some opening strategy openiPQ and write si for the verifier’s output.
It follows that
p(si 6= ŝ(c) ∧ si 6= ⊥)
= p(fi(c) 6= ŝ(c) ∧ fi(c) 6= ⊥)
≤ p(c ∈ R ∧ fi(c) 6= ⊥) +
∑
j




P (fi(c) 6= fj(c) ∧ fi(c) 6= ⊥ ∧ fj(c) 6= ⊥)
≤ α+ α−1 · ε
where the final inequality holds because p(fi(c) 6= fj(c) ∧ fi(c) 6= ⊥ ∧ fj(c) 6=
⊥) ≤ ε by the assumed binding property. It is easy to see that the upper
bound α + α−1 · ε is minimized by setting α =
√
ε. We conclude that p(si 6=
ŝ(c) ∧ si 6= ⊥) < 2
√
ε.
Theorem 3.19. Let S = (comPQV , openPQV ) be a 2-prover commitment
scheme. If S is ε-fairly-binding in the sense of simultaneous opening and
openV is deterministic, then S is 2
√
ε-fairly-binding.
Proof. It again suffices to consider deterministic strategies for the provers. As
in the previous proof, we fix a deterministic commit strategy comPQ and an
enumeration {openiPQ}Ni=1 of the deterministic opening strategies. The veri-
fier’s output when the provers use openiPQ is a function fi(c) of the commit-
ment. We now define the function ŝ(c) that satisfies the properties required by
Definition 3.2. Our definition again depends on a parameter α > 0. We parti-
tion the set C of all possible commitments into disjoint sets R∪
⋃
s,i Cs,i = C
that satisfy the following three properties for every i and every s:
Cs,i ⊆ f−1i ({s}) , p(c ∈ Cs,i) ≥ α or Cs,i = ∅ , and p(c ∈ R∧fi(c) = s) < α .
The second property implies that there are at most α−1 non-empty sets Cs,i.
Similar to the previous proof, it is easy to see that such a partitioning exists.
For any c ∈ C, we now define ŝ(c) as follows. We set ŝ(c) = s for c ∈ Cs,i and
ŝ(c) = 0 for c ∈ R.
Now fix some opening strategy openiPQ and a string s◦, and write si for




j Cs,j , we note
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that if ŝ(c) 6= s◦ then c ∈ R ∪ C 6=s◦ . Thus, it follows that
p(si 6= ŝ(c) ∧ si = s◦)
= p(ŝ(c) 6= s◦ ∧ si = s◦)
≤ p
(
c ∈ (R ∪ C6=s◦) ∧ fi(c) = s◦
)
= p(c ∈ R ∧ fi(c) = s◦) +
∑
s6=s◦,j
p(c ∈ Cs,j ∧ fi(c) = s◦)




p(fj(c) = s ∧ fi(c) = s◦)
< α+ α−1 · ε
where the final inequality holds because p(fj(c) = s ∧ fi(c) = s◦) ≤ ε by the
assumed binding property. Again, we minimize the upper bound by setting
α =
√
ε which completes the proof.
For the fairly-weak-binding property, we can get better parameters. Also
note that we do not require openV to be deterministic here.
Theorem 3.20. Every 2-prover commitment scheme S that is ε-fairly-binding
in the sense of simultaneous opening is
√
2ε-fairly-weak-binding.
Proof. Fix a commit strategy comPQ against S. Enumerate all strings in the
domain D of S as s1◦, . . . , sd◦, and for every i, let openiPQ be an opening strategy
maximizing pi := p(si = si◦), where si is the output of the verifier when P and
Q use this strategy. We assume without loss of generality that the pi are in
descending order. We define p(ŝ) as follows. Let N ≥ 2 be an integer which
we will fix later. By Definition 3.14 and Inequality (2.2), it holds that
N∑
i=1





· ε = 1 + N(N − 1)
2
· ε
where we let pi = 0 for i > d in case N > d. We would like to define p(ŝ)
as p(ŝ = si◦) := pi − (N − 1)ε/2 for all i ≤ N, d; however, this is not always
possible because pi − (N − 1)ε/2 may be negative. To deal with this, let N ′
be the largest integer such that N ′ ≤ N and p1, . . . , pN ′ ≥ (N − 1)ε/2. (We
take N = 0 if p1 < (N − 1)ε/2.) It follows that
N ′∑
i=1
pi ≤ 1 +
N ′(N ′ − 1)
2







pi = 1 +
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for some ε̃ ≤ ε. We now set p(ŝ) to be p(ŝ = si) := pi−(N−1)ε̃/2 ≥ pi−(N−
1)ε/2 ≥ 0 for all i ≤ N ′. Now consider an opening strategy openPQ and let
p(s) be the resulting output distribution. By definition of the pi, it follows that
p(s = si◦) ≤ pi for all i ≤ d, and pi ≤ p(ŝ = si◦)+(N −1)ε/2 for all i ≤ N ′. By
Lemma 2.2, we can conclude that there exists a consistent joint distribution
p(ŝ, s) with p(ŝ = s = si◦) = min{p(s = si◦), p(ŝ = si◦)} ≥ p(s = si)−(N−1)ε/2
for all i ≤ N ′, and thus p(ŝ 6= s = si◦) = p(s = si◦)−p(ŝ = s = si◦) ≤ (N−1)ε/2
for all i ≤ N ′. Furthermore, when N ′ < i ≤ N , we have p(ŝ 6= s = si◦) =
p(s = si◦) ≤ pi < (N − 1)ε/2 by definition of N ′. Since the pi are sorted in
descending order, it follows that for all i > N












and thus, we have shown for all s◦ ∈ D that







We now select N so that this value is minimized: it is easy to verify that the
function f : R>0 → R>0, x 7→ 1/x + (x − 1)ε/2 has its global minimum in√
2/ε; thus, we pick N := d
√
2/εe, which gives us















for any s◦ ∈ D, as claimed.
3.2.6 Security of CHSHq
Using the results from the previous section, we now show that CHSHq is a
fairly-binding string-commitment scheme. It is understood that the possible
attacks against CHSHq are those where the provers do not communicate.
Proposition 3.21. The string-commitment scheme CHSHq is q−1-fairly-
binding in the sense of simultaneous opening.
Proof. By Remark 3.16, it suffices to consider deterministic attack strategies.
Fix a deterministic strategy comPQ and two deterministic opening strate-
gies openPQ and open
′
PQ. The strategy comPQ specifies P ’s output x as
a function f(a) of the verifier’s message a. The opening strategies are de-
scribed by constants y and y′. By definition of CHSHq, s = s◦ implies
f(a) + y = a · s◦ and likewise, s′ = s′◦ implies f(a) + y′ = a · s′◦. The
condition s = s◦ ∧ s′ = s′◦ can hold only if a = (y − y′)/(s◦ − s′◦). It follows
that p(s = s◦ ∧ s′ = s′◦) ≤ p
(
a = (y − y′)/(s◦ − s′◦)
)
≤ q−1, which proves our
claim.
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From Proposition 3.21, Theorem 3.19 and Theorem 3.20, we conclude that
the following corollaries hold.
Corollary 3.22. CHSHq is 2
√
q−1-fairly-binding.
Corollary 3.23. CHSHq is
√
2q−1-fairly-weak-binding.
Remark 3.24. It is not too hard to see that Corollary 3.23 above implies an
upper bound on the classical value ω of the game CHSH2n considered in [BS15]
of ω(CHSH2n) ≤ 2−
n−1
2 + 2−n. As such, Theorem 1.3 in [BS15] implies that
the above ε is asymptotically optimal for odd n, i.e., the square root loss to the
binding property of the bit-commitment version is unavoidable (for odd n).
As for security against quantum attacks, we point out that [BS15, RAM16]
provide an upper bound on the quantum value ω∗(CHSHq) of general finite-field
CHSH; however, this does not directly imply security against quantum attacks
of CHSHq as a (fairly-weak-binding) string-commitment scheme.
Furthermore, we show that a variant of CHSHq is 2
√
q−1-binding. How-
ever, this variant requires the opening information to be twice as large as the
domain of CHSHq, so it is not possible to compose multiple instances of this
variant using our composition theorem (see Definition 4.1).
Corollary 3.25. Let CHSHq+ be the scheme defined as follows: The commit
phase is the same as in CHSHq. In the opening phase, Q sends the opening
information and the string s that the provers committed to. Then, V opens
the commitment as in CHSHq and checks if the result equals the string s he






Proof. Let openPQ be a dishonest strategy for the opening phase of CHSH
q
+.
Let s◦ be the string that Q sends along with the opening information. Since
V does not send any messages to Q in CHSHq+, the string s◦ is computed as
a function of the provers’ randomness. From the strategy openPQ, a strategy
open′PQ for CHSH
q can be extracted by simply leaving out s◦. By Lemma 3.4
and Corollary 3.22, we conclude that if the provers use open′PQ in CHSH
q, we
have p(s 6= ŝ ∧ s = s◦) ≤ 2
√
q−1. It follows that when they use openPQ in
CHSHq+, we have p(s 6= ŝ∧ s 6= ⊥) ≤ 2
√
q−1. The result for the weak-binding
property follows similarly, using Remark 3.10 and Corollary 3.23.
While it may seem like a similar idea could be used to transform any fairly-
binding scheme into a binding scheme at the cost of increasing the size of the
opening information, the proof above relies on the assumption that the second
prover can not choose the message s◦ depending on any information sent by
the verifier. Otherwise, Lemma 3.4 does not apply.
As a counter-example, consider another variant of CHSHq similar to CHSHq+
where in the opening phase, P sends the string s and Q sends the opening in-
formation. The following strategy breaks the binding property of this variant:
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In the commit phase, P sends x = 1. The provers can open to 0 by sending 0
and 1 respectively in the opening phase. Since this strategy always opens to
0, p(ŝ = 0) needs to be large. On the other hand, if P sends s◦ = a−1 (if it
exists) and Q sends 0, it holds that p(s = s◦) is large and p(s◦ 6= ŝ) is small.
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Chapter 4
The Composition Theorem
4.1 Composition of Commitment Schemes
4.1.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present one of the central results of this thesis: the com-
position theorems. We define a composition operation in Definition 4.3 which
constructs a composed scheme out of two component schemes. This is achieved
as follows: The provers use the first scheme to commit, but instead of opening
the commitment, they instead commit to the opening information using the
second scheme. They then open this second commitment, which allows the
verifier to obtain the opening information of the first scheme and thus open
the first commitment.
The composition operation cannot be applied to any two schemes – we
define a notion of eligible pairs (Definition 4.1) that it can be applied to.
Some of the requirements in that definition are necessary for the composition
operation to make sense. For example, the composition operation requires
that the first scheme is structured so that in the opening phase, a prover sends
some opening information to the verifier who then computes the result. Other
requirements are necessary for our proofs of the composition theorems to work.
The composition theorems show that if the first scheme is ε-binding (ac-
cording to some binding definition) and the second one is δ-binding (according
to the same definition), then the composed scheme is (ε+ δ)-binding.
While this is what one would expect from this composition operation, it
is non-trivial to formally prove. It is unclear how one would prove this result
using the sum-binding definition directly, rather than our newly-introduced
definitions.
Together with our analysis of the CHSH scheme in Section 3.2.6, the compo-
sition theorem implies that the binding parameter of the Lunghi et al. scheme
decays linearly in the number m of rounds, rather than double-exponentially,
41
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as [LKB+15] suggests.
4.1.2 Eligible Pairs and the Composition Operation
We consider two 2-prover commitment schemes S and S ′ of a restricted form,
and we compose them to a new 2-prover commitment scheme S ′′ = S ? S ′
in a well-defined way; our composition theorem then shows that S ′′ is secure
(against classical attacks) if S and S ′ are. We start by specifying the restriction
to S and S ′ that we impose.
Definition 4.1. Let S and S ′ be two 2-prover string-commitment schemes
with domains D and D′, respectively. We call the pair (S,S ′) eligible if the
following two properties hold, or they hold with the roles of P and Q exchanged.
1. The commit phase of S is a protocol comPQV that involves communi-
cation between P and V only, and the opening phase of S is a protocol
openQV = (openQ, openV ) between Q and V only. In other words, comQ
and openP are both trivial and do nothing.1 Similarly, the commit phase
of S ′ is a protocol com′PQV that involves communication between Q and
V only (but both provers may be active in the opening phase).
2. The opening phase openQV of S is of the following simple form: Q sends
some y ∈ D′ to V , and V computes s deterministically as s = Extr(y, c),
where c is the commitment.2 We call this message y the opening infor-
mation.
Furthermore, we specify that the possible attacks on S are so that P and Q
do not communicate during the course of the entire scheme, and the possible
attacks on S ′ are so that P and Q do not communicate during the course of
the commit phase but there may be limited communication during the opening
phase.
An example of an eligible pair of 2-prover commitments is (CHSHq,XCHSHq),
where XCHSHq coincides with scheme CHSHq except that the roles of P and
Q are exchanged.
Remark 4.2. For an eligible pair (S,S ′), it will be convenient to understand
openQ and openV as non-interactive algorithms, where openQ produces y as its
output, and openV takes y as additional input (rather than viewing the pair
as a protocol with a single one-way communication round).
We now define the composition operation. Informally, committing is done
by means of committing using S, and to open the commitment, Q uses openQ
1Except that comQ may output state information to the opening protocol openQ, e.g.,
in order to pass on the commit phase randomness.
2Our composition theorem also works for a randomized Extr, but for simplicity, we restrict
to the deterministic case.
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to locally compute the opening information y and he commits to y with respect
to the scheme S ′, and then this commitment is opened (to y), and V computes
and outputs s = Extr(y, c). Formally, this is captured as follows (see also
Fig. 4.1).
Definition 4.3. Let S = (comPV , openQV ) and S ′ = (com′QV , open′PQV ) be
an eligible pair of 2-prover commitment schemes. Then, their composition
S ? S ′ is defined as the 2-prover commitment scheme consisting of comPV =





Q ◦ com′Q ◦ openQ, openV ◦ open′V ◦ com′V ) ,
where we make it explicit that comP and openQ use joint randomness, and so
do com′Q and open
′
P .
When considering attacks against the binding property of the composed
scheme S ? S ′, we declare that the possible deterministic attacks3 are those
of the form (comP , open′PQ ◦ptoqPQ ◦com′Q), where comP is an possible deter-
ministic commit strategy for S, com′Q and open′PQ are possible deterministic
commit and opening strategies for S ′, and ptoqPQ is the one-way communica-
tion protocol that communicates P ’s input to Q (see also Fig. 4.2).4
Remark 4.4. We point out that the composition S?S ′ can be naturally defined
for a larger class of pairs of schemes (e.g. where both provers are active in the
commit phase of both schemes), and the above intuition still holds. However,
our proof only works for this restricted class of pairs of schemes. Extending
the composition result in that direction is an open problem.
Remark 4.5. We observe that if (S,XS) is an eligible pair, where XS co-
incides with S except that the roles of P and Q are exchanged, then so is
(XS,S ? XS). As such, we can then compose XS with S ? XS, and obtain
yet another eligible pair (S,XS ? S ? XS), etc. We write Sm for the m-fold
composition of S with itself, i.e., Sm = S ? XS ? S ? . . . for m terms. Ap-
plying this to the schemes S = CHSHq, we obtain the multi-round scheme
from Lunghi et al. [LKB+15]. As such, our composition theorem below implies
security of their scheme—with a linear blow-up of the error term (instead of
double exponential).
We point out that formally we obtain security of the Lunghi et al. scheme
as a 2-prover commitment scheme under an abstract restriction on the provers’
communication: in every round, the active prover cannot access the message
that the other prover received in the previous round. As such, when the rounds
of the protocol are executed fast enough so that it is ensured that there is no
3The possible randomized attacks are then naturally given as those that pick one of the
deterministic attacks according to some distribution.
4This one-way communication models that in the relativistic setting, sufficient time has
passed at this point for P to inform Q about what happened during comP .
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Figure 4.1: The composition of S and S ′ (assuming single-round commit
phases). The dotted arrows indicate communication possible to the dishonest
provers.
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time for the provers to communicate between subsequent rounds, then security
as a relativistic commitment scheme follows immediately.
Remark 4.6. In Section 2.2.2, we noted that the verifier in a relativistic
commitment scheme also needs to be convinced that the provers keep the ap-
propriate distance from each other. In some schemes, this can be achieved by
splitting up the verifier into two entities and placing them at the same locations
as the provers. If (S,XS) is an eligible pair, then S ?XS, and more generally
Sm, allow for the verifier to be split up in this way. This holds because in each
round before the last, the verifier initiates a new commitment.
Remark 4.7. It is immediate that S ? S ′ is a commitment scheme in the
sense of Definition 2.8, and that it is complete if S and S ′ are, with the error
parameters adding up. It is intuitively clear that S ? S ′ should be binding if
S and S ′ are: committing to the opening information y and then opening the
commitment allows the provers to delay the announcement of y (which is the
whole point of the exercise), but it does not allow them to change y, by the
binding property of S ′; thus, S ? S ′ should be (almost) as binding as S. This
intuition is confirmed by our composition theorem below.
4.1.3 Hiding Property for Composed Schemes
The hiding property is obviously inherited from S, i.e., S ? S ′ is δ-binding in
the sense of Definition 2.13 if and only if S is δ-hiding. However, this definition
is not suitable for schemes with a multi-round opening phase: a scheme that
reveals the committed string s in the first round of the opening phase would
still satisfy Definition 2.13, but clearly, doing so defeats the entire purpose of
a multi-round commitment scheme. Recall that, using the terminology used
in context of relativistic commitments, the rounds of the opening phase up to
before the last are referred to as the sustain phase, and only the last round is
considered the opening phase proper. We show in this section that S ? S ′ is
hiding up to before the last round, with the error parameters adding up.
Definition 4.8. Let S = (comPQV , openPQV ) be a commitment scheme. We
write v for the verifier’s view immediately before the last round of communica-
tion in openPQV . We say that a scheme is ε-hiding until the last round if for
any (possibly dishonest) verifier V and any two inputs s0 and s1 to the honest
provers, we have d(p(v|s0), p(v|s1)) ≤ ε.
Theorem 4.9. Let S be a ε-hiding commitment scheme and S ′ a scheme that
is δ-hiding until the last round. If (S,S ′) is eligible, then the composed scheme
S ′′ = S ? S ′ is (ε+ δ)-hiding until the last round.
Proof. Fix a strategy against the hiding-until-the-last-round property of S ′′.
We consider the distribution p(v, y, v′|s) where s is the string that the provers
commit to, v the verifier’s view after comPQV has been executed, y the opening
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information to which Q commits using the scheme S ′, and v′ the verifier’s view
immediately before the last round of communication. We need to show that
d(p(v′|s0), p(v′|s1)) ≤ ε+ δ for any s0 and s1.
First, note that p(v′|v, y, sb) = p(v′|v, y) since v′ is produced by P , Q and
V acting on y and v only. From any strategy against S ′′, we can obtain a
strategy against S ′ by fixing v. Thus, by the hiding property of S ′, for any
y0 and y1, we have d(p(v′|v, y = y0), p(v′|v, y = y1)) ≤ δ and it follows by the




p(y|v, s0)p(v′|v, y) ≈δ
∑
y
p(y|v, s1)p(v′|v, y) = p(v′|v, s1)
where we use ≈δ to indicate that the two distributions have statistical distance
at most δ. Since we have d(p(v|s0), p(v|s1)) ≤ ε by the hiding property of S,
it follows that




where the first and last equality hold because v′ contains v since v′ is the view
of V at a later point in time.
4.2 The Composition Theorems
4.2.1 A Composition Theorem for (Strongly) Binding
Schemes
Before stating and proving the composition theorem, we need to single out one
more relevant parameter.
Definition 4.10. Let (S,S ′) be an eligible pair, which in particular means
that V ’s action in the opening phase of S is determined by a function Extr.
We define k(S) := maxc,s |{y |Extr(y, c) = s}|.
I.e., k(S) counts the number of y’s that are consistent with a given string
s in the worst case. Note that k(CHSHq) = 1: for every a, x, s ∈ Fq there is
at most one y ∈ Fq such that x+ y = a · s.
In the following composition theorems, we take it as understood that the
assumed respective binding properties of S and S ′ hold with respect to a well-
defined respective classes of possible attacks. We start with the composition
theorem for the fairly-binding property, which is easier to prove than the one
for the fairly-weak-binding property.
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Theorem 4.11. Let (S,S ′) be an eligible pair of 2-prover commitment schemes,
and assume that S and S ′ are respectively ε-fairly-binding and δ-fairly-binding.
Then, their composition S ′′ = S ? S ′ is (ε+ k(S) · δ)-fairly-binding.
Proof. We first consider the case k(S) = 1. We fix an attack (comP , open′′PQ)
against S ′′. Without loss of generality, the attack is deterministic, so open′′PQ
is of the form open′′PQ = open
′
PQ ◦ ptoqPQ ◦ com′Q.
Note that comP is also a commit strategy for S. As such, by the fairly-
binding property of S, there exists a function ŝ(c), only depending on comP ,
so that the property specified in Definition 3.2 is satisfied for every opening
strategy openQ for S. We will show that it is also satisfied for the (arbitrary)
opening strategy open′′PQ for S ′′, except for a small increase in ε: we will show
that p(ŝ(c) 6= s ∧ s = s◦) ≤ ε + δ for every fixed target string s◦. This then
proves the claim.
To show this property on ŝ(c), we “decompose and reassemble” the at-
tack strategy (comP , open′PQ ◦ ptoqPQ ◦ com′Q) for S ′′ into an attack strategy
(com′Q, newopen
′

















Informally, this means that ahead of time, P and Q simulate an execution
of (comP (∅)||comV (∅)) and take the resulting communication/commitment5 c
as shared randomness, and then newopen′PQ computes stateP from c as does
comP , and runs open′PQ (see Fig. 4.2).6 It follows from the fairly-binding
property that there is a function ŷ(c′) of the commitment c′ so that p(ŷ(c′) 6=
y ∧ y = y◦(c)) ≤ δ for every function y◦(c).
The existence of ŷ now gives rise to an opening strategy openQ for S;
namely, simulate the commit phase of S ′ to obtain the commitment c′, and
output ŷ(c′). By Definition 3.2, for s̃ := Extr(ŷ(c′), c) and every s◦, p(ŝ(c) 6=
s̃ ∧ s̃ = s◦) ≤ ε.
We are now ready to put things together. Fix an arbitrary target string s◦.
For any c we let y◦(c) be the unique string such that Extr(y◦(c), c) = s◦ (and
some default string if no such string exists); recall, we assume for the moment
that k(S) = 1. Omitting the arguments in ŝ(c), ŷ(c′) and y◦(c), it follows that
p(ŝ 6= s ∧ s = s◦) ≤ p(ŝ 6= s ∧ s = s◦ ∧ s = s̃) + p(s = s◦ ∧ s 6= s̃)
≤ p(ŝ 6= s̃ ∧ s̃ = s◦) + p
(
Extr(y, c) 6= Extr(ŷ, c) ∧ Extr(y, c) = s◦
)
≤ p(ŝ 6= s̃ ∧ s̃ = s◦) + p(y 6= ŷ ∧ y = y◦)
≤ ε+ δ.
5Recall that by convention (Remark 2.10), the commitment c equals the communication
between V and, here, P .
6We are using here that Q is inactive during comPQ and P during com′PQ, and thus the
two “commute”.
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Figure 4.2: Constructing the opening strategy newopen′PQ against S ′.
Thus, ŝ is as required.
For the general case where k(S) > 1, we can reason similarly, except that
we then list the k ≤ k(S) possibilities y1◦(c), . . . , yk◦ (c) for y◦(c), and conclude




y 6= ŷ ∧ y = yi◦
)
≤ k(S) · δ, which then results
in the claimed bound.
Remark 4.12. Putting things together, we can now conclude the security (i.e.,
the binding property) of the Lunghi et al. multi-round commitment scheme.
Corollary 3.22 ensures the fairly-binding property of CHSHq, i.e., the Cré-
peau et al. scheme as a string-commitment scheme, with parameter 2
√
q−1.
The composition theorem (Theorem 4.11) then guarantees the fairly-binding
property of the m-fold composition as a string-commitment scheme, with pa-
rameter (m + 1) · 2
√
q−1. Finally, Proposition 3.6 implies that the m-fold
composition of CHSHq with itself is a εm-binding bit-commitment scheme with
error parameter εm = (m+1) ·4
√
q−1 as claimed in the introduction, or, more




4.2.2 Composition Theorem for Weakly Binding Schemes
We now show the composition theorem for the weak version of the binding
property. Since this notion makes sense also against quantum attacks, we em-
phasize the restriction to classical attacks—extending the theorem to quantum
attacks is an open problem. See Chapter 5 for some partial progress in this
direction.
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Theorem 4.13. Let (S,S ′) be an eligible pair of 2-prover commitment schemes,
and assume that S and S ′ are respectively ε-fairly-weak-binding and δ-fairly-
weak-binding against classical attacks. Then, their composition S ′′ = S ? S ′
is a (ε + k(S) · δ)-fairly-weak-binding 2-prover commitment scheme against
classical attacks.
Proof. We first consider the case k(S) = 1. We fix an arbitrary deterministic
attack (comP , open′′PQ) against S ′′, where open′′PQ is of the form open′′PQ =
open′PQ ◦ ptoqPQ ◦ com′Q. Let a be V ’s randomness in comV . Then, c is a
function c(a) of a, and the distribution p(a, y) is well defined. Since comP
is also an attack strategy against S, there exists a distribution p(ŝ) (only
depending on comP ) such that Definition 3.9 is satisfied for every opening
strategy openQ for S.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 4.11, we decompose and reassemble the
attack strategy (comP , open′PQ ◦ptoqPQ ◦com′Q) for S ′′ into an attack strategy
(com′Q, newopen
′
PQ) for S ′. Concretely, for every fixed choice of a, we obtain












and the distribution of the verifier’s output y when the provers use newopen′PQ,a
is p(y|a). It follows from the fairly-weak-binding property of S ′ that there ex-
ists a distribution p(ŷ), only depending on com′Q, so that for every choice of
a there exists a consistent joint distribution p(ŷ, y|a) so that p(ŷ 6= y ∧ y =
y◦|a) ≤ δ for every fixed target string y◦. Note that here, consistency in par-
ticular means that p(ŷ|a) = p(ŷ). This joint conditional distribution p(ŷ, y|a)
together with the distribution p(a) of a then naturally defines the distribution
p(a, ŷ, y), which is consistent with p(a, y) considered above.
The existence of p(ŷ) now gives rise to an opening strategy openQ for
S; namely, sample ŷ according to p(ŷ) and output ŷ. Note that the joint
distribution of a and ŷ in this “experiment” is given by
p(a) · p(ŷ) = p(a) · p(ŷ|a) = p(a, ŷ) ,
i.e., is consistent with the distribution p(a, ŷ, y) above. By Definition 3.9, we
know there exists a joint distribution p(ŝ, s̃), consistent with p(ŝ) fixed above
and with p(s̃) determined by s̃ := Extr(ŷ, c(a)), and such that p(ŝ 6= s̃ ∧ s̃ =
s◦) ≤ ε for every s◦. We can now “glue together” p(ŝ, s̃) and p(c, ŷ, y, s̃), i.e.,
find a joint distribution that is consistent with both, by setting
p(a, ŷ, y, s̃, ŝ) := p(a, ŷ, y, s̃) · p(ŝ|s̃) .
We now fix an arbitrary target string s◦. Furthermore, for any a we let y◦(a) be
the unique string such that Extr(y◦(a), c(a)) = s◦ (and to some default string if
no such string exists); recall, we assume for the moment that k(S) = 1. With
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respect to the above joint distribution, it then holds that
p(ŝ 6= s ∧ s = s◦) = p(ŝ 6= s ∧ s = s◦ ∧ s = s̃) + p(s = s◦ ∧ s = s◦ ∧ s 6= s̃)
≤ p(ŝ 6= s̃ ∧ s = s◦ ∧ s = s̃) + p(s 6= s̃ ∧ s = s◦)
≤ p(ŝ 6= s̃ ∧ s̃ = s◦)
+ p
(
Extr(y, c(a)) 6= Extr(ŷ, c(a)) ∧ Extr(y, c(a)) = s◦
)
≤ p(ŝ 6= s̃ ∧ s̃ = s◦) + p(y 6= ŷ ∧ y = y◦(a))
≤ p(ŝ 6= s̃ ∧ s̃ = s◦) +
∑
a p(a) · p(y 6= ŷ ∧ y = y◦(a)|a)
≤ ε+ δ .
Thus, the distribution p(ŝ, s) is as required.
For the case where k(S) > 1, we can reason similarly, except that we then
list the k ≤ k(S) possibilities y1◦(a), . . . , ya◦(a) for y◦(a), and conclude that




y 6= ŷ ∧ y = yi◦(a)
)
≤ k(S) · δ, which then results in
the claimed bound.
Remark 4.14. Analogously to Remark 4.12, we can conclude from Corol-
lary 3.23 and Theorem 4.13 that CHSHq is (m+1)·
√
2q−1-fairly-weak-binding.
It follows from Proposition 3.11 that CHSHq is a (m + 1) · 23/2
√
q−1-weak-
binding bit-commitment scheme. More generally, we can conclude that for any
k < n, it is a (m + 1) · 2k+1/2
√
q−1-weak-binding k-bit string-commitment
scheme. Below, we show how to avoid the factor 2 introduced by invoking
Proposition 3.11.
4.3 Variations
In this section, we show two variants of the composition theorems. The first
one says that if we compose a weak-binding with a fairly-weak-binding scheme,
we obtain a weak-binding scheme. This allows us to slightly improve the
parameter in Remark 4.14. The proof crucially relies on the fact that, in the
weak definition, there is some freedom in “gluing together” the distributions
p(s) and p(ŝ). The second variant says that composing two binding (or weak-
binding) schemes yields a binding (or weak-binding, respectively) scheme.
We start by proving the following two properties for fairly-weak-binding
commitment schemes. The first property shows that one may assume the joint
distribution p(ŝ, s) to be such that s and ŝ are independent conditioned on
s 6= ŝ.
Lemma 4.15. Let S be a ε-fairly-weak-binding commitment scheme. Then,
for any comPQ and openPQ there exists a joint distribution p(ŝ, s) as required
by Definition 3.9, but with the additional property that
p(ŝ, s|s 6= ŝ) = p(ŝ|s 6= ŝ) · p(s|s 6= ŝ) .
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Proof. Since the scheme is ε-fairly-weak-binding, it follows that there exists a
consistent joint distribution p(ŝ, s) such that p(s 6= ŝ ∧ s = s◦) ≤ ε for every
s◦. Because of this, we have
p(s = s◦) = p(s=s◦ ∧ ŝ=s◦) + p(s=s◦ ∧ ŝ 6=s◦)
= p(s=s◦ ∧ ŝ=s◦) + p(s 6= ŝ ∧ s=s◦)
≤ p(ŝ = s◦) + ε.
We apply Lemma 2.2 to the marginal distributions p(ŝ) and p(s). The resulting
joint distribution p̃(ŝ, s) satisfies p̃(ŝ = s◦ ∧ s = s◦|s = ŝ) = min{p(s =
s◦), p(ŝ = s◦)} and p̃(ŝ, s|s 6= ŝ) = p̃(ŝ|s 6= ŝ) · p̃(s|s 6= ŝ). It remains to show
that p̃(s 6= ŝ ∧ s = s◦) ≤ ε for all s◦. Indeed, we have
p̃(s 6= ŝ ∧ s = s◦) = p̃(s = s◦)− p̃(s = ŝ ∧ s = s◦)
= p̃(s = s◦)− p̃(ŝ = s◦ ∧ s = s◦)
= p(s = s◦)−min{p(ŝ = s◦), p(s = s◦)}
≤ p(s = s◦)− (p(s = s◦)− ε)
= ε
as claimed.
The second property shows that the quantification over all fixed s◦ in Def-
inition 3.9 of the fairly-weak-binding property can be relaxed to s◦ that may
depend on ŝ, but only on ŝ. Note that we can obviously not allow s◦ to depend
(arbitrarily) on s, since then one could choose s◦ = s.
Proposition 4.16. Let S be a ε-fairly-weak-binding commitment scheme.
Then
∀ comPQ ∃ p(ŝ) ∀ openPQ ∃ p(ŝ, s) ∀ p(s◦|ŝ) : p(s 6= ŝ ∧ s = s◦) ≤ ε ,
where it is understood that p(ŝ, s, s◦) := p(ŝ, s) · p(s◦|ŝ). Thus, the joint dis-
tribution p(ŝ, s) is such that p(s 6= ŝ ∧ s = s◦) ≤ ε holds in particular for any
function s◦ = f(ŝ) of ŝ.
Proof. For given comPQ and openPQ, let p(ŝ, s) be as guaranteed by the fairly-
weak-binding property. By Lemma 4.15, we may assume without loss of gen-
erality that p(ŝ, s|s 6= ŝ) = p(ŝ|s 6= ŝ) p(s|s 6= ŝ). Then, by Lemma 2.7, we also
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have that p(s, s◦|s 6= ŝ) = p(s|s 6= ŝ) p(s◦|s 6= ŝ). It follows that
p(s 6= ŝ ∧ s = s◦) = p(s 6= ŝ) · p(s = s◦|s 6= ŝ)
= p(s 6= ŝ)
∑
s∗◦
p(s = s∗◦ ∧ s◦ = s∗◦|s 6= ŝ)
= p(s 6= ŝ)
∑
s∗◦












where the inequality follows from the fact that p(s 6= ŝ∧ s = s∗◦) ≤ ε for every
fixed s∗◦.
For the rest of the section, we take it as understood that we only consider
classical attacks.
Theorem 4.17. Let (S,S ′) be an eligible pair of 2-prover commitment schemes,
where S is ε-weak-binding and S ′ is δ-fairly-weak-binding, and let D be the do-
main of S. Then, the composition S?S ′ is a (ε+(|D|−1)·k(S)·δ)-weak-binding
commitment scheme.
In particular, if S is a bit commitment scheme then S ? S ′ is a (ε+ k(S) · δ)-
weak-binding.
Proof. We follow the proof of Theorem 4.13, up to when it comes to choosing
y◦. Let us first consider the case m = 1, i.e., S is a bit-commitment scheme. In
that case, and assuming for the moment that k(S) = 1, we let y◦ be the unique
string that satisfies Extr(y◦, c) = s◦, but where now s◦ := 1− s̃. We emphasize
that for a fixed c, this choice of y◦ is not fixed anymore (in contrast to the
choice in the proof of Theorem 4.13); namely, it is a function of s̃ = Extr(ŷ, c),
which in turn is a function of ŷ. Therefore, by Proposition 4.16, it still holds
that p(y 6= ŷ ∧ y = y◦|a) ≤ δ, and we can conclude that
p(ŝ 6= s ∧ s 6= ⊥) ≤ p(ŝ 6= s ∧ s 6= ⊥ ∧ s = s̃) + p(s 6= s̃ ∧ s 6= ⊥)
= p(ŝ 6= s̃ ∧ s 6= ⊥ ∧ s = s̃) + p(s 6= s̃ ∧ s = 1− s̃)
≤ p(ŝ 6= s̃ ∧ s̃ 6= ⊥) + p(y 6= ŷ ∧ y = y◦)
≤ p(ŝ 6= s̃ ∧ s̃ 6= ⊥) +
∑




= ε+ δ .
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In the case that k(S) > 1, we instead randomly select one of the at most
k(S) strings y◦ that satisfy Extr(y◦, c) = s◦ = 1 − s̃. Then, conditioned on
a, y◦ is still independent of y given ŷ, so that Proposition 4.16 still applies,
and we can argue as above, except that we get a factor k(S) blow-up from
p(s 6= s̃ ∧ s = 1− s̃) ≤ k(S) · p(y 6= ŷ ∧ y = y◦).
Finally, for the case m > 1, we first pick a random s◦ ∈ D \ {s̃}, and
then choose y◦ such that Extr(y◦, c) = s◦, uniquely or at random, depending
of k(S). Conditioned on a, y◦ is still independent of y given ŷ, and therefore
Proposition 4.16 still applies, but now we get an additional factor (|D| − 1)
blow-up from p(s 6= s̃ ∧ s 6= ⊥) ≤ (|D| − 1) p(s 6= s̃ ∧ s = s◦).
Remark 4.18. Theorem 4.17 allows us to slightly improve the bound we obtain
in Remark 4.14 on the Lunghi et al. multi-round commitment scheme. By The-
orem 4.13, we can compose m instances of CHSHn to obtain a m · 2−(n−1)/2 -
fairly-weak-binding string-commitment scheme. Then, we can compose the
Crépeau et al. bit commitment scheme (i.e., the bit-commitment version of
CHSHn), which is 2−(n−1)-weak-binding, with this fairly-weak-binding string-
commitment scheme; by Theorem 4.17, this composition, which is the Lunghi
et al. multi-round bit-commitment scheme, is
(




Finally, for completeness, we point out that the composition theorem also
applies to two ordinary binding or weak-binding commitment schemes.
Theorem 4.19. Let (S,S ′) be an eligible pair of 2-prover commitment schemes,
where S is ε-binding and S ′ is δ-binding. Then, the composition S ? S ′ is
(ε+ δ)-binding. The same holds for the weak-binding property.
Proof. The proof is almost the same as in Theorem 4.11 or Theorem 4.13,
respectively, except that now there are no s◦ and y◦, and in the end we can
simply conclude that
p(s 6= ŝ ∧ s 6= ⊥) ≤ p(s 6= ŝ ∧ s 6= ⊥ ∧ s = s̃) + p(s 6= s̃ ∧ s 6= ⊥)
≤ p(s̃ 6= ŝ ∧ s̃ 6= ⊥) + p(y 6= ŷ ∧ y 6= ⊥)
≤ ε+ δ ,
where the second inequality holds since y = ⊥ implies that s = Extr(y, c) =
⊥.
4.4 Tightness
We now show that our composition result is nearly tight for CHSHq. Let
CHSHqm be the m-fold composition of CHSH
q with itself, as defined in Re-
mark 4.5. We show that if q = p2k for some prime p, this composed scheme
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slightly weaker result was proved in [BC16], which shows that ε & 16m2
−n/2
for q = 2n with n even.7 Furthermore, we show that, as a string-commitment
scheme, CHSHnm can be ε-fairly-weak-binding only if ε & 12m
√
q−1 (for q =
p2k).




p(Xq(a, r) + Yq(s, r) = a · s) (4.1)
where a, s and r are selected uniformly at random. It holds that:
1. There are Xq and Yq such that p(Xq(a, r) + Yq(s, r) = a · s) = λq for all
a, s ∈ Fq.










Proof. Fix X ′q and Y ′q that achieve the maximum in Equation (4.1). We show
that there also are functions Xq and Yq such that for any a and s, p(Xq(a, r)+
Yq(s, r) = a · s) = λq: Without loss of generality, X ′q and Y ′q depend only on
a and s, not on r. Intuitively, Xq and Yq do the following: they randomize
their inputs a and s by adding uniformly random elements ra, rs ∈ Fq, then
apply X ′q and Y ′q , and finally remove the random terms again from the output.
Formally, we let
Xq(a, (ra, rs)) = X
′
n(a+ ra)− ars − rars
Yq(a, (ra, rs)) = Y
′
n(s+ rs)− ras
For ra and rs uniformly random, we have p(X ′q(a+ra)+Y ′q (s+rs) = as+ars+
rars+sra) = λq. Thus, it is easy to see that p(Xq(a, (ra, rs))+Yq(s, (ra, rs)) =
as) = λq.
The functions Xq and Yq in Equation (4.1) describe classical strategies for
the CHSHq game and λq is the maximal winning probability that classical










The following lemma can be seen as a generalization of Theorem 3.12 to
string-commitment schemes. Intuitively, it bounds the winning probability of
the provers in the following game: First, they have to produce a commitment.
Then, they receive a uniformly random string s◦ and, in order to win, they
have to open the commitment to s◦. The winning probability in this game
is at most ε + 2−n, when the scheme is an ε-fairly-weak-binding n-bit string-
commitment scheme.
7The paper states ε & 1
3
m2−n/2, but their binding definition is p0+p1 ≤ 1+ε; to convert
their bound to our definition (equivalent to p0 + p1 ≤ 1 + 2ε), it must be multiplied by 1/2.
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Lemma 4.21. Let S be an ε-fairly-weak-binding commitment scheme with
domain D. Fix a possible commit strategy comPQ for S and, for each s◦ ∈ D,
a possible opening strategy openPQ(s◦). Let p(s|s◦) be the output distribution
of S if the provers use comPQ and openPQ(s◦). Let p(s◦) be the uniform
distribution over D. Then, p(s = s◦) =
∑
s◦∈D p(s◦)p(s = s◦|s◦) ≤ ε+ |D|
−1.
Proof. Let p(ŝ) be a distribution that satisfies Equation (3.4) for the com-
mit strategy comPQ. Now consider any consistent joint distribution p(s, ŝ|s◦).
Here, consistency also means that p(ŝ|s◦) = p(ŝ). Thus, for a uniformly ran-
dom s◦, p(ŝ = s◦) = |D|−1. By the ε-fairly-weak-binding property of S, we
have
ε ≥ p(s 6= ŝ ∧ s = s◦) ≥ p(s = s◦)− p(ŝ = s◦) = p(s = s◦)− |D|−1
and thus our claim follows.
With the help of the lemma above, is easy to see that λq limits the binding
parameter of the one-round scheme CHSHq: If P sends Xn(a, r) and Q sends
Yn(s◦, r) for uniformly random r, then we have p(s = s◦|a 6= 0) = λq, and
thus p(s = s◦) ≥ λq − q−1 for every s◦. Thus, by Lemma 4.21, CHSHq can
be ε-fairly-weak-binding only if ε ≥ λq − 2q−1. We now show that this bound
scales approximately linearly with the number of rounds.
Theorem 4.22. Let λq as in Lemma 4.20. For odd m, the CHSHqm com-
mitment scheme can be ε-fairly-weak-binding as a string-commitment scheme
only if

























Proof. Let Xq(a, r) and Yq(b, r) be functions as in Lemma 4.20. We define
a commit strategy comPQ and an opening strategy openPQ(s◦) for every s◦
which aims to open to s◦.
We assume that the provers havem uniformly random ri ∈ Fq and (m+1)/2
uniformly random inputs r′i, i odd, for Xq and Yq as shared randomness. We
write ci = (ai, xi) for the communication between the verifier and the active
prover in round i, where the xi are specified below. The dishonest provers
exchange their communications as fast as possible, so in round i + 2, the
active prover knows c1, . . . , ci. Let y0 = s◦ and for i > 0, let yi such that
Extr(yi, ci) = yi−1. Such a yi exists and is unique if ai 6= 0. We only specify
our strategy for the case where the verifier’s messages ai are all non-zero and
assume that the provers fail to open to s◦ otherwise. One can compute yi from
c1, . . . , ci, so in round i+ 2, the active prover can compute yi.
If in any round i, the commitment is (ai, ri+ai ·yi−1), the provers can open
to s◦ simply by following the honest strategy for CHSHqm from that round on.
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The strategy described below is such that the provers have (m+ 1)/2 chances
to bring about this situation with probability λq.
• Round 1 (commit): P produces a “fake commitment” x1 = Xq(a1, r′1).
• Round i, i even: Q computes y′i−1 = Yq(yi−2, r′i−1), hoping that xi−1 +
y′i−1 = ai−1 · yi−2, i.e., y′i−1 = yi−1. He honestly commits to y′i−1 by
computing xi = ai · y′i−1 + ri.
• Round i+1, i even: P checks if yi−1 = y′i−1. If yes, both provers proceed
honestly from this round on, i.e., they follow the honest strategy for
CHSHqm in all subsequent rounds.8 If not, P again produces a “fake
commitment” xi+1 = Xq(ai+1, r′i+1).
• Round m+ 1: Q sends y′m = Yq(ym−1, r′m) to V .
By definition, it holds that y′i−1 = yi−1 if and only if Xq(ai−1, r′i−1) +
Yq(yi−2, r
′
i−1) = ai−1 · yi−2, which happens with probability λq. In this case,
we have ci = (ai, ri + ai · yi−1), so the provers can indeed open to s◦ by
proceeding honestly (ignoring completeness errors for now).
By definition of Xq, Yq, and λq, if the provers use the strategy openPQ(s◦),
then for

















we have p(s = s◦|a1, . . . , am 6= 0) = λ. Thus, p(s = s◦) ≥ λ −mq−1 for all
s◦. Applying Lemma 4.21, we conclude that the scheme can be ε-fairly-weak-
binding only if
























otherwise, by claim 2 of Lemma 4.20.
From the analysis in the above proof, we can also derive a version of the
theorem for the bit-commitment scheme described in Proposition 3.11.
Corollary 4.23. For even m, the commitment scheme CHSHqm can be ε-






















8Q can compute yi−1 in round i + 2 and thus he too knows whether the provers should
proceed honestly or not.
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Proof. Let comP = comP (0), i.e., P produces an honest commitment to 0. Let
openPQ(0) = openPQ, i.e., the honest opening strategy. Since the provers play
honestly, they are successful with probability at least 1− (m+ 1)q−1.
For openPQ(1), let s◦ such that Extr(s◦, c1) = 1. The provers then use the
strategy in the proof of Theorem 4.22 to produce a fake commitment c1 and
open it to s◦. Then, we have
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In Chapter 4, we proved composition theorems for two-prover commitment
schemes. Those theorems crucially rely on the assumption that dishonest
provers can only use classical shared randomness, and not entangled quan-
tum states: The definition of our (strong) binding property does not apply if
the provers use quantum entanglement instead of classical randomness. While
the weak binding property is well-defined for adversaries with quantum capa-
bilities, our proof of the composition theorem for this binding property, i.e.,
Theorem 4.13, still requires that we can assume without loss of generality
that the adversaries’ strategy is deterministic. This is not true if we consider
adversaries with quantum capabilities.
In this chapter, we take some steps towards arguing that the Lunghi et al.
scheme is binding for provers with quantum capabilities.
In Section 5.4, we show that CHSHq satisfies the fairly-weak-binding def-
inition as a string-commitment scheme even when the adversaries can share
entangled quantum states. Our intuitive argument in Chapter 4 thus suggests
that CHSHqm also satisfies the binding property with parameter linear in m
for such adversaries. However, since our composition theorem only applies to
classical provers, this intuition remains without a rigorous proof.
Approaching the problem from another direction, we introduce an analogue
of the strong binding definition for the quantum case, and prove a composition
theorem using this definition which applies to quantum provers. However, we
currently do not know if CHSHq (or any other scheme) satisfies this stronger
definition. Thus, the question whether there exists a multi-round scheme bind-
ing for quantum adversaries remains open.
59
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5.2 Quantum Information Theory
We start with a very brief introduction to quantum information theory where
we fix our notation. We refer readers who are not familiar with the subject
to introductory textbooks such as [NC00] or [Wil13]. Quantum information
theory is based on quantum mechanics, but takes a somewhat different point
of view. While quantum mechanics is about the evolution of quantum sys-
tems over time, quantum information theory views them as static carriers of
information which only change when acted upon by an experimenter.
We begin with defining the required mathematical concepts and then in-
troduce quantum states, measurements, and entanglement. Many properties
that are taken for granted in classical information do not apply to quantum
information: in particular, it is generally not possible to extract information
from a quantum state without changing it, or to make a perfect copy of a quan-
tum state. However, we also show how to express classical information and
computation in the formalism of quantum information theory. Thus, quantum
information can be viewed as an extension of classical information.
5.2.1 Definitions
In this section, we recall the mathematical concepts that are used to describe
quantum information. We let H be a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert space,
i.e., a complex vector space with an inner product 〈·|·〉 that is conjugate-
symmetric and linear in the second argument. We write vectors in H using
the bra-ket notation introduced by Paul Dirac [Dir39]: A vector in H is written
as a ket-vector |φ〉. Every ket-vector |φ〉 has a corresponding bra-vector 〈φ| in
the dual space H∗:
〈φ| : H → C, |ψ〉 7→ 〈φ|ψ〉 .
Thus, a bra- and a ket-vector “fit together” notationally to form the inner
product: 〈φ| |ψ〉 = 〈φ|ψ〉.




Definition 5.2. Let {|i〉}i∈I be a basis of H. It is called an orthonormal basis
if all vectors have norm 1 and are mutually orthogonal. That is, for all i, j ∈ I:
〈i|j〉 =
{
1 if i = j
0 otherwise
We write L(H) to denote the vector space of linear operators onH. For any
pair of vectors |φ〉 , |ψ〉 ∈ H, the outer product is defined as the linear operator
|φ〉〈ψ| : H → H, |δ〉 7→ |φ〉 〈ψ|δ〉 = 〈ψ|δ〉 |φ〉. The space L(H) is spanned by
the set of outer products. In fact, if {|i〉}i∈I is a basis of H, then {|i〉〈j|}i,j∈I is
a basis of L(H). We recall the following two linear operators acting on L(H):
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Definition 5.3. The conjugate transpose is the linear operator L(H)→ L(H)
that maps |φ〉〈ψ| to |φ〉〈ψ|† := |ψ〉〈φ| for all |φ〉 , |ψ〉 ∈ H.
Definition 5.4. The trace is the linear operator Tr : L(H) → C defined by
Tr(|φ〉〈ψ|) = 〈ψ|φ〉 for all |φ〉 , |ψ〉 ∈ H.
For any A ∈ L(H) and any orthonormal basis {|i〉}i∈I ,
∑
i∈I 〈i|A |i〉 =∑
i∈I Tr(A |i〉〈i|) = Tr(A), using the equality
∑
i∈I |i〉〈i| = I. Thus, the above
definition of the trace coincides with the more usual one where Tr(A) is defined
as the sum of the diagonal elements of a matrix representation of A.
Definition 5.5. A linear operator ρ : H → H is called a density matrix if ρ
is positive semi-definite (i.e., 〈φ| ρ |φ〉 ≥ 0 for all |φ〉 ∈ H) and Tr(ρ) = 1.
Definition 5.6. An operator U ∈ L(H) is called unitary if U†U = I.
An equivalent characterization of unitaries is that they map an orthonor-
mal basis to an orthonormal basis, i.e., U is unitary if and only if there are
orthonormal bases {|i〉}i∈I and {|φi〉}i∈I such that U =
∑
i∈I |φi〉〈i|.
Definition 5.7. Let P : H → H be a linear operator. We say that P is a
projector if P 2 = P and P † = P . We say that two projectors P and Q are
(mutually) orthogonal if PQ = 0.1
Definition 5.8. Suppose that H = HA ⊗HB. The partial trace is defined as
the linear operator
TrA : L(H)→ L(HB), ρA ⊗ ρB 7→ Tr(ρA)ρB
The partial trace TrB is defined symmetrically.
5.2.2 Quantum States and Measurements
A (finite-dimensional) quantum system A is associated with a state space HA,
which is a finite-dimensional, complex Hilbert space. The state of a quantum
system is represented as a density matrix ρ over HA. We identify the state of
a quantum system with the density matrix that describes it and also call ρ a
quantum state.
A quantum state can be acted on in the following two ways: The first
is to apply a unitary U , transforming the state ρ into UρU†. The second
way is to perform a measurement, which is the only way to extract classical
information from a quantum state. A (projective) measurement is described by
a collection {Pi}i∈I of mutually orthogonal projectors such that
∑
i∈I Pi = I,
1Usually, projectors are defined just by the property P 2 = P . If they also satisfy P † = P ,
they are usually called orthogonal projectors. However, since all projectors we consider
are orthogonal projectors, we reserve the term orthogonal for mutually orthogonal pairs of
projectors.
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where I is some finite index set. The measurement produces outcome i with
probability pi := Tr(PiρP
†
i ) = Tr(Piρ). If the state is measured and outcome i
is observed, the state collapses to 1piPiρPi. There are more general formalisms
for measurements, but we can restrict to projective measurements without loss
of generality (see Naimark’s Dilation Theorem).
If we can write ρ = |φ〉〈φ|, ρ is called a pure state and we can use |φ〉
as a representation of the quantum state. In this representation, applying a
unitary U maps |φ〉 to U |φ〉. When performing a measurement, we observe
outcome i with probability pi = ‖Pi |φ〉 ‖2 and obtain post-measurement state
1
pi
Pi |φ〉. If a quantum system is in the pure state |φi〉 with probability pi, it
is represented by the density matrix
∑
i pi |φi〉〈φi|.
For every orthonormal basis B = {|i〉}i∈I of H, {|i〉〈i|}i∈I is a projective
measurement, called the total projective measurement with respect to B or
simply the measurement in basis B.
5.2.3 Bi-partite Quantum States and Entanglement
A crucial concept for this chapter is quantum entanglement shared between
two parties. Let A and B be two quantum systems with respective state
spaces HA and HB . We may consider the two systems together as a single
joint quantum system AB. The state space of AB is HAB := HA ⊗ HB . If
A and B are prepared independently in states ρA and ρB , respectively, the
state of the joint system is ρA ⊗ ρB . If the state of the joint system is a pure
tensor like this, we say that it is in product state. A product state can be seen
as an analogue to a pair of independent random variables. A state is called
separable if it can be written as ρAB =
∑
i piρA,i⊗ρB,i where the ρA,i and ρB,i
are density matrices, pi ≥ 0 and
∑
i pi = 1. A separable state is analogous
to a pair of possibly correlated random variables. Finally, states that are not
separable are called entangled and do not have any classical analogue.
If we perform an action on system A, the joint system AB is affected
as follows: If a unitary UA is applied on A, it acts as UA ⊗ IB on the whole
system. A measurement {Pi}i∈I on A acts as {Pi⊗IB}i∈I on the joint system.
Symmetrically, applying a unitary UB on system B acts as IA ⊗ UB and a
measurement {Pi}i∈I on B acts as {IA ⊗ Pi}i∈I on AB.
A final operation that can be performed on a joint system is to remove a
part of it. When we have a joint system AB in state ρAB , the state of the
subsystem B on its own is described by the partial trace TrA(ρAB).
The above generalizes to tripartite (and, more generally, n-partite) states.
Entanglement does not depend on physical proximity. Two agents that are
far apart – like the provers in a relativistic bit-commitment scheme – can
each keep one part of an entangled quantum state and apply unitaries and
measurements to their part. Sharing an entangled quantum state allows two
parties to correlate their behavior without communicating in a way that is
not possible classically. We give an example of this phenomenon in the next
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section.
5.2.4 Example: A Strategy for CHSH
To illustrate the effects of quantum entanglement, we now describe a strategy
for the CHSH game using an entangled quantum state, which has a better
success probability than any strategy that relies solely on shared randomness.
Recall that the CHSH game works as follows [CHSH69]: The players Alice
and Bob each receive an input bit a and b, respectively, and they each have
to output a bit x and y, respectively, without communicating. They win if
x+y = a·b. In other words, if a = b = 1, they have to output different bits, and
in all other cases, they have to output identical bits. It is easy to see that the
maximal success probability for strategies using shared classical randomness
is 0.75. However, there is a strategy that uses quantum entanglement and
achieves a success probability of cos(π/8)2 ≈ 0.85.
Let A and B be quantum systems with state spaces HA = HB = C2. We







|φ0〉 = cos(π/8) |0〉+ sin(π/8) |1〉
|φ1〉 = sin(π/8) |0〉 − cos(π/8) |1〉
|ψ0〉 = cos(π/8) |0〉 − sin(π/8) |1〉
|ψ1〉 = sin(π/8) |0〉+ cos(π/8) |1〉
{|+〉 , |−〉}, {|φ0〉 , |φ1〉}, and {|ψ0〉 , |ψ1〉} are orthonormal bases of C2. The
measurements in the standard basis and each of those bases are defined as
follows.
MA0 = {|0〉 〈0| , |1〉 〈1|}
MA1 = {|+〉 〈+| , |−〉 〈−|}
MB0 = {|φ0〉 〈φ0| , |φ1〉 〈φ1|}
MB1 = {|ψ0〉 〈ψ0| , |ψ1〉 〈ψ1|}
The system AB is prepared in state |Φ〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ⊗ |0〉+ |1〉 ⊗ |1〉). Alice
keeps system A and Bob keeps system B. The strategy now works as follows.
The players apply the measurement MAa or MBb , respectively, on their part of
the quantum state. Their outputs are their respective measurement outcomes.
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First, let us consider the case a = 0, b = 0. Alice applies the measurement
MA0 , which results in a uniformly random outcome x ∈ {0, 1} with post-
measurement state |x〉 ⊗ |x〉. Bob applies MB0 . In order to win the game, he
needs to output the same bit as Alice, and thus the winning probability is
‖(IA ⊗ |φx〉 〈φx|)(|x〉 ⊗ |x〉)‖2 = | 〈φx|x〉 |2 = cos(π/8)2 ≈ 0.85
If a = 0, b = 1, the two players again need to output the same bit. Thus, the
probability that Bob produces the correct output is | 〈ψx|x〉 |2 = cos(π/8)2 ≈
0.85. If a = 1, b = 0, Alice outputs a uniformly random x ∈ {0, 1}, and the
post-measurement state is |+〉 ⊗ |+〉 if x = 0 and |−〉 ⊗ |−〉 if x = 1. They
need to output the same bit again, and thus the success probability is






= (cos(π/4) cos(π/8) + sin(π/4) sin(π/8))
2
= cos(π/8)2 ≈ 0.85
Finally, we consider the case a = 1, b = 1. Here, the provers win if they
produce different outputs. The winning probability is






= cos(π/8)2 ≈ 0.85
and thus, for all possible inputs a and b, the players can win with probability
cos(π/8)2 ≈ 0.85, without communicating.
5.2.5 Representing Classical Information and Random-
ness
The formalism from the preceding sections can also be used to capture classical
information. We can represent a single bit as a state of a qubit system, i.e., a
quantum system with state space C2. We write {|0〉 , |1〉} for the standard basis
of C2 and represent the bit b as the state vector |b〉. More generally, we can
represent elements of a finite set S via a bijection mapping each element s to a
standard basis vector |s〉 of C|S|. This representation can also be understood
as an encoding, where decoding is done by measuring the quantum state in
the standard basis. Note that because the quantum state itself is one of the
basis vectors, performing this measurement has a deterministic outcome and
does not alter the state. A distribution p(s) over some set S is then naturally
represented by the density matrix
∑
s∈S p(s) |s〉〈s|. Shared randomness can
be represented as the separable bipartite state
∑
s∈S p(s) |s〉〈s| ⊗ |s〉〈s|.
It is possible to represent all classical computations as unitaries. Let X
be a finite set and Y a finite group, where the group operation is denoted
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by + and the neutral element by 0. Let f : X → Y be some function. Let
Uf : C|X| ⊗ C|Y | → C|X| ⊗ C|Y |, |x〉 ⊗ |y〉 7→ |x〉 ⊗ |y + f(x)〉. It is easy to see
that Uf is unitary because it maps an orthonormal basis to an orthonormal
basis. We can represent the computation of f(x) as follows in the quantum
formalism: Given |x〉, we first append |0〉 ∈ C|Y | and then apply Uf . The
second quantum system now holds the desired result.
5.3 Protocols
In this section, we adapt our formal definitions of interactive protocols from
Section 2.2.1 to the quantum setting. We again consider protocols involving
three parties, the provers P and Q and the verifier V . A protocol protPQV =
(protP , protQ, protV ) consists of a triple of l-round interactive algorithms oper-
ating on a quantum state ρPQV over a Hilbert space HPQV = HP ⊗HQ⊗HV .
The subscripts P , Q and V indicate the player that controls the system. The
players can perform the following actions on their respective parts of the quan-
tum states:
• apply unitaries and perform measurements,
• prepare an additional quantum system in some initial state and add it
to their system,
• discard a part of their quantum state,
• transmit part of their quantum state to another player, making them
part of that player’s state in the next round.
The outcome of this procedure is a quantum state ρ′PQV over a Hilbert space
H′PQV = H′P ⊗ H′Q ⊗ H′V . Note that the state spaces may change due to
players exchanging parts of their states and preparing additional subsystems.
We write
ρ′PQV ← protPQV (ρPQV )
to denote an execution of the protocol on the input state ρPQV . As in the
classical case, we can compose protocols by using the output state of one as
the input for the other. We separate shared entanglement from the input: to
denote shared entanglement between P and Q, we write protPQV [σPQ].
A commitment scheme with domain D consists of two interactive quantum
algorithms: The first, comPQV [σPQ] = (comP , comQ, comV ) takes an input




for P and Q, and V has no input. The output is
some state ρ′PQV . openPQV [σ
′
PQ] then takes the output of comPQV as input
and V produces a (quantum representation of a) single bit as output, indicating
whether the commitment was opened correctly or not. P and Q produce no
output.
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Of particular interest is the security of a classical commitment scheme (i.e.,
one that requires only classical information processing on the part of the honest
players) against dishonest provers with quantum capabilities. In this case, they
can not send quantum information to the honest V . We may model this as V
immediately measuring all quantum states he receives in the standard basis of
their respective state space.
For classical commitment schemes, the definitions of soundness and the
hiding property simply carry over. If the scheme requires the verifier to store
quantum information, the hiding property needs to be adapted: we say that
the scheme is δ-hiding if no measurement that V can perform on his quantum
state allows him to distinguish between any pair of strings s0 and s1 with
probability better than δ.2
5.4 Binding Properties
5.4.1 Definition
As we already mentioned, the weak-binding properties defined in Section 3.2.3
carry over to the quantum setting without change. We define the following
strong binding property for the quantum case, essentially replacing the func-
tion ŝ with a measurement. As usual, the binding property is defined with
respect to some set of possible strategies for the dishonest players, e.g., strate-
gies where they do not communicate.
Definition 5.9. Let S be a commitment scheme. We say that S is ε-binding if
for every dishonest opening strategy comP there exists a measurement Eval =
{Mŝ}ŝ such that for every possible shared quantum states σPQ and every dis-
honest opening strategy openQ we have p(s 6= ŝ ∧ s 6= ⊥) ≤ ε where s is
the output of the verifier after the opening phase and ŝ is the outcome of the




where ρ′PQV is the
state after the execution of comPQV [σPQ]. We say that it is fairly ε-binding if
p(s 6= ŝ ∧ s = s◦) ≤ ε holds for all s◦.
In order to actually perform the measurement Eval, P needs to obtain (a
copy of) V ’s quantum state. This is possible if only P communicates with V
in the commit phase, V sends (a copy of) his initial state to P , and all the
communication with V is classical, so P can simply store copies of all messages
he sends to V . If only Q is active in the opening phase, the measurement can
be performed without affecting the outcome of the protocol execution. These
conditions are all satisfied in the CHSHq scheme.
We do not currently know whether there exists a scheme that satisfies
Definition 5.9. However, we were able to show that CHSHq satisfies the weak-
binding definition as a string-commitment scheme.
2To be more formal, one might use the trace distance here.
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5.4.2 The Finite Field CHSH Game With Restricted In-
puts
We now prove that CHSHq is weak-binding with respect to quantum adver-
saries. Our proof is based on an analysis of the following CHSH-like game: Let
S ⊆ Fq with |S| = N . In the game CHSHqS , the two players Alice and Bob re-
ceive uniformly random inputs a ∈ Fq and b ∈ S and, without communicating,
produce outputs x and y in Fq. They win if x+ y = a · b.








We use the following lemma:
Lemma 5.11. Let {Πi}i∈I be a collection of projectors on a Hilbert space H
and let |φ〉 be a unit vector in H. For i, j ∈ I, let εi,j = ‖ΠiΠj |φ〉‖. Then,
‖
∑







i Πi |φ〉 ‖ ≤ 1, the conclusion obviously holds, so we assume that
‖
∑


























































Proof of Theorem 5.10. A quantum strategy for Alice and Bob is (without loss
of generality) described by a bipartite quantum state |φ〉 ∈ S(HA ⊗ HB), a
projective measurement {P ax }x∈Fq on HA for every a ∈ Fq, and a projective
measurement {Qby}y∈Fq for every b ∈ S. The output distribution of Alice and
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Bob on inputs a and b is p(x, y|a, b) = 〈φ| (P ax ⊗Qby) |φ〉. Let win be the event















x ⊗ Qba·b−x. Note that Πa,b is a projector since it is the
sum of a set of mutually orthogonal projectors. In order to bound p(win|b),
we consider an extended version of the game where Bob receives two distinct
inputs b and b′ and produces two outputs y and y′. Here, the players win if
x+ y = a · b and x+ y′ = a · b′. We write win for the former event and win′ for
the latter. It is easy to see that if b 6= b′, then no matter what strategy the
players use, p(win,win′|b, b′) = 1/q: If both winning conditions are satisfied,
then y − y′ = a · (b − b′), so a = (y − y′) · (b − b′)−1. Since Bob does not
know a, this holds with probability 1/q. One strategy for the extended game
is that Bob first applies the measurement {Qby}y∈Fq and then the measurement
{Qb′y′}y′∈Fq on the post-measurement state. Thus,
1
q
































































= 1. It follows that
∑
a ‖Πa,b′Πa,b |φ〉‖ ≤√
q.
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5.4.3 Binding Property of the Commitment Scheme
Theorem 5.12. The CHSHq scheme is ε-fairly-weak-binding for ε = 2/ 4√q.
Proof. Fix a commit strategy comPQ against the scheme. Enumerate the
elements of Fq as s1, . . . , sq, and for every i ∈ {1, . . . , q} let openiPQ be an
opening strategy maximizing pi := p(s = si), where s is the output of the
verifier when P and Q use this strategy. We assume without loss of generality
that the pis are in descending order. We define p(ŝ) as follows. Let N ≥ 2 be
an integer which we will fix later. By Theorem 5.10, it holds that
N∑
i=1




where we let pi = 0 for i > q in case N > q. To see that this inequality holds,
consider the game CHSHqS with S = {s1, . . . , sN}. We let Alice produce her
output x using the strategy comPQ and we let Bob use the strategy openiPQ
on input si. Given that the input is si, this strategy succeeds with probability
pi. From our bound on the quantum value of this game, our bound on the
sum of probabilities follows.
We would like to define p(ŝ) as p(ŝ = si) := pi − (N − 1)/
√
q for all
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negative. To deal with this, let N ′ be the largest integer such that N ′ ≤ N
and p1, . . . , pN ′ ≥ (N −1)/
√



















for some ε ≤ 1/√q. We now set p(ŝ) to be p(ŝ = si) := pi−(N−1)ε ≥ 0 for all
i ≤ N ′. Now consider an opening strategy openPQ and let p(s) be the resulting
output distribution. By definition of the pi, it follows that p(s = si) ≤ pi for
all i ≤ q, and pi ≤ p(ŝ = si) + (N − 1)/
√
q for all i ≤ N ′. It follows that
there is a joint distribution p(ŝ, s) with p(ŝ = s = si) = min{p(s = si), p(ŝ =
si)} ≥ p(s = si) − (N − 1)/
√
q for all i ≤ N ′, and thus p(ŝ 6= s = si) =
p(s = si) − p(ŝ = s = si) ≤ (N − 1)/
√
q for all i ≤ N ′. Furthermore, when
N ′ < i ≤ N , we have p(ŝ 6= s = si) = p(s = si) ≤ pi < (N − 1)/
√
q by
definition of N ′. Since the pi are sorted in descending order, it follows that
for all i > N












and thus, we have shown for all s◦ ∈ Fq that








We now select N so that this value is minimized: it is easy to verify that the
function f : R>0 → R>0, x 7→ 1/x + (x − 1)/
√
q has its global minimum in
4
√
q; thus, we pick N := d 4√qe, which gives us






















for any s◦ ∈ Fq, as claimed.
5.5 The Composition Theorem
5.5.1 The Composition Operation
Besides considering adversaries with quantum capabilities, this composition
theorem also differs from the previous one in that it composes a weak-binding
and binding scheme to produce a weak-binding scheme. The structure of the
proof is somewhat different as well: In the proof of the classical composition
theorem, we composed a “small” S (in the sense that only one prover com-
municates with the verifier in the commit phase and only the other in the
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opening phase) with a “big” S ′. In the proof of our composition theorem for
the quantum case, we instead compose a “big” S with a small S ′. This requires
a slightly different definition of eligible pairs (S,S ′) where some properties of
S and S ′ are reversed:
Definition 5.13. Let S and S ′ be two 2-prover string-commitment schemes
with domains D and D′, respectively. We call the pair (S,S ′) eligible if they
are both classical (i.e., no quantum communication or computation is required
on the part of the honest verifier and provers) and the following two properties
hold, or they hold with the roles of P and Q exchanged.
1. The commit phase of S is a protocol comPQV that involves communi-
cation between P and V only. The commit phase of S ′ is a protocol
com′PQV that involves communication between Q and V only and the
opening phase is a protocol open′PQV involving communication between
P and V only.
2. The last round of openPQV is of the following simple form: Q sends some
y ∈ D′ to V who computes the output deterministically as s = Extr(y, c̄)
where c̄ consists of all communication in the previous rounds (including
the commit phase). We call this message y the final opening information.
Furthermore, we specify that the possible attacks on S are so that P and Q
do not communicate during the course of the commit phase, but there may be
some limited communication during the opening phase. The possible attacks
on S ′ are so that P and Q do not communicate during the course of the entire
execution of the scheme.
The composition operation S ? S ′ is defined in the same way as in the
classical setting: instead of sending the opening information y in the last round,
the provers instead use S ′ to commit to y and then open the commitment. We
define the possible attacks (comPQ, open′′PQ) on S?S ′ to be those where comPQ
is a commit strategy for S and open′′PQ can be decomposed as open′PQ◦com′PQ◦
ptoq ◦ open∗PQ where ptoq allows P to send a quantum state to Q, open∗PQ is
an opening strategy for S excluding the last round. For any input state ρPQ,
com′PQ(ρPQ) is a commit strategy and open
′
PQ is an opening strategy for S ′.
5.5.2 The Composition Theorem
In the following composition theorem, we take it as understood that the as-
sumed respective binding properties of S and S ′ hold with respect to a well-
defined respective classes of possible attacks.
Theorem 5.14. Let (S,S ′) be an eligible pair of 2-prover commitment schemes,
and assume that S is ε-fairly-weak-binding and that S ′ is δ-fairly-binding.
Then, their composition S ′′ = S ? S ′ is a (ε + k(S) · δ)-fairly-weak-binding
2-prover commitment scheme.
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Proof. We first consider the case where k(S) = 1. We fix an arbitrary possible
strategy (comP , open′′PQ) against S ′′, where open′′PQ is of the form open′′PQ =
open′PQ ◦ com′PQ ◦ ptoq ◦ open∗PQ. We decompose and reassemble the strategy
into strategies against S and S ′. The strategy for S ′ uses a shared quantum
state ρPQ of appropriate size and works by executing com′PQ(ρPQ) and then
open′PQ. By the δ-fairly-binding property of S ′, there exists a measurement
Eval = {Mŷ}ŷ depending only on com′PQ which Q can apply after com such
that p(y 6= ŷ ∧ y = y◦) ≤ δ for every y◦, where y is the output of openPQV .
This holds for every possible shared quantum state ρPQ, and in particular
for the ones generated as follows: Let σPQV be the quantum state after an
execution of comPQV and open∗PQV . This execution involves sending classical
messages c̄ between the provers and the verifier. Thus, we may write σPQV =∑
c̄ p(c̄)σ
c̄
PQV . Writing p(y, ŷ|c̄) for the distribution of the output and the
measurement outcome when using the shared quantum state ρPQ = σc̄PQ, it
holds that p(y 6= ŷ ∧ y = y◦|c̄) ≤ δ.
Note that comP is a commit strategy for S. As such, by the weak-binding
property of S, there exists a distribution p(ŝ), only depending on comP , so that
Definition 3.9 is satisfied for every opening strategy openQ for S. In particular,
this holds for the following opening strategy:
1. The provers execute open∗PQ.
2. Q simulates an execution of com′Q and performs the measurement Eval
with result ŷ.
3. Q sends ŷ to V .
By the ε-fairly-weak binding property of S, there is a consistent joint distribu-
tion p(s, ŝ) such that for every s◦, p(s̃ 6= ŝ ∧ s̃ = s◦) ≤ ε where s̃ = Extr(ŷ, c̄).
Let y◦(c̄) be such that Extr(y◦, c̄) = s◦ (or some default value if no such y◦
exists). Since we assume that k(S) = 1, there is only one possible value for
y◦(c̄). Recalling that s = Extr(y, c̄), it holds that
p(ŝ 6= s ∧ s = s◦) = p(ŝ 6= s ∧ s = s◦ ∧ s = s̃) + p(ŝ 6= s ∧ s = s◦ ∧ s 6= s̃)
≤ p(ŝ 6= s̃ ∧ s̃ = s◦) + p(Extr(y, c̄) 6= Extr(ŷ, c̄) ∧ Extr(y, c̄) = s◦)
≤ p(ŝ 6= s̃ ∧ s̃ = s◦) +
∑
c̄
p(c̄)p(y 6= ŷ ∧ y = y◦(c̄)|c̄)
≤ ε+ δ
and in the case that k(S) > 1, it is easy to see that we can upper-bound this
probability with ε+ k(S)δ.
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In this chapter, we shift our focus to the no-communication assumption. Specif-
ically, we consider if (1-round) two-prover bit-commitment schemes can be se-
cure based on the sole assumption that the provers cannot communicate. In
the previous chapters, we imposed some limit on the resources that the provers
could use to correlate their behaviour. In Chapters 3 and 4, we assumed that
the provers can only use classical shared randomness and in Chapter 5, we
considered provers that can use an entangled quantum state to correlate their
actions. But even for single-round schemes, the assumptions on the provers’
resources can make a difference for the security of the scheme. The CHSHq
scheme is binding for classical provers, and also against quantum provers, al-
beit with a weaker parameter. However, in [CSST11], it is shown that there
exists a bit-commitment scheme that is binding in the classical setting, but not
in the quantum setting. The scheme in question is essentially an error-tolerant
version of CHSH2
n
: instead of requiring that x + y = a · b, we require that
when we parse x+ y and a · b as bit-strings, 85% of the positions are equal.
This condition means that for 85% of indices i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the CHSH
winning condition xi ⊕ yi = ai · b has to be satisfied. In other words, the
provers can open to an arbitrary bit if, in a series of CHSH games, they can
win 85% of the time. Since there is a strategy that wins a CHSH game with
probability ≈ 85% using quantum entanglement (see Section 5.2.4), there is a
high probability that dishonest provers in the quantum setting can open to any
bit they want. Furthermore, as discussed in Section 1.4.4, CHSHq is insecure
against arbitrary non-signalling provers.
Thus, it is natural to ask if there is a commitment scheme whose binding
73
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property require only the assumption that the provers can not transmit any
information to one another, i.e., that it is truly based on the non-signaling
assumption only.
We answer this question in the negative. If a commitment scheme is per-
fectly hiding, then it is possible for non-signaling adversaries to perfectly emu-
late the behavior of the honest provers, thus breaking the binding property. If
it is close to perfectly hiding, they can act in a way that is hard to distinguish
from the behavior of honest provers, and thus, cheating provers can succeed
with near-certainty.
We also show a positive result: there exists a three-prover bit commitment
scheme that is perfectly hiding and binding with a strong parameter. We
prove this result by describing a three-prover commitment scheme with these
properties: The first two provers execute the CHSHq protocol with the verifier.
The third prover has to send the same output as the second one to the verifier.
6.2 Bipartite Systems and Two-Prover Commit-
ments
6.2.1 One-Round Bipartite Systems
Informally, a bipartite system consists of two subsystem, which we refer to as
the left and the right subsystem. Upon input a to the left and input a′ to
the right subsystem, the left subsystem outputs x and the right subsystem
outputs x′ (see Fig. 6.1, left). Formally, the behavior of such a system is
given by a conditional distribution q(x, x′|a, a′), with the interpretation that
given input (a, a′), the system outputs a specific pair (x, x′) with probability
q(x, x′|a, a′). Note that we leave the sets A,A′,X and X ′, from which a, a′, x
and x′ are respectively sampled, implicit.
If we do not put any restriction upon the system, then any conditional dis-
tribution q(x, x′|a, a′) is eligible, i.e., describes a bipartite system. However,
we are interested in systems where the two subsystems cannot communicate
with each other. How exactly this requirement restricts q(x, x′|a, a′) depends
on the available “resources”. For instance, if the two subsystems are determin-
istic, i.e., compute x and x′ as deterministic functions of a and a′ respectively,
then this restricts q(x, x′|a, a′) to be of the form q(x, x′|a, a′) = δ(x|a) ·δ(x′|a′)
for conditional Dirac distributions δ(x|a) and δ(x′|a′). If in addition to al-
lowing them to compute deterministic functions, we give the two subsystem
shared randomness, then q(x, x′|a, a′) may be of the form
q(x, x′|a, a′) =
∑
r
p(r) · δ(x|a, r) · δ(x′|a′, r)
for a distribution p(r) and conditional Dirac distributions δ(x|a, r) and δ(x′|a′, r).
Such a system is called classical or local. Interestingly, this is not the end of
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the story. By the laws of quantum mechanics, if the two subsystems share an
entangled quantum state and obtain x and x′ without communication as the
result of local measurements that may depend on a and a′, respectively, then
this gives rise to conditional distributions q(x, x′|a, a′) of the form
q(x, x′|a, a′) =
〈
ψ
∣∣(Eax ⊗ F a′x′ )∣∣ψ〉 ,
where |ψ〉 is a quantum state and {Eax}x and {F a
′
x′ }x′ are so-called POVMs.1
This is typically referred to as a violation of Bell inequalities [Bel64], and is
nicely captured by the notion of non-local games. A famous example is the
so-called CHSH-game [CHSH69], which is closely connected to the example
two-prover commitment scheme from the introduction, and which shows that
the variant considered in [CSST11] is insecure against quantum attacks.
The largest possible class of bipartite systems that is compatible with the
requirement that the two subsystem do not communicate, but otherwise does
not assume anything on the available resources and/or the underlying physical
theory, are the so-called non-signaling systems, defined as follows.
Remark 6.1. By convention, we write p(x|a, b) = p(x|a) to express that
p(x|a, b) does not depend on b, i.e., that p(x|a, b1) = p(x|a, b2) for all b1 and
b2, and as such p(x|a) is well defined and equals p(x|a, b).
Definition 6.2. A conditional distribution q(x, x′|a, a′) is called a non-signaling
(one-round) bipartite system if it satisfies
q(x|a, a′) = q(x|a) (NS)
as well as with the roles of the primed and unprimed variables exchanged, i.e.,
q(x′|a, a′) = q(x′|a′) (NS′)
We emphasize that this is the minimal necessary condition for the require-
ment that the two subsystems do not communicate. Indeed, if e.g. q(x|a, a′1) 6=
q(x|a, a′2), i.e., if the input-output behavior of the left subsystem depends on
the input to the right subsystem, then the system can be used to communicate
by giving input a′1 or a′2 to the right subsystem, and observing the input-output
behavior of the left subsystem. Thus, in such a system, communication does
take place.
The non-signaling requirement for a bipartite system is—conceptually and
formally—equivalent to requiring that the two subsystems can (in principle)
be queried in any order. Conceptually, it holds because the left subsystem
should be able to deliver its outputs before the right subsystem has received
any input if and only if the output does not depend on the right subsystem’s
input (which means that no information is communicated from right to left),
1A POVM is essentially a measurement where only the measurement outcome is recorded
and the post-measurement state is ignored.
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and similarly the other way round. And, formally, we see that the non-signaling
requirement from Definition 6.2 is equivalent to asking that q(x, x′|a, a′) can
be written as
q(x, x′|a, a′) = q(x|a) ·q(x′|x, a, a′) and q(x, x′|a, a′) = q(x′|a′) ·q(x|x′, a, a′)
for some respective conditional distributions q(x|a) and q(x′|a′). This char-
acterization is a convenient way to “test” whether a given bipartite system is
non-signaling.
Clearly, all classical systems are non-signaling. Also, any quantum system
is non-signaling.2 But there are non-signaling systems that are not quantum
(and thus in particular not classical). The typical example is the NL-box (non-
local box; also known as PR-box) [PR94], which, upon input bits a and a′
outputs random output bits x and x′ subject to
x⊕ x′ = a · a′ .
This system is indeed non-signaling, as it can be queried in any order: submit
a to the left subsystem to obtain a uniformly random x, and then submit a′
to the right subsystem to obtain x′ := x⊕ a · b, and correspondingly the other
way round.
6.2.2 Two-Round Systems
We now consider bipartite systems as discussed above, but where one can
interact with the two subsystems multiple times. We restrict to two rounds:
after having input a to the left subsystem and obtained x as output, one can
now input b into the left subsystem and obtain output y, and similarly with
the right subsystem (see Fig. 6.1, right). In such a two-round setting, the
non-signaling condition needs to be paired with causality, which captures that
the output of the first round does not depend on the input that will be given
in the second round.
Definition 6.3. A conditional distribution q(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′, b, b′) is called a
non-signaling two-round bipartite system if it satisfies the following two causal-
ity constraints
q(x, x′|a, a′, b, b′) = q(x, x′|a, a′) (C1)
and q(x′|x, y, a, a′, b, b′) = q(x′|x, y, a, a′, b) (C2)
and the following two non-signaling constraints
q(x, y|a, a′, b, b′) = q(x, y|a, b) (NS1)
and q(y|x, x′, a, a′, b, b′) = q(y|x, x′, a, a′, b) (NS2)
2Indeed, the two parts of an entangled quantum state can be measured in any order, and
the outcome of the first measurement does not depend on how the other part is going to be
measured.
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Figure 6.1: A one-round (left) and two-round (right) bipartite system.
as well as with the roles of the primed and unprimed variables exchanged.
(C1) captures causality of the overall system, i.e., when considering the
left and the right system as one “big” multi-round system. (C2) captures that
no matter what interaction there is with the left system, the right system still
satisfies causality. Similarly, (NS1) captures that the left and the right system
are non-signaling over both rounds, and (NS2) captures that no matter what
interaction there was in the first round, the left and the right system remain
non-signaling in the second round.
It is rather clear that these are necessary conditions; we argue that they are
sufficient to capture a non-signaling two-round system in the following section.
6.2.3 Capturing the Non-Signaling Property
To see that Definition 6.3 is not only necessary but also sufficient to capture the
non-signaling constraint, consider a two-round bipartite system that conforms
to Definition 6.3. We show that the two subsystems can be queried in any
order without altering the output distribution, as long as the order of rounds
for each subsystem individually is respected. Thus, it is impossible to obtain
information about the right side of the system by observing only the behaviour
on the left side (and vice versa), which shows that Definition 6.3 is indeed
sufficient. First, we point out the following.
Remark 6.4. (C1) and (NS1) together imply that q(x|a, b) and q(x|a, a′) are
well-defined and satisfy
q(x|a, b) = q(x|a) (C3) and q(x|a, a′) = q(x|a) (NS3) .
This follows from Lemma 6.5 below.
Lemma 6.5. Any conditional distribution q(x|a, b, c, d) such that q(x|a, b, c, d) =
q(x|a, b) and q(x|a, b, c, d) = q(x|a, c), must also satisfy q(x|a, b, c, d) = q(x|a).
Proof. Recall that, by convention, q(x|a, b, c, d) = q(x|a, b) means q(x|a, b, c, d) =
q(x|a, b, c′, d′) for all x, a, b, c, c′, d, d′, and similarly for q(x|a, b, c, d) = q(x|a, c).
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As such, for arbitrary x, a, b, b′, c, c′, d, d′ it holds that
q(x|a, b, c, d) = q(x|a, b, c′, d′) = q(x|a, b′, c′, d′)
and thus q(x|a, b, c, d) = q(x|a).
If q(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′, b, b′) is a non-signaling two-round bipartite system, it
can be written as
q(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′, b, b′) = q(x, y|a, b) · q(x′, y′|x, y, a, a′, b, b′)
= q(x|a) · q(y|x, a, b) · q(x′|x, y, a, a′, b) · q(y′|x, y, a, a′, b, b′)
where the first equality uses (NS1), and the second uses (C3) and (C2), and
as
q(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′, b, b′)
= q(x, x′|a, a′) · q(y, y′|x, x′, a, a′, b, b′)
= q(x|a) · q(x′|x, a, a′) · q(y|x, x′, a, a′, b) · q(y′|x, x′, y, a, a′, b, b′)
where the first equality uses (C1), and the second uses (NS3) and (NS2), and
the second equality can also be replaced by
= q(x|a) · q(x′|x, a, a′) · q(y′|x, x′, a, a′, b′) · q(y|x, x′, y, a, a′, b, b′) .
And, similarly, with the roles of the primed and unprimed variables exchanged.
This shows that the two subsystems can be queried in any order. For instance,
one can first query the left subsystem to get x on input a, distributed according
to q(x|a), and then y on input b, distributed according to q(y|x, a, b), and then
then one can query the right subsystem twice to get x′ and y′, distributed ac-
cording to q(x′|x, y, a, a′, b) and q(y′|x, y, a, a′, b, b′), respectively.3 Or, one can
first query the left subsystem once to obtain x, then query the right subsystem
to obtain x′ etc. It is straightforward to verify that all six eligible orderings
are possible.
6.2.4 Two-Prover Commitments
In this section, we consider commitment schemes with a one-round commit and
opening phase not as interactive algorithms but as abstract bipartite systems.
That is, we redefine them as follows:
Definition 6.6. A single-round two-prover bit-commitment scheme S consists
of a probability distribution p(a, a′), conditional distributions p0(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′)
3Note that in order to sample, say, x′ according to q(x′|x, y, a, a′, b), it seems like that the
right subsystem needs to know a, x etc., i.e., that communication is necessary, contradicting
the non-signaling requirement. However, this reasoning merely shows that in general, such
a non-signaling system is not classical.
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and p1(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′), and a function Extr(c, y, y′) with range {0, 1,⊥}, where
c is the commitment, i.e., c = (a, a′, x, x′).4
We say that S is classical/quantum/non-signaling if pb(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′) for
b = 0, 1 are both classical/quantum/non-signaling when parsed as bipartite
one-round systems pb((x, y), (x′, y′)|a, a′). By default, any two-prover commit-
ment scheme S is assumed to be non-signaling.
Formulating it a bit more algorithmically, V samples messages a and a′
for the two provers according to the distribution p(a, a′). In order to commit
and open to a bit b, the honest provers input a and a′ into a bipartite system
described by the distribution pb(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′). This system then produces
the respective messages x and x′ that P and Q send in the commit phase,
and the messages y and y′ that they send in the opening phase. The verifier
V computes the function Extr(c, y, y′) to determine to which bit the provers
opened, or if they failed to open to any bit.
In this formalism, the completeness property can be restated as follows:
Definition 6.7. A commitment scheme S is γ-complete if pb(Extr(c, y, y′) 6=
b) ≤ γ for all b ∈ {0, 1},
Writing p(xb, x′b, yb, y
′
b|a, a′) for pb(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′), we can restate the def-
inition of the hiding property as follows:




0|a, a′), p(x1, x′1|a, a′)
)
≤ δ for all
a, a′. If S is 0-hiding, we also say it is perfectly hiding.
The definition for the binding property that we use here is essentially the
sum-binding definition (Definition 2.14), restated in the form of the following
game between the (honest) verifier V and the adversarial provers P , Q.
1. The commit phase is executed: V samples a and a′ according to p(a, a′),
and sends a to P and a′ to Q, upon which P and Q send x and x′ back
to V , respectively.
2. V sends a bit b ∈ {0, 1} to P and Q.
3. P and Q try to open the commitment to b: they prepare y and y′ and
send them to V .
4. The provers win if b = Extr(c, y, y′).
We emphasize that even though in the actual binding game above, the
same bit b is given to the two provers, we require that the response of the
provers is well determined by their strategy even in the case that they receive
different bits. Of course, if the provers are allowed to communicate, they are
4Recall that we assume without loss of generality that the commitment is the entire
communication during the commit phase.
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able to detect when they receive different bits b and b′ and could reply with,
e.g., y = y′ = ⊥ in that case. However, if we restrict to non-signaling provers,
we assume that it is physically impossible for them to communicate with each
other and distinguish the case of b = b′ from b 6= b′.
A non-signaling strategy for dishonest provers is described by a non-signaling
bipartite system q(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′, b, b′) as specified in Definition 6.3. Together
with the distribution p(a, a′) and the bit b sent by the verifier, this system
defines the distributions
qb(x, x
′, y, y′) =
∑
a,a′
p(a, a′)q(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′, b, b)
for b ∈ {0, 1}. Writing winb for the event that b = Extr(c, y, y′), the binding
property requires a bound on the sum q0(win0) + q1(win1).
Definition 6.9. A two-prover commitment scheme S is ε-binding (against
non-signaling attacks) if it holds for any non-signaling two-round bipartite
system q(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′, b, b′) that q0(win0) + q1(win1) ≤ ε.
In other words, a scheme is ε-binding if in the above game the dishon-
est provers win with probability at most 1/2 + ε when b ∈ {0, 1} is selected
uniformly at random.
If a commitment scheme is binding (for a small ε) in the sense of Defini-
tion 6.9, then for any strategy q for P and Q, they can just as well honestly
commit to a bit b̂, where b̂ is set to 0 with probability p0 = q0(win0) and to
1 with probability p1 = 1 − p0 ≈ q1(win1), and they will have essentially the
same respective success probabilities in opening the commitment to b = 0 and
to b = 1.
6.3 Impossibility of Two-Prover Commitments
In this section, we show impossibility of secure single-round two-prover com-
mitments against arbitrary non-signaling attacks. We start with the analysis
of a restricted class of schemes which are easier to understand and for which
we obtained stronger results.
6.3.1 Simple Schemes
We first consider a special, yet natural, class of schemes. We call a two-prover
commitment scheme S simple if it has the same communication pattern as the
scheme described in the introduction. More formally, it is called simple if a′, x′
and y are “empty” (or fixed), i.e., if S is given by p(a), p0(x, y′|a), p(x, y′|a)
and Extr(c, y′) with c = (a, x); to simplify notation, we then write y instead
of y′. In other words, P is only involved in the commit phase, where, in order
to commit to bit b, he outputs x upon input a, and Q is only involved in the
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opening phase, where he outputs y. The non-signaling requirement for S then
simplifies to pb(y|a) = pb(y).
In case of such a simple two-prover commitment scheme S, a non-signaling
two-prover strategy reduces to a non-signaling one-round bipartite system as





Figure 6.2: The adversaries’ strategy p(x, y|a, b) in case of a simple commit-
ment scheme.
As a warm-up exercise, we first consider a simple two-prover commitment
scheme that is perfectly hiding and 0-complete. Recall that the perfect hiding
property means that p0(x|a) = p1(x|a) for any a. To show that such a scheme
cannot be binding, we have to show that there exists a non-signaling one-round
bipartite system q(x, y|a, b) such that q0(win0)+q1(win1) is significantly larger
than 1. But this is actually trivial: we can simply set q(x, y|a, b) := pb(x, y|a).
It then holds trivially that qb(x, y) = pb(x, y), so the dishonest provers are
as successful in opening the commitment as the honest provers in opening an
honestly prepared commitment. Thus, the binding property is broken as badly
as it can get. The only thing that needs to be verified is that q(x, y|a, b) is
actually non-signaling, i.e., that q(x|a, b) = q(x|a) and q(y|a, b) = q(y|b).
To see that the latter holds, note that q(y|a, b) = pb(y|a), and because
S is non-signaling we have that pb(y|a) = pb(y), i.e., does not depend on a.
Thus, the same holds for q(y|a, b) and we have q(y|a, b) = q(y|b). The former
condition follows from the (perfect) hiding property: q(x|a, b) = pb(x|a) =
pb′(x|a) = q(x|a, b′) for arbitrary b, b′ ∈ {0, 1}, and thus q(x|a, b) = q(x|a).
Below, we show how to extend this result to non-perfectly-binding simple
schemes. In this case, we cannot simply set q(x, y|a, b) := pb(x, y|a), because
such a q would not be non-signaling anymore— it would merely be “almost non-
signaling”. Instead, we have to find a strategy q(x, y|a, b) that is (perfectly)
non-signaling and close to pb(x, y|a); we will find such a strategy with the help
of Lemma 2.4. In Section 6.3.2, we will then consider general schemes where
both provers interact with the verifier in both phases. In this general case,
further complications arise.
Theorem 6.10. Consider a simple two-prover commitment scheme S that is
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δ-hiding. Then, there exists a non-signaling strategy q(x, y|a, b) such that
q0(win0) = p0(win0) and q1(win1) > p1(win1)− δ .
If S is 0-complete, it follows that
q0(win0) + q1(win1) > 1 + (1− δ)
and thus it cannot be ε-binding for ε ≤ (1− δ)/2.
Proof. Recall that S is given by p(a), pb(x, y|a) and Extr(c, y), and we write






for any fixed a. Using Lemma 2.4 for every a, we can glue together p(x0, y0|a)
and p(x1, y1|a) along x0 and x1 to obtain a distribution p(x0, x1, y0, y1|a) such
that p(x0 6= x1|a) ≤ δ, and in particular d
(
p(x0, y1|a), p(x1, y1|a)
)
≤ δ.
We define a strategy q for the dishonest provers by setting q(x, y|a, b) :=
p(x0, yb|a) (see Fig. 6.3). First, we show that q is non-signaling. Indeed,
we have q(x|a, b) = p(x0|a) for any b, so q(x|a, b) = q(x|a), and we have
q(y|a, b) = p(yb|a) = p(yb) for any a, and thus q(y|a, b) = q(y|b).
As for the winning probability, for b = 0 we have q(x, y|a, 0) = p(x0, y0|a)
and as such q0(winb) equals p0(winb). For b = 1, we have
d
(




p(x0, y1|a), p(x1, y1|a)
)
≤ δ
and since the statistical distance does not increase under data processing, it










Figure 6.3: Defining the strategy q by gluing together p(x0, y0|a) and
p(x1, y1|a).
The bound on the binding property in Theorem 6.10 is tight, as the fol-
lowing theorem shows.
Theorem 6.11. For all δ ∈ Q such that 0 < δ ≤ 1 there exists a classical
simple two-prover commitment scheme that is perfectly sound, δ-hiding and
(1− δ)/2-binding against non-signaling adversaries.
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Proof. We construct a scheme where the first prover reveals the bit b right at
the beginning with probability δ. For simplicity, we first assume that δ = 1/n
for some integer n ≥ 1 and then indicate how to extend the proof to arbitrary
rational numbers.
The scheme works as follows. Let [n] = {0, . . . , n − 1}. The shared ran-
domness of the provers is r ∈ [n] selected uniformly at random. The verifier
selects a ∈ [n] uniformly at random and sends it to prover P . If a = r then P
reveals x := b to the verifier. Otherwise, he sends back x := ⊥. In the opening
phase, Q sends r to the verifier. The verifier accepts if and only if P revealed
b or the output y of Q satisfies y ∈ [n] and y 6= a.
It is clear that this scheme is sound and δ-hiding. Now consider dishonest
provers that follow some non-signaling strategy q(x, y|a, b). This then defines
qb(a, x, y) = p(a) · q(x, y|a, b) with p(a) = 1/n, and it holds that qb(winb) =














qb(y) = 1− δ .
Therefore, using that q(x|a, b) = q(x|a) and hence q0(x) = q1(x), we calculate
q0(win0) + q1(win1) = q0(x=0) + q0(x=⊥, y 6= a) + q1(x=1) + q1(x=⊥, y 6= a)
≤ q0(x=0) + q1(x=1) + q0(x=⊥) + q1(y 6=a)
= 1 + (1− δ) .
We now adapt this argument to δ = m/n, where m and n are integers such
that 0 < m ≤ n. For every a ∈ [n], we define a subset Sa of [n] as
Sa = {a+ i mod n | i ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}}.
We adapt our scheme by replacing the condition r = a with r ∈ Sa. Clearly, the
scheme is still sound. Since every Sa has exactly m elements, the scheme is δ-
hiding: the probability that the first prover reveals b is m/n = δ; otherwise, he
does not give any information about b. The proof that the scheme is (1−δ)/2-
binding goes through as before if we can show that q(y 6∈ Sa|a, b) = 1 − δ for
any non-signaling strategy q. Indeed, for every y ∈ [n], there are exactly m
values for a such that y ∈ Sa. Since a ∈ [n] is selected randomly and q(y|a, b)
is independent of a, we have q(y 6∈ Sa|a, b) = 1−m/n = 1− δ.
6.3.2 Arbitrary Schemes
We now remove the restriction on the scheme to be simple. As before, we first
consider the case of a perfectly hiding scheme.
Theorem 6.12. Let S be a single-round two-prover commitment scheme. If
S is perfectly hiding, then there exists a non-signaling two-prover strategy
q(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′, b, b′) such that qb(winb) = pb(winb) for b ∈ {0, 1}.
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Proof. S being perfectly hiding means that d(p(x0, x′0|a, a′), p(x1, x′1|a, a′)) = 0





1|a, a′) along (x0, x′0) and (x1, x′1) for every (a, a′), we obtain a
distribution p(x0, x′0, x1, x′1, y0, y′0, y1, y′1|a, a′) with the correct marginals and
p((x0, x
′
0) 6= (x1, x′1)|a, a′) = 0. That is, we have x0 = x1 and x′0 = x′1 with
certainty. We now define a strategy for dishonest provers as (Figure 6.4)
q(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′, b, b′) := p(x0, x′0, yb, y′b′ |a, a′) .
Since p(x0, x′0, yb, y′b|a, a′) = p(xb, x′b, yb, y′b|a, a′), it holds that qb(winb) =
pb(winb). It remains to show that this distribution satisfies the non-signaling
and causality constraints (C1) up to (NS2) of Definition 6.3. This is done
below.
• For (C1), note that summing up over y and y′ yields q(x, x′|a, a′, b, b′) =
p(x0, x
′
0|a, a′), which indeed does not depend on b and b′.
• For (NS1), note that q(x, y|a, a′, b, b′) = p(x0, yb|a, a′) = p(xb, yb|a, a′) =
p(xb, yb|a), where the last equality holds by the non-signaling property
of p(xb, yb|a, a′).
• For (C2), first note that
q(x, x′, y|a, a′, b, b′) = p(x0, x′0, yb|a, a′) (6.1)
which does not depend on b′. We then see that (C2) holds by dividing
by q(x, y|a, a′, b, b′) = p(x0, yb|a, a′).
• For (NS2), divide Equation (6.1) by q(x, x′|a, a′, b, b′) = p(x0, x′0|a, a′)
The properties (C1) to (NS2) with the roles of the primed and unprimed





























1|a, a′) glued together.
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The case of non-perfectly hiding schemes is more involved. At first glance,
one might expect that by proceeding analogously to the proof of Theorem 6.12
– that is, gluing together p(x0, x′0, y0, y′0|a, a′) and p(x1, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′) along
(x0, x
′
0) and (x1, x′1) and defining q the same way – one can obtain a strategy
q that succeeds with probability 1−δ if the scheme is δ-hiding. Unfortunately,
this approach fails because in order to show (NS1) we use that p(x0, y1|a, a′) =
p(x1, y1|a, a′) which in general does not hold for commitment schemes that are
not perfectly hiding. As a consequence, our proof is more involved, and we
have a constant-factor loss in the parameter.
Theorem 6.13. Let S be a single-round two-prover commitment scheme and
suppose that it is δ-hiding. Then there exists a non-signaling two-prover strat-
egy q(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′, b, b′) such that
q0(win0) = p0(win0) and q1(win1) ≥ p1(win1)− 5δ .
Thus, if S is perfectly sound, it is at best (1− 5δ)/2-binding.
To prove this result, we use two technical lemmas. In the first one, we
add the additional assumptions that p(x0|a, a′) = p(x1|a, a′) and p(x′0|a, a′) =
p(x′1|a, a′). The second one shows that we can tweak an arbitrary scheme in
such a way that these additional conditions hold. We give the proofs after
Theorem 6.13.
Lemma 6.14. Let S be a δ-hiding two-prover commitment scheme with the
additional property that p(x0|a, a′) = p(x1|a, a′) and p(x′0|a, a′) = p(x′1|a, a′).







1|a, a′), p(x1, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′)
)
≤ δ
and p′(x1, x′1|a, a′) = p(x0, x′0|a, a′).
As usual, the non-signaling requirement on p′(x1, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′) is to be
understood as p′(x1, y1|a, a′) = p′(x1, y1|a) and p′(x′1, y′1|a, a′) = p′(x′1, y′1|a′).
Lemma 6.15. Let S be a δ-hiding two-prover commitment scheme. Then,







1|a, a′), p(x1, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′)
)
≤ 2δ
which has the property that p̃(x1|a, a′) = p(x0|a, a′) and p̃(x′1|a, a′) = p(x′0|a, a′).
With these two lemmas, Theorem 6.13 is easy to prove.
Theorem 6.13. We start with a δ-hiding non-signaling bit-commitment scheme





1|a, a′) and satisfies p̃(x1|a, a′) = p(x0|a, a′) and p̃(x′1|a, a′) =
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Thus, replacing p(x1, x′1, y1, y1|a, a′) by p̃(x1, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′) gives us a 3δ-
hiding two-prover commitment scheme that satisfies the extra assumption in
Lemma 6.14. As a result, we obtain a distribution p′(x1, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′) that
is 3δ-close to p̃(x1, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′), and thus 5δ-close to p(x1, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′),





1|a, a′) by p′(x1, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′) gives us a perfectly-hiding two-
prover commitment scheme, to which we can apply Theorem 6.12. As a conse-
quence, there exists a non-signaling strategy q(x, x′, y, y′|a, a′) with q0(win0) =
p0(win0) and q1(win1) ≥ p1(win1)− 5δ, as claimed.
Remark 6.16. If S already satisfies p(x0|a, a′) = p(x1|a, a′) and p(x′0|a, a′) =
p(x′1|a, a′), we can apply Lemma 6.14 right away and thus get a strategy q with
q0(win0) = p0(win0) and q1(win1) = p1(win1) − δ. Thus, with this additional
condition, we still obtain a tight bound as in Theorem 6.10.
We now prove the two lemmas:
Proof of Lemma 6.14. For arbitrary a and a′, we glue together the distribu-
tions p(x0, x′0, y0, y′0|a, a′) and p(x1, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′) to obtain a joint distribu-





0) 6= (x1, x′1)|a, a′
)
≤ ε ,
and thus d(p(x0, x′0, y1, y′1|a, a′), p(x1, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′)) ≤ ε. Let Λ be the event
that both x0 = x1 and x′0 = x′1. We define p′(x1, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′) as follows,





1|a, a′) := p(Λ, x0, x′0|a, a′) · p(y1, y′1|Λ, x1, x′1, a, a′)
+ p(Λ, x0, x
′
0|a, a′) · r(y1|x0, a, a′) · r(y′1|x′0, a, a′)





+ p(Λ, x0, x
′
0|a, a′) · r(y1|x0, a, a′) · r(y′1|x′0, a, a′)
where r(y1|x0, a, a′) and r(y′1|x′0, a, a′) are to be defined later, and the last
equality holds by definition of Λ.5
The claim about the closeness to p(x1, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′) follows from the fact
that p(Λ|a, a′) ≤ ε. Furthermore, we have p′(x1, x′1|a, a′) = p(Λ, x0, x′0|a, a′) +
p(Λ, x0, x
′
0|a, a′) = p(x0, x′0|a, a′) as claimed.
It remains to show that we can achieve p′ to be non-signaling. For that,
we simply define r(y1|x0, a, a′), and similarly r(y′1|x′0, a, a′), in such a way
5Algorithmically, the distribution p′ should be understood as follows. First, x0, x′0, x1
and x′1 are sampled according to the glued-together distribution p. Then, if the event Λ
occurred (i.e. x0 = x1 and x′0 = x
′
1), y1 and y
′
1 are sampled according to the corresponding
conditional distribution; otherwise, they are chosen independently according to distributions
that depend only on x0 and x′0, respectively.
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that p′(x1, y1|a, a′) = p(x1, y1|a, a′); this does the job since p(x1, y1|a, a′) =
p(x1, y1|a), and as such p′(x1, y1|a, a′) = p′(x1, y1|a). Note that
p′(x1, y1|a, a′) = p(Λ, x1, y1|a, a′) + p(Λ, x0|a, a′) · r(y1|x0, a, a′) . (6.2)
Thus, we set
r(y1|x0, a, a′) :=
p(x1, y1|a, a′)− p(Λ, x1, y1|a, a′)
p(Λ, x0|a, a′)
=
p(Λ, x1, y1|a, a′)
p(Λ, x0|a, a′)
It remains to show that r(y1|x0, a, a′) as defined is indeed a probability distri-
bution, and that things work out also in case p(Λ, x0|a, a′) = 0.
In the latter case, we have p′(x1, y1|a, a′) = p(Λ, x1, y1|a, a′), indepen-
dent of the choice of r; thus, it remains to show that p(Λ, x1, y1|a, a′) =
p(x1, y1|a, a′). For that, we observe that p(Λ, x1|a, a′) = p(Λ, x0|a, a′) =
p(x0|a, a′) = p(x1|a, a′), where the first equality is due to the definition of
Λ and the last holds by our additional assumption on Com. It follows that∑
y1




and since p(Λ, x1, y1|a, a′) ≤ p(x1, y1|a, a′), it holds that p(Λ, x1, y1|a, a′) =
p(x1, y1|a, a′) as required.
Finally, to show that r(y1|x0, a, a′) is a probability distribution, we observe
that r(y1|x0, a, a′) ≥ 0, and, summing over y1 and using that p(x0|a, a′) =
p(x1|a, a′), we see that∑
y1
r(y1|x0, a, a′) =
p(x1|a, a′)− p(Λ, x1|a, a′)
p(Λ, x0|a, a′)
=






In the same way, it is possible to choose r(y′1|x′0, a, a′) so that p′(x′1, y′1|a, a′) =
p(x′1, y
′
1|a, a′) = p(x′1, y′1|a′), using the assumption that p(x′0|a, a′) = p(x′1|a, a′).
This concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 6.15. We begin by adjusting the distribution of x1. By the
hiding property of Com, p(x0, x′0|a, a′) and p(x1, x′1|a, a′) are ε-close, and thus
in particular d(p(x0|a, a′), p(x1|a, a′)) ≤ ε. Gluing together the distributions










1|a, a′) := p(x0, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′)
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1|a, a′), p(x1, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′)
)
≤ ε and also p′(x1|a, a′) =
p(x0|a, a′).
We show that p′ is non-signaling. Since p′(x′1, y′1|a, a′) = p(x′1, y′1|a, a′)
and p is non-signaling, it follows that p′(x′1, y′1|a, a′) = p′(x′1, y′1|a′). Showing
that p′(x1, y1|a, a′) = p′(x1, y1|a) is equivalent to showing that p(x0, y1|a, a′) =
p(x0, y1|a). By the observation in Remark 2.6, the marginal p(x0, x1, y1|a, a′)
is obtained by gluing together p(x0|a, a′) and p(x1, y1|a, a′) along x0 and x1.
Since Com is non-signaling, we have p(x0|a, a′) = p(x0|a) and p(x1, y1|a, a′) =
p(x1, y1|a). It follows that p(x0, x1, y1|a, a′) = p(x0, x1, y1|a), and therefore
that p(x0, y1|a, a′) = p(x0, y1|a).
In order to obtain p̃ as claimed, we repeat the above process. Note that
the modification from p to p′ did not change the distribution of x′1, y′1, i.e.,
p′(x′1, y
′
1|a, a′) = p(x′1, y′1|a, a′), and in particular d
(





p(x′0|a, a′), p(x′1|a, a′)
)
≤ ε. Therefore, exactly as above, we can now adjust
the distribution of x′1 in p′ and obtain a non-signaling p̃(x1, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′) that
is ε-close to p′(x1, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′) and thus 2ε-close to p(x1, x′1, y1, y′1|a, a′),
and which satisfies p̃(x′1|a, a′) = p(x′0|a, a′) and p̃(x1|a, a′) = p′(x1|a, a′) =
p(x0|a, a′), as claimed.
6.3.3 Multi-Round Schemes
We briefly discuss a limited extension of our impossibility results for single-
round schemes to schemes where during the commit phase, there is multi-round
interaction between the verifier V and the two provers P and Q. We still
assume the opening phase to be one-round; this is without loss of generality in
case of classical two-prover commitment schemes (where the honest provers are
restricted to be classical). In this setting, we have the following impossibility
result, which is restricted to perfectly-hiding schemes.
Theorem 6.17. Let S be a multi-round two-prover commitment scheme. If
S is perfectly hiding, then there exists a non-signaling two-prover strategy that
completely breaks the binding property, in the sense of Theorem 6.12.
A formal proof of this statement requires a definition of n-round non-
signaling bipartite systems for arbitrary n. Such a definition can be based
on the intuition that it must be possible to query the left and right subsystem
in any order. With this definition, the proof is a straightforward extension
of the proof of Theorem 6.12: the non-signaling strategy is obtained by glu-
ing together p(x0,x′0|a,a′) and p(x1,x′1|a,a′) along (x0,x′0) and (x1,x′1), and
setting q(x,x′, y, y′|a,a′, b, b′) := p(x0,x′0, yb, y′b′ |a,a′), where we use bold-face
notation for the vectors that collect the messages sent during the multi-round
commit phase: a collects all the messages sent by the verifier to the prover P ,
etc.
As far as we see, the proof of the non-perfect case, i.e. Theorem 6.13,
does not generalize immediately to the multi-round case. As such, proving
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the impossibility of non-perfectly-hiding multi-round two-prover commitment
schemes remains an open problem.
6.4 Possibility of Three-Prover Commitments
It turns out that we can overcome the impossibility results by adding a third
prover. We will describe a scheme that is perfectly sound, perfectly hiding
and 2−n-binding with communication complexity O(n). We now define what
it means for three provers to be non-signaling; since our scheme is similar to
a simple scheme, we can simplify this somewhat. We consider distributions
q(x, y, z|a, b, c) where a and x are input and output of the first prover P , b
and y are input and output of the second prover Q and c and z are input and
output of the third prover R.
Definition 6.18. A conditional distribution q(x, y, z|a, b, c) is called a non-
signaling (one-round) tripartite system if it satisfies
q(x|a, b, c) = q(x|a) , q(y|a, b, c) = q(y|b) , q(z|a, b, c) = q(z|c) ,
q(x, y|a, b, c) = q(x, y|a, b) , q(x, z|a, b, c) = q(x, z|a, c)
and q(y, z|a, b, c) = q(y, z|b, c) .
In other words, for any way of viewing q as a bipartite system by dividing
in- and outputs consistently into two groups, we get a non-signaling bipartite
system. Actually, by means of Lemma 6.5, it is not hard to see that the first
three requirements follow by the (union of the) latter three.
We restrict to simple schemes, where during the commit phase, only P is
active, sending x upon receiving a from the verifier, and during the opening
phase, only Q and R are active, sending y and z to the verifier, respectively.
Definition 6.19. A simple three-prover commitment scheme S consists of
a probability distribution p(a), two distributions p0(x, y, z|a) and p1(x, y, z|a),
and a function Extr(c, y, z) with range {0, 1,⊥} where c = (a, x).
It is called classical/quantum/non-signaling if pb(x, y, z|a) is, when understood
as a tripartite system pb(x, y, z|a, ∅, ∅) with two “empty” inputs.
Soundness and the hiding-property are defined in the obvious way. As for
the binding property, for a simple three-prover commitment scheme S and a
non-signaling strategy q(x, y, z|a, b, c), let qb(a, x, y, z) := p(a)q(x, y, z|a, b, b).
Like before, we define winb as the event b = Extr(c, y, z). We say that S is
ε-binding if
q0(win0) + q1(win1) ≤ 1 + ε.
Theorem 6.20. For every prime power q, there exists a classical simple three-
prover commitment scheme that is perfectly sound, perfectly hiding and q−1/2-
binding. The verifier communicates dlog qe bits to the first prover and receives
the same number of bits from each prover.
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The scheme that achieves this is essentially the CHSHq scheme, except
that we add a third prover that imitates the actions of the second. To be
more precise: The provers P , Q and R have as shared randomness a uniformly
random rFq. The verifier V chooses a uniformly random a ∈ Fq and sends it
to P . As commitment, P returns x := r + a · b. To open the commitment to
b, Q and R send y := r and z := r to V . The output of Extr((a, x), y, z) is
defined as follows: if y = z, it is the smallest b such that x− y = a · b, and if
y 6= z, or no such b exists, it is ⊥.
Before beginning with the formal proof that this scheme has the properties
stated in our theorem, we give some intuition. Let a and x be the input and
output of the dishonest first prover, P . To succeed, the second prover Q has
to produce output x+ a · b where b is the second prover’s input and the third
prover R has to produce x + a · c where c is the third prover’s input. Our
theorem implies that a strategy which always produces these outputs must be
signaling. Why is that the case?
In the game that defines the binding-property, we always have b = c,
but the dishonest provers must obey the non-signaling constraint even in the
“impossible” case that b 6= c. Let us consider the difference between Q’s
output and R’s output in the case that b 6= c: we get (x+ a · b)− (x+ a · c) =
a · b−a · c = ±a. But in the non-signaling setting, the joint distribution of Q’s
and R’s output may not depend on a. Thus, the strategy we suggested does
not satisfy the non-signaling constraint. Let us now prove the theorem.
Theorem 6.20. It is easy to see that the scheme is q−1-complete, like CHSHq.
For every fixed a and b, pb(x|a) is uniform, so the scheme is perfectly hiding.
Now consider a non-signaling strategy q for dishonest provers. The provers
succeed if and only if y = z = a · b − x. Define q(a, x, y, z|b, c) = p(a) ·
q(x, y, z|a, b, c). The non-signaling property implies that
q(y = a · b− x|a, b, c = 0) = q(y = x⊕ a · b|a, b, c = 1) and (6.3)
q(z = a · c− x|a, b = 0, c) = q(z = x⊕ a · c|a, b = 1, c) . (6.4)
It follows that
q0(win0) + q1(win1)
= q(y = a · b− x, z = a · c− x|b = 0, c = 0)
+ q(y = a · b− x, z = a · c− x|b = 1, c = 1)
≤ q(y = a · b− x|b = 0, c = 0) + q(z = a · c− x|b = 1, c = 1)
= q(y = a · b− x|b = 0, c = 1) + q(z = a · c− x|b = 0, c = 1)
by Equations (6.3) and (6.4)
≤ 1 + q(y = a · b− x, z = a · c− x|b = 0, c = 1) by Equation (2.2)
It now remains to upper-bound q(y = a · b−x, z = a · c−x|b = 0, c = 1). Since
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p(a) is uniform and q(y, z|a, b, c) is independent of a, we have
q(y = a · b− x, z = a · c− x|b = 0, c = 1) ≤ q(y ⊕ z = a|b = 0, c = 1) = 1
q
and thus our scheme is q−1/2-binding.
This result is reminiscent of a result by Masanes, Acin and Gisin [MAG06]
where they show that if a non-signaling distribution p(x, y|a, b) with b ∈ {0, 1}
is 2-shareable, then it is also local, i.e., it can be sampled using classical shared
randomness.6 Being 2-shareable means that there is a non-signaling distribu-
tion p(x, y1, y2|a, b1, b2) such that p(x, y|a, b) = p(x, y1|a, b) = p(x, y2|a, b) for
all b ∈ {0, 1}.
This relates to our commitment scheme as follows: Suppose that the dis-
honest provers’ strategy q(x, y, z|a, b, c) is such that q(y = z|b = c) = 1. It
follows that q(x, y|a, b = x) = q(x, z|a, c = x) for x = 0, 1. Thus, the distribu-
tion q(x, y|a, b) is 2-shareable and hence local. Hence, the dishonest provers
can not succeed with a better probability than classical provers.
Remark 6.21. The three-prover scheme above has the drawback that two
provers are involved in the opening phase; as such, there needs to be agree-
ment on whether to open the commitment or not; if there is disagreement then
this may be problematic in certain applications. However, P and Q are not
allowed to communicate. One possible solution is to have V forward an au-
thenticated “open” or “not open” message from P to Q and R. This allows for
some communication from P to Q and R, but if the size of the authentication
tag is small enough compared to the security parameter of the scheme, i.e., n,
then security is still ensured.
6More generally, they show that if b ∈ {0, . . . ,m−1} and p(x, y|a, b) is m-shareable, then
p(x, y|a, b) is local.
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Summary
This dissertation makes different contributions to the theory of multi-prover
commitment schemes; in particular relativistic commitment schemes. A com-
mitment scheme is an important cryptographic primitive crucial for crypto-
graphic protocols that allow two or more parties that do not fully trust each
other to cooperate in a secure way. More concretely, we consider multi-prover
commitment schemes whose security relies on an assumed restriction on the
communication between the provers, and not on computational hardness as-
sumptions.
A commitment scheme is a means to solve the following problem: Alice has
selected a message which she wants to keep secret at the moment, but which
she may want to reveal to Bob at a later time. However, if she simply sends
the message to Bob later, he has no guarantee that the message he received
is the same one that Alice selected earlier. A commitment scheme ensures the
secrecy of the message until Alice chooses to reveal it, but also prevents Alice
from revealing a different message than the one she selected originally.
Formally, a commitment scheme consists of a pair of interactive protocols
between (usually) two parties called the prover and the verifier. The first
protocol is called the commit phase; it takes a message from the prover as
input and no input from the verifier. The second protocol, called the opening
phase, then outputs either a message or the failure symbol ⊥ to the verifier. If
the output is a message m, we say that the prover opened the commitment to
m; if the output is ⊥, we say that the prover failed to open the commitment.
Often, the opening phase just consists in the prover sending some opening
information to the verifier who then computes the output locally.
To be secure, a commitment scheme needs to have the following three
properties: It should be complete, meaning that the input to the commit
phase and the output of the opening phase are equal if both parties follow
the protocols. It should be hiding, meaning that the verifier cannot learn
the prover’s input message before the opening phase is executed, even if the
verifier is dishonest and deviates from the protocols. Finally, it should be
binding, meaning that after the commit phase, there is at most one message
that the prover can successfully open to, even if the prover is dishonest and
deviates from the protocols. The set of possible messages that a commitment
99
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scheme can take as input is called its domain. If the domain is the set {0, 1},
we speak of a bit-commitment scheme.
The standard notion of commitment schemes can offer security only if the
dishonest prover or the dishonest verifier is computationally bounded, i.e. lim-
ited in the amount of computation he can perform. However, this is only true
for commitment schemes with a single prover. Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Kilian and
Wigderson showed in 1988 how to overcome this limitation by considering a
variant of the notion of commitment schemes where the prover is split into two
(or more) separate entities and it is assumed that they cannot communicate
during the execution of the commitment scheme. Related to this approach is
the notion of relativistic commitment schemes, introduced by Kent in 1999,
where this non-communication assumption is temporarily enforced through
spatial separation of the provers.
The first main contribution of this dissertation is a set of new definitions
of the binding property for multi-prover commitment schemes. These new
definitions have several advantages over the sum-binding definition which has
been used so far: They are not restricted to bit-commitment schemes but
are applicable to commitment schemes with arbitrary finite domains. When
restricted to bits, some of our definitions are strictly stronger than the sum-
binding definition. Finally, our definitions are closer to the intuitive notion of
a commitment scheme being binding and are more convenient to work with.
We introduce these new definitions and study how they relate to each other.
As a testing ground for our new definitions, we consider the bit-commitment
scheme CHSHq, introduced by Crépeau, Salvail, Simard and Tapp, which can
be extended in a natural way to a commitment scheme with domain Fq (where
q is a prime power). We analyze it with respect to this larger domain for the
first time and show that different variations of the scheme satisfy our different
definitions of the binding property.
Our new definitions enable us to prove a rather general composition theorem
for two-prover commitment schemes, which is the second main contribution of
this dissertation. We compose two commitment schemes by having the provers
commit to the opening information of the first scheme instead of sending it
to the verifier, and then they open this second commitment, revealing the
opening information of the first scheme so that the original commitment is
opened. Under some mild assumptions about the two original schemes, we
prove that the composed scheme is binding if the two original schemes are
binding (with the cheating probabilities adding up).
The purpose of this composition is to delay the opening of the commitment.
This is important in the context of relativistic commitment schemes where the
no-communication assumption is only enforced temporarily and so the binding
property holds only for a limited time.
Very concretely, our composition theorem allows us to give a tight analy-
sis of the relativistic commitment scheme introduced by Lunghi, Kaniewski,
Brussières, Houlman, Tomamichel and Wehner in 2015. Their original anal-
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ysis showed an upper bound on the cheating probability of dishonest provers
that was doubly-exponential in the number of communication rounds where
the latter determines for how long the scheme remains binding. The scheme
can be understood as an iterated composition of CHSHq with itself and so we
can analyze its security using our composition theorem, achieving a significant
improvement over the original analysis by Lunghi et al.: it follows that the
cheating probability for dishonest provers can be bounded by a term that is
only linear in the number of rounds, rather than double-exponential. We also
show the optimality of our bound up to a small constant factor.
To put this difference into more concrete terms: Lunghi et al. implemented
their scheme with provers in Bern and Geneva (distance: 129.2 km). Their
analysis guaranteed that the commitment would stay binding (with a reason-
ably low cheating probability) for about 2 ms. Based on our analysis, this
time scales up to 1056 years, or, speaking more practically, until the devices
run out of memory.
The third main contribution is an impossibility result about two-prover
commitment schemes with general non-signaling adversaries. As Crépeau,
Salvail, Simard and Tapp pointed out, the assumption that the provers can-
not communicate needs further specification. Some two-prover commitment
schemes are secure against classical non-communicating provers but insecure if
they have quantum capabilities and can use entangled quantum states shared
among them. Furthermore, if we want to truly base security on the sole as-
sumption that the provers cannot communicate, we need to consider general
non-signaling provers, i.e., provers whose behavior may be correlated in ar-
bitrary ways as long as no communication between them is implied. The
CHSHq scheme is secure against provers with quantum entanglement, but in-
secure against general non-signaling provers. This raises the question whether
any other commitment schemes are secure against such general non-signaling
provers.
We show that for two-prover commitment schemes the answer is no: any
commitment scheme that is complete and hiding is by necessity not binding
against general non-signaling provers. On the other hand, we show a positive
answer for three-prover commitment schemes: we prove that a simple extension
of CHSHq to three provers is complete, hiding against an arbitrary dishonest
verifier and binding against general non-signaling provers.
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Samenvatting
Deze dissertatie draagt bij aan de theorie van multi-prover commitment sche-
mes, in het bijzonder relativistische commitment schemes. Een commitment
scheme is een cruciale bouwsteen voor cryptografische protocollen welke meer-
dere partijen die elkaar niet vertrouwen in staat stellen om op een veilige
manier samen te werken. Meer specifiek beschouwen wij multi-prover com-
mitment schemes waarvan de veiligheid gebaseerd is op veronderstelde beper-
kingen op de communicatie tussen de provers, en niet op aannamen over de
computationele complexiteit van wiskundige problemen.
Een commitment scheme is een middel om het volgende probleem op te
lossen: Alice heeft een bericht geschreven die zij eerst geheim wil houden,
maar die zij mogelijk later aan Bob wil onthullen. Echter, als zij het bericht
eenvoudigweg op een latere tijd aan Bob zou sturen, weet Bob niet zeker of het
bericht dat hij ontving gelijk is aan het bericht dat zij eerder heeft geschreven.
Een commitment scheme zorgt ervoor dat het bericht geheim blijft totdat
Alice het wil onthullen, maar ook dat Alice geen ander bericht aan Bob kan
onthullen.
Een commitment scheme is formeel gedefinieerd als een tweetal interactieve
protocollen tussen (meestal) twee partijen, genoemd de prover en de verifier.
Het eerste protocol, genoemd de commit fase, neemt een bericht van de prover
als input en geen input van de verifier. Het tweede protocol, genoemd de
opening fase, geeft dan een bericht uit aan de verifier, of ⊥ om aan te geven
dat de prover er niet in geslaagd is om het commitment te openen. Als de
output een bericht m is, zegt men dat de prover het commitment naar m
geopend had. Vaak stuurt de prover in de opening fase alleen zogenoemde
opening information aan de verifier die dan lokaal de output berekent.
Om veilig te zijn moet een commitment scheme de volgende eigenschappen
hebben: het moet compleet zijn, d.w.z. dat de input van de commit fase gelijk
is aan de output van de opening fase als beide partijen de protocollen volgen.
Het moet verbergend zijn, d.w.z. dat de verifier de input van de prover niet
voor de opening fase kan uitvinden, ook als de verifier oneerlijk is en van de
protocollen afwijkt. Het moet bindend zijn, d.w.z. dat de prover na de commit
fase maar naar één bericht kan openen, ook als de prover oneerlijk is en van de
protocollen afwijkt. De verzameling van mogelijke inputs van een commitment
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scheme wordt zijn domein genoemd. Als het domein de verzameling {0, 1} is,
spreken we van een bit-commitment scheme.
Een standaard commitment scheme kan alleen veilig zijn als tenminste
één van de partijen beperkte rekenkracht heeft. Dit is echter alleen waar als
er maar één prover is. Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Kilian en Wigderson bewezen in
1988 dat deze beperking omzeild kan worden door een variant van commitment
schemes waar de prover opgesplitst wordt in twee (of meer) aparte entiteiten
die per aanname gedurende de uitvoering van het commitment scheme niet
kunnen communiceren. Gerelateerd aan dit idee is het idee van relativistische
commitment schemes, dat in 1999 door Kent werd voorgesteld: door de provers
ver van elkaar te plaatsen is het mogelijk om tijdelijk aan de aanname te
voldoen dat de provers niet kunnen communiceren.
De eerste hoofdbijdrage van deze dissertatie zijn nieuwe definities voor het
bindend-zijn van een multi-prover commitment scheme. Deze nieuwe definities
hebben meerdere voordelen boven de tot nu gebruikte sum-binding definitie:
ze zijn niet beperkt tot bit-commitment schemes, maar van toepassing voor
commitment schemes met arbitraire eindige domeinen. Voor bit-commitment
schemes zijn sommige van onze definities strikt sterker dan de sum-binding de-
finitie. Verder blijven onze definities dichter bij de intuïtie en zijn makkelijker
te gebruiken. Wij stellen deze definities voor en bestuderen de relaties tussen
hen.
Om onze definities te testen gebruiken wij het CHSHq bit-commitment
scheme – geïntroduceerd door Crépeau, Salvail, Simard en Tapp – die op een
natuurlijke manier uitgebreid kan worden naar een commitment scheme met
domein Fq (waar q een macht van een priemgetal is). Wij analyseren het voor
het eerst als een commitment scheme voor dit grotere domein en bewijzen dat
verschillende varianten van het commitment scheme aan verschillende definities
voldoen.
Onze nieuwe definities stellen ons in staat om een vrij algemene compositie-
stelling voor two-prover commitment schemes te bewijzen, de tweede hoofd-
bijdrage van deze dissertatie. Wij voegen twee commitment schemes samen
door de provers aan de opening information van het eerste scheme te laten
committen met het tweede scheme, en dan dit tweede commitment te ope-
nen. Dit onthult de opening information en het eerste commitment wordt dus
geopend. Wij bewijzen dat het samengestelde scheme bindend is als de twee
originele schemes bindend zijn en aan enkele lichte verdere eisen voldoen. (De
succeskans voor oneerlijke provers in het samengestelde commitment scheme
is de som van hun succeskansen in de twee originele schemes.)
Het doel van deze compositie is het openen van het commitment te vertra-
gen. Dit is belangrijk in de context van relativistische commitment schemes,
waar de aanname dat de provers niet kunnen communiceren alleen tijdelijk
geldig is.
Concreet maakt onze compositie-stelling een betere analyse mogelijk van
het relativistische commitment scheme dat door Lunghi, Kaniewski, Brussiè-
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res, Houlman, Tomamichel en Wehner in 2015 werd voorgesteld. Hun originele
analyse bewees een bovengrens aan de succeskans van oneerlijke provers die
dubbel exponentieel was in het aantal communicatie-ronden, dat bepaalt hoe
lang het commitment scheme bindend zal blijven. Het scheme kan beschouwd
worden als een iteratieve compositie van CHSHq met zichzelf, en dus kunnen
wij het met behulp van onze compositie-stelling analyseren. Op deze ma-
nier bereiken wij een enorme verbetering van het resultaat van Lunghi et al.:
wij bewijzen dat de succeskans van oneerlijke provers lineair is in het aantal
communicatie-ronden, en niet dubbel exponentieel. We bewijzen ook dat ons
resultaat optimaal is, op een klein constante factor na.
Meer concreet: Lunghi et al. hebben hun commitment scheme met provers
in Bern en Genève (afstand: 192.2 km) geïmplementeerd. Volgens hun analyse
bleef het scheme bindend (met een redelijk lage succeskans voor oneerlijke
provers) voor 2 ms. Onze analyse bewijst dat een duur van 1056 jaar met
dezelfde grens aan de succeskans mogelijk is – of, meer praktisch, totdat de
geheugens van de apparaten vol zijn.
De derde hoofdbijdrage is een bewijs dat er geen two-prover commitment
schemes bestaan die veilig zijn tegen algemene non-signaling provers. Zoals
bewezen door Crépeau, Salvail, Simard en Tapp moet de niet-communicatie
premisse verder worden uitgewerkt. Sommige commitment schemes zijn veilig
tegen klassieke oneerlijke provers, maar onveilig tegen provers die een verstren-
gelde kwantumtoestand delen. Wil men nog verder gaan en de veiligheid van
een commitment scheme echt alleen bouwen op de aanname dat de provers niet
kunnen communiceren, moet men algemene non-signaling provers beschouwen.
Dit betekent dat het gedrag van de provers op welke manier dan ook gecorre-
leerd kan zijn, zolang het geen communicatie tussen hen impliceert. CHSHq
is veilig tegen provers met kwantumverstrengeling, maar niet tegen algemene
non-signaling provers. Dit werpt de vraag op of een ander commitment scheme
wel veilig tegen zulke provers is.
Wij bewijzen dat dit voor two-prover commitment schemes niet het geval
is: een commitment scheme dat compleet en verbergend is kan niet bindend
zijn voor algemene non-signaling provers. Anderzijds hebben wij ook een po-
sitief resultaat: wij bewijzen dat een eenvoudige uitbreiding van CHSHq naar
een three-prover commitment scheme compleet, verbergend voor een arbitraire
oneerlijke verifier, en bindend voor algemene non-signaling provers is.
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